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ABSTRACT 
Linear versus Ecological Perspective 
in Clinical Judgments of Social Work Students 
Ezra Teitelbaum 
This study explores the dialectic between the older, linear-
mechanistic approach of the clinical-normative-individual-system 
model, and the newer, ecological-systems approach of the life 
model. Theoretical issues are outlined as they have unfolded 
during several decades. 
The principal independent variable is clinical-orientation of 
clinician-subjects with regard to degree of adher~nce to linear-
mechanistic and/or ecological-systems approaches. Secondary 
independent variables are duration-severity and interpersonal-
context of client problem/situations, described in four situational 
vignettes. Hypotheses predict positive correlations between 
measures of each independent variable, and degree of linear 
versus ecological weighting to clinicians' assessments and 
intervention plans for each vignette. 
Data were collected in 1980 from 152 second-year graduate 
students in casework and direct practice, who represented an 
initial pool of 1,007 stUdents from fourteen CSWE-approved schools 
which provided unrestricted cooperation, through lists of eligible 
students . 
Three instruments were utilized: (a) An informational 
questionnaire inquired about students' willingness to participate, 
and characteristics which would enable the researcher to determine 
eligibility, and identify extraneous effects. (b) The second sought 
graded measures of subjects' adherence to specific theoretical 
principles of linear or ecological approaches. (c) The final 
instrument sought repeated measures of type of assessment and 
intervention plan (linear or ecological>, formulated in response to 
systematically varied vignette conditions. 
Findings include several positive correlations between self-
rated clinical-orientation and assessment measures, and fewer 
positive correlations between clinical-orientation and intervention 
measures. The interpersonally isolated client whose probleml 
situation is chronic tends to pull judgments in the direction of 
linear-mechanistically weighted assessments and intervention plans, 
regardless of clinician's orientation. 
Implications for teaching the ecological approach are 
explored. Use of the clinical-orientation instrument for student 
self-observation is suggested. 
Research implications include refining of instrumentation, and 
comparison of seasoned and student clinicians, to test empirical 
applicability of the ecological approach. 
.. -- .-... _.-... -. ---
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clinician-subjects with regard to degree of adherence to linear-
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Prior to the presentation of this research study, major 
concepts of the current dialectic between the new and the old in 
contemporary social work practice, will be traced and brought 
together through a historical-theoretical literature review. The 
review is divided into material which appeared Ca) before the 
period 1978, 1979 and 1980, which are the respective years in 
which the design for our research was fully proposed, finalized, 
and carried out; and Cb) from 1978 to the present. The intent of 
the review is not to be comprehensive, but to be focused on both 
C a) the salient historical and theoretical backdrop in which the 
dialectic developed; and Cb) the relevant conceptual elements of 
~oth the old and the new alternatives which serve as the bases 
for our instrument development. 
Two major contextual considerations of the research are 
noted. First, it was done at a moment in which the full 
technology of the life model was about to emerge but had not yet 
made its impact. Second, subjects were second year graduate 
social work student interns, whose practice experience and 
understanding were clearly in the process of development. 
The literature in the two decades prior to the late 1970's 
1 
had seen efforts to apply systems theory to social work practice. 
Applied systems theory, drawn from the physical sciences and 
adapted to the biological sciences, deals with man as a social and 
2 
biological organism of systematically and purposefully organized 
complexity. An ecological approach, conceived in the interaction 
of biological organisms with one another and with their physical 
environment, refers to all aspects of man I s environment, including 
his physical environment within a systemic framework. The life 
model attempts to structure practice over time within the framework 
of this organized complexity, rather than removed from it. A 
systems theory framework provides a set of principles for 
understanding man. The life model presents an approach to 
practice within that framework. Central is the emphasis on health 
and growth over disease and pathogenesis. 
A linear-mechanistic framework explains man from a 
chronological, cause-effect viewpoint. The tendency is to isolate 
one partial cause-effect chain at a time, to analyze it apart from 
its broader internal and social contexts. The focus is on the 
individual, who is to some degree disabled by a problem. The 
source of the problem must be understood, so that it may be 
corrected or "cured" within that person. Origins of this vantage 
point may be traced to casework I s early incorporation of a 
nineteenth century "scientific" attitude that all matter and 
phenomena, both living and non-living, could be understood by 
reduction to basic laws of physical science. 
The applicability of the "clinical-normative-individual-
system" model to social variables would seem to be limited by its 
origin in principles of intrapsychic and psychosocial determinism 
and linear causality. For practitioners and researchers who wish 
3 
to account for phenomena of organized complexity (in which linear, 
historically traceable, individually-oriented problems are not 
central> this approach appears to be less useful (Lutz, 1968>' 
The "unit of attention" describes the cognitive field within 
which a practitioner defines and conceptualizes the people, their 
environment and the problems presented. It provides the 
viewpoints for understanding and the options for intervention. We 
will trace the historical-theoretical development of the unit of 
attention, first in the linear-mechanistic world-view, as it 
expanded its capacity to "scientifically" incorporate the 
complexities of being human in the twentieth century. We will 
then look at the development of the ecological-systems approach in 
social work practice as an alternative world-view to helping 
people in need. 
The originating idea, at the time this study was conceived, 
was to contrast the understanding and application of the newer 
systems approach of the then-developing life model against the 
linear-mechanistic approach of the "clinical-normative-individual-
system" model. This research represents an early, limited effort 
to test and compare, in operational terms, some conceptual 
elements of the old and the new approaches to practice. 
Systems theory and the ecological approach may be seen as 
complementary and combinable into an ecological-systems approach. 
This approach, in turn, may be seen as providing the social-
scientific perspective for the life model. 
4 
This research has attempted to advance knowledge in social 
work in three ways. First, it has explored whether or not among 
a large group of second year social work student intern 
clinicians, there are stated differences in clinical orientation 
<linear-mechanistic versus ecological-systems). Second, the study 
has explored whether or not in simulated practice situations.. there 
are differences in proposed assessment and intervention plans 
between interns who tend to adhere to principles of a linear-
mechanistic approach and those who tend to adhere to principles of 
an ecological-systems approach. Third, the study has sought to 
understand what might contribute to such differences. 
The originating idea was to test the newer ecological systems 
approach to practice as an "alternate recommendation,,1 to the 
older linear-mechanistic approach. More pointedly, we have 
sought to determine if there are discernable differences in the 
following specifying questions: (a) What do social work student 
interns actually say they believe about their practice in relation 
to linear-mechanistic and ecological-systems principles? (b) What 
is the relationship between what social work student clinicians say 
they believe about their practice perspectives, and the kinds of 
assessments and intervention plans they say they would de."ooelop 
and and utilize in specific simulated practice situations? 
This study tests for differences which emerge from the second 
specifying question through the development and use of two main 
instruments. The first instrument attempts to measure differences 
in what social work student clinicians say they believe about their 
5 
practice orientations. The second attempts to measure differences 
I 
in assessments and intervention plans in specific simulated 
practice situatic.ns for social work student clinicians who indicate 
that they adhere to principles of the two practice perspectives 
under study. 
To address the second specifying question, an attempt was 
made to test for differences in what social work student clinicians 
do in markedly different simulated practice situations. Two main 
variables which affect such differences were chosen, based on 
wha t, theoretically and pragmatically, would be expected both to 
affect clinical .judgment, and to draw upon the preferences and 
biases which would be linked to the two clinical orientations in 
question. One variable, interpersonal-context of problem/ 
situation, refers to whether a client's problem/situ a tion is 
reflective of either an interpersonally involved life context or a 
socially/ interpersonally isolated life context. The second 
variable, duration-severity of problem/situation, refers to whether 
a client's problem/situation is of an acute, more recent or reactive 
nature, as opposed to a chronic, more longstanding, lifelong 
I 
nature. I n linear-mechanistic terms, these differences refer to 
opposite extremes of psychopathology. 
The two variables, interpersonal-context and duration-
severity, together point to a narrower issue from the second 
specifying question: Are there differences in what social work 
student clinicians do in specific simulated practice situations in 
the development of case assessments and intervention plans when 
-- -- -------
the problem/situation varies according to interpersonal-context 
and/or duration-severity? 
Two broad sets of concepts were drawn from the literature. 
6 
These provided basic theoretical backgrpund for development of the 
two main instruments which were utilized in this study. 
The first set was a comparative grouping of principles which 
may be said to distinguish theoretically between the two 
alternative orientations to the understanding of problem/situations 
of people. These principles appear in Figure 1, Chapter I V . 
They serve as the basis of the study's first instrument which 
distinguishes self-perceived theoretical-orientations of clinicians. 
Examples include a clinician's prediliction to think a bout the work 
in terms of linear causality as opposed to equifinality; or to focus 
on regressive as opposed to progressive forces in efforts to 
understand people. 
The second set of concepts is represented by a number of 
specific, comparative sets of operationalized criteria which were 
developed to distinguish whether a clinician's actual assessments 
and intervention plans reflect linear-mechanistic or ecological-
systems type responses (or mixtures of both). These criteria are 
presented later in Chapter IV, in Figures 2 and 3. They are 
incorporated into the construction of the instrument which 
operationally tests our hypotheses. There are five such criteria 
for assessment and nine of these for intervention plans. Examples 
include distinctions between a clinician's focus on personality 
deficits as opposed to personality strengths in assessment and in 
7 
intervention planning; on history as opposed to current factors for 
assessment; or on use of office versus life context for location of 
interventions. 
The emphasis in the first set is on general theoretical 
principles. The emphasis in the second set is on operationalized 
aspects of practice-related, specific orientation in thought and 
action in clinical work. The first stresses a basic orientation to 
the world of people in problem/situations, based on alternative 
theoretical explanations of what makes things happen. The second 
stresses specific issues in understanding and intervening in case 
I 
situations. It is based on alternative views of what to look for 
and what to do in actual practice. 
While the first and the second sets of concepts for each 
school of thought are related, in that they measure and compare 
similar ideas, they do not measure and compare the same things. 
The first deals with comparisons of inherent world views. The 
second compares specific guidelines for understanding and action. 
The notion of alternate rather than opposed is vital. It 
emphasizes this researcher I s efforts to compare two clusters of 
principles which represent alternative world views. The newer 
view may be said to have grown out of some clinicians' efforts to 
utilize the older view in a changing world. Therefore, they are 
different but related. Furthermore, the notion of alternate 
emphasizes that social work is still developing as the world is 
changing, and that there are no static absolutes. It also stresses 
that the newer view has, by no means, replaced the older one 
among many clinicians (see footnote 1). 
Following this introduction, a historical-conceptual 
8 
literature review will be presented to prepare the reader for the 
research study. The shift in epistemology in science and social 
science prior to and during the twentieth century will be described 
as a backdrop for understanding the shifts in world view in the 
development of social work practice. The development of an 
expanding, increasingly holistic and organismic view of social 
work practice from its nineteenth century inception in a linear-
mechanistic framework through the beginnings of the ecological-:-
systems approach of the life model will be summarized. In this 
progression, this author will (a) outline relevant benchmarks in 
the historical development of casework theory as well as 
contributions Cb) from psychoanalysis, Cc) from group work, and 
Cd) from family practice conceptions. (e) The initial development 
of the life model through the late 1970' s, which is when this 
research was proposed will be followed by Cf) developments from 
approximately 1978 to the present to show main themes and new 
concepts in elaborations of life model which did not exist when 
this research was undertaken. The sections in Chapter II recount 
an overview of relevant conceptual developments of the old and the 
new over extended periods of time. The sections in Chapter I I I , 
on more recent developments in the life model, draw on a limited 
but seminal selection from the literature as a means of presenting 
a range of essential concepts. 
I· 
CHAPTER II 
Theoretical and Historical Considerations 
About Approaches to Practice until the Late 1970' s 
Epistemologv: Some Notes on Ways of Knowing 
9 
For Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 15) a systematic set of basic 
(metaphysical> beliefs about reality which can never be proven, 
plus their methods for inquiry and understanding, constitutes a 
paradigm. Paradigms reflect an essence of what we think (but 
cannot prove) about the world. Our actions and inquiry occur in 
relation to those paradigms: "As we think, so do we act." 
Kuhn (1970) addresses shifts in shared views about the 
nature of the world for science with implications for similarities in 
social science. He sees a paradigm within a scientific community 
as a "disciplinary matrix" (p. 182), a constellation of shared 
commitment to basic beliefs about the world and to ways of 
ordering knowledge toward the solution of problems which need to 
be addressed (pp. 174-210), A paradigm gains status and promise 
by showing more success than competitors in solving a few acute 
problems satifactorily over time (pp. 23, 23-51). 
For Kuhn (1970) new phenomena which contradict expectation, 
when repeatedly uncovered, produce "awareness of anomaly" (1970, 
p. 52>' He describes a scientific community as first trying to 
understand anomaly within its contemporary paradigm, or if 
necessary, ad.justing the paradigm. Existing knowledge is utilized 
10 
to the fullest to understand the problem before a paradigm change 
is needed C pp . 52-65). Lingering, unresol ved anomalies present 
emerging crises, while an incremental, cumulative process of data 
collection and minor paradigm adjustment lay the groundNork of 
readiness for a paradigm shift (pp. 66-91). When a paradigm's 
tools no longer solve the problems which it defines, a crisis 
ensues, with extravagant retooling, an effort "reserved for the 
occasion that demands it" (p. 76). 
When in response to crisis, a scientific community rejects a 
paradigm, it simultaneously accepts another, in a process through 
which the two paradigms are compared with nature, and with one 
another C Kuhn, 1970, p. 77). Crisis blurs a paradigm and loosens 
usual rules for inquiry, observes Kuhn (p. 84>' A scientific 
revolution is a non-cumulative developmental episode; "an older 
paradigm ... is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new 
one" (p. 92), in a qualitative shift in view about how to practice 
science Cpp. 157-8). While an old and new paradigm may involve 
the same phenomena, they are incompatible because they organize 
data in qualitatively different ways. The new may encompass 
dilemmas to which the old was refractory, and thereby lead to new 
discovery (pp. 92-135>. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) describe ways of knowing and 
inquiring about truth during three sequential paradigm periods in 
the Western World: These are the Ca) "prepositivist," (b) 
positiVist and (c) postpositivist or naturalist periods. The 
"prepositivist" period mirrors the view of Aristotelian science from 
11 
the fourth century B.C., in which knowledge was deductively 
advanced by means of passive, non-interfeE'ing observation, which 
would not distort what was learned. More than two millenia after 
Aristotle when scientists began to be active observers who would 
inductively tryout ideas to see what worked, science moved into 
the positivist period (pp. 18-19>-
Lincoln and Gu ba (1985, pp. 19-24) discuss positivism's 
reflection in both science and social science where identical 
methodologies are seen as serving identical aims. These aims are 
inductive derivation of universal, testable laws of nature, whose 
basic elements consist of the components of the universe and the 
mechanics of their predetermined motion. I n this Newtonian, 
mechanistic, reductionist model, observation is seen as disturbing 
the data collection, but not the basic motion or complex phenomena 
which are observed. Error of observation can be accounted for by 
analysis of the observation, itself. 
The authors (1985, pp. 24-8) speak of positivism's failure to 
conceptualize science adequately by seeing it as non-cognitive and 
non-rational, with emphasis on verification over discovery; on 
prediction over understanding, description and problem-response; 
on operational facts over meanings or implications. Operationalism 
is criticized for the limitations (a) placed on human free will by 
determinism and on (b) alternate views of scientific understanding 
by reductionism. Most seering is their criticism of positivism's 
axiomatic assumptions that (a) there is a single reality equal to 
the sum of its parts; (b) an observer can be separated from the 
. - -_. --'-' -----
observed; (c) (repeatable) observations are independent of their 
contexts in time and space; (d) effects have causes in time; and 
(e) scientific results are rendered value-free by methodology. 
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Germain <1970, p. 29) speaks of a crisis in casework's 
commitment to a scienfific metaphor which had become outmoded, in 
light of the changes both in science and in the human condition. 
Casework had not advanced with science to "deal with problems of 
growth, change, and potentiality ... ," in a view which eliminates 
"the dichotomy of object and space ... person and situation. II 
Schwartz <1976, pp. 174-5) addresses the issue of anomaly in 
contemporary social work: "We too have our received beliefs, 
embodied in the paradigm of study-diagnosis-treatment, as it was 
taken over from medicine, research and positivist science." These 
beliefs embody a consensual language which frames "certain kinds 
of questions and ... no others." Such anomaly includes 
contradictions between theoretically sequential and actually 
simultaneous conceptions of study-diagnosis-treatment; 
prescriptiveness and self-determination; detachment and empathy; 
changing people and helping them; and general difficulty in living 
with the subject-object view of the helping relationship. 
In describing the postpositivist, naturalist paradigm, Lincoln 
and Guba <1985, pp. 36-8) restate the five axiomatic assumptions 
from a naturalist viewpoint: (a) Realities are multiple and can 
be studied only holistically toward understanding them, with little 
likelihood of prediction or con trol . (b) Both observer and 
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observed have inseparable interactive influence upon one another. 
Cc) Inquiry's aim is to form descriptive understanding of 
individual situations which may not be repeatable in the context 
of other times and places. Cd) Entities mutually and 
simultaneously shape one another, so that cause and effect cannot 
be distinguished. eel Results of inquiry are influenced by values 
of the inquirer, of the paradigm, and of the substantive theory 
which guides the inquiry, as well as by the inquiry' s context. 
Results are meaningful to the extent to which they are congruent 
with these factors. 
The naturalist assumptions, for whose primacy Lincoln and 
Guba argue, present radical alternatives to their predecessors. 
A simplified framework has been utilized for understanding 
changes in epistemology in science and social science, and the 
shift from a positivist to a naturalist paradigm during the current 
era. It is a backdrop to for understanding and contextually 
placing the crisis which has developed in social work during the 
past quarter century, and shifts in social work practice in recent 
years. The next sections deal with the expansion of a linear-
mechanistic, positivist-anchored paradigm in casework from its 
inception, the expansion of this paradigm, and the development of 
an alternate ecological-systems, naturalist-anchored paradigm, in 
a qualitatively different conception of social work practice. 
A Linear-Mechanistic Approach 
and the Clinical-Normative Model 
Some Historical Notes on the development of casework. 
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The "clinical-normative-individual-system" model of casework 
(Lutz, 1968, pp. 18-21) reflects its dominant themes since the 
infu·sion of psychoanalytic theory in the 1920's and 1930's. The 
model addresses itself to helping a person with a problem. The 
notion of "problem" is conceived as "distressful intrapsychic 
functioning"- and "disordered social functioning" (p. 8). A 
problem is represented by interpersonal or social behaviors which 
are deviant from a standard cultural or developmental norm. 
Emphasis is on a person's "sick," regressed, internal qualities, 
addressed mainly in terms of a psychoanalytic personality system. 
The introduction of modern social theory and ego psychology into 
practice has seen greater acceptance of cultural relativity, with a 
diminished tendency to see the client as "sick" but rather as not 
having achieved developmental norms. For Lutz this model remains 
tuned to a "culture of sickness," with a bent toward thinking in 
terms of illness persisting among its practitioners. 2 
The history of the clinical-normative model may be traced to 
the cultural and scientific ethos of nineteenth century England and 
America. Casework's origins in that era maybe seen through the 
efforts of various factions of society to establish a "stabilizing" 
social control, based on internal change or external management, 
over people whose lives were rendered chaotic by industrialization 
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and urbanization. These origins may be traced to the Reverend 
Thomas Chalmers' visitations of th~ poor in the 1820's and 1830's 
in his Glasgow parish. Chalmers' approach was delimited by the 
Calvinist notion of predestination. It reappeared with the 
development of Charity Organization Societies (COS) in England and 
the United States in the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
(Lubove, 1965, pp. 2-5>' The approach may broadly be seen as 
an effort at maintaining stabilizing control over the poor, while 
overlooking social and economic causes of such distress. 3 Early 
COS workers viewed such changes as transformation of moral 
character in the individual pauper (deSchweinitz, 1943, pp. 113, 
148-53) . Lubove (p. 7) sees "scientific philanthropy" as a move 
toward greater efficiency of nonetheless preconceived moral notions 
about character, based on the presence or absence of moral fiber 
that could enable a person to be trained to act responsibly. 
With the infusion of moralistic "scientific charity" went the 
influence of nineteenth century science. The idea was (Germain, 
1971, p. 242) that people could be understood by "immutable laws 
of cause and effect" thought to govern behavior. Sufficient 
knowledge of the past could lead to certainty for treatment. 
Richmond's Social Diagnosis (1917) may be seen as a culmination 
of the application of this doctrine. 4 As Germain (1971, pp. 243-4) 
states, casework, heir to COS scientific aspirations, "was deeply 
rooted in the optimism and scientism of the late 19th century." 
Diagnosis was seen to emerge "in proportion to the number of facts 
ascertained (cause) and would point to the treatment steps that 
would lead inevitably to cure (effect)." This was similar to the 
"doctrine of specific etiology" of nineteenth century medicine. 
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It is no surprise in retrospect, that this tradition's heirs, 
partly rooted in the Calvinist ethic of predestination and the 
linear cause-effect approach, embraced the medical model and its 
psychoanalytic offshoot. As Janchill notes <1969, p. 81), the 
medical model presupposes a normative appraisal. While Richmond 
and others used the medical model as a metaphor, Germain (1971, 
p. 251) notes that it was misapplied by her contemporaries and 
followers in literal terms, unaware of its "make-believe aspect." 
This literal application of the medical adopted into casework 
practice in the 1920's (Germain, 1970, pp. 13, 15-16), along with 
that decade's "conservative social climate" (Woodroofe, 1966, p. 
135), laid a foundation for accepting theories which focused on the 
individual and tended to obscure his social matrix (Woodroofe, p. 
146>' Woodroofe speaks of the "psychiatric deluge" of the twenties 
as reinforcing, in the notion of psychological inadequacy, the 
American individualist conviction that most problems of poverty 
were refelctions of moral inadequacy (p. 135). 
Germain <1971, p. 250-7) sees the misapplication of the 
medical model as having obscured the interaction of individual 
processes with social processes, and constricted casework's 
development. Yet, if we review Richmond's attempt to establish an 
encompassing concept of social diagnosis, although rooted in a 
mechanistic framework of "scientism," we see effort toward a 
holistic approach based on social causative factors. Thus, 
--------- -.. -- .. 
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movement to a more holistic view of a case in Richmond's work is 
I 
paralleled by the search for a more objective-scientific approach, 
while an underlying (now socio-scientific) determinism remains. 
The introduction of a nascent psychoanalytic theory in the 
1920' s when its fin al structural forma t emerged, was followed by 
its adoption in the early 1930's, "as casework's chief knowledge 
base" (Hellenbrand, 1965, p. 308), Hamilton, in reaction to the 
narrower approach of ostensibly treating via personality only, 
cautioned against the exclusion of economic problems and poverty 
from social workers' concerns (Hellenbrand, pp. 203-4), We see a 
re-emerging effort to develop a holistic and organismic approach 
in the "person-in-situation" (Germain, 1970, p. 19) concept in 
Hamilton's Theory and Practice of Social Casework (1940), Thus, 
holism (broader than Richmond's) returns in a normative scientific 
outlook of what has now become the diagnostic schoo1. Determinism 
(now of a psychosocial variety) remains cached in the background. 
As summarized by Lutz 0968, pp. 9-14), in the 1950's and 
1960's, while interest in the social sciences increased, casework 
was increasin~ly influenced by concepts such as organized groups 
including family or school, roles and communication, and cultural 
variations in life style. Ego psychology emerged in the forties 
and fifties, offering a dynamic explanation of the ego's capacity 
for growth and adaptation, based not merely on the narrower, 
intrapsychic, mediating function of the ego, but on a broader 
conceptualization of its ability to interact with the external world. 
Pathology is recognized as impaired ego development, or in 
regression to a prior level of development under stress. The 
approach is to see the person, through her ego, as responding 
dynamically to her life situation at a particular time. Help 
involves development, maintenance, or return of some degree of 
autonomy to the ego. 
The norm is independent functioning of the person. 
Deviation from it is where pathology lies. The value which 
appears to underlie the norm is adaptation. Ego psychology 
accepts a high degree of cultural relativity, in that adaptation 
. need not be conformity to (or deviance from) one specific set of 
norms. Adaptation involves each individual's unique mode of 
handling and resolving her life's conflicts within the context of 
her own unique social encounters and internal stresses at 
particular times in her life. 
18 
Ego psychology, emerging from a clinical-normative framework 
of psychoanalysis, seems to have enabled psychoanalytic theory to 
develop in a broader, more holistic and organismic direction, and 
to retain a less stringently normative outlook as it influenced 
casework. Under its sway, however, determinism in casework (as 
with Hamilton's earlier developments) remained cached in the 
background, but grew broader, more psychosocial in scope. 
Essentially, major historical developments in casework which 
have led to the clinical-normative model of today show certain 
trends. (a) The tendency to react to a relative narrowness of 
approach during one era is met by attempts to develop more 
.. --... -.----
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holistic and organismic approaches. (b) While the normative 
aspect of theory and practice has become less rigid, it has by no 
means disappeared. An emphasis on the presence or absence of 
individual moral fiber from COS days, shifted toward an emphasis 
on socially determining factors, and then toward attempts at the 
integration of psychological and social causation. (c) Thus, the 
concept of causality has moved from emphasis on direct and 
intrapsychic causality, to interaction of social and intrapsychic" 
ego-oriented causative factors, in an apparently looser, less rigid 
framework. Thus, holistically-oriented reactions to a relatively 
I 
narrow approach during some periods, may be seen as reactions to 
a simplified notion of linear causality. Yet, the infusion of science 
into casework has not altered the underlying thread of determinism 
In the sixties varied practice innovations emerged (Germain, 
1970, p . 22 >. "The impact of massive poverty alongside affluence, 
the persistence of social pathologies despite the advances in 
knowledge, and the the civil rights movements influenced 
community organization beyond anything experienced by casework 
or group work" (Germain & Gitterman, 1980, p. 357). Public fund 
availability to social agencies (including settlement houses and 
family service agencies), note Piven and Cloward (1971, p. 295), 
"brought ... thousands of voluntary groups into different phases of 
the anti-poverty effort .... " As Germain and Gitterman (1980, p, 
352) note, "pressing social issues of the 1960s' and 1970's, 
including civil rights, the Vietnam War, and the war on poverty 
... threatened the role of casework in the profession and in 
society." With a broadened return to emphasis on social factors, 
the dominant model was again seen as too narrow, and a crisis 
developed. 
A basic question at this point is: Why has the clinical-
normative model come under increasing criticism? The answer 
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appears to lie in three areas: ( a ) First, the model does not deal 
adequately with the conflict between humanism and science. In 
fact, it perpetuates this conflict. (b) Second, the model remains 
basically anchored to determinism; and determinism, for science in 
general, and for casework in particular, has been increasingly 
problematic. (c) Additionally, from a more pragmatic standpoint, 
it seems out of place, with current emphasis on social factors as 
contributory to individual maladjustment, given its implicit placing 
of responsibility on the individual for his plight. What at an 
earlier time had been viewed as the fault of the victim, tends now 
to be seen as relative to impinging social factors. 
Germain notes the historic threads of science and humanism 
in casework's search for knowledge and skill, for a sense of 
social purpose for humanity, and for professional values in its 
development (1973a, p. 325). Efforts in the lSe')' s to utilize 
scientific principles "in handlihg the problems of charities and 
correction crystallized in the commitment to a scientific method 
known as scientific philanthropy." From this era to Social 
Diagnosis in 1917 and into the next few decades, casework 
increased its scientific commitment "by absorbing knowledge from 
" , 
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the behavioral and social sciences, developing a method based on 
the logical principles of scientific inquiry, and adopting scientific 
'attitudes of objectivity and open mindedness" <1973b, p. 126L 
Yet, science and humanism, especially in the 1960' s, have 
often been seen as presenting opposing instead of complementary 
ways of viewing humans in their world. For example, the 
application of science has been seen as having dangerous 
consequences for humanity. "Sometimes this conflict has been 
called the cause-function issue and sometimes it has been termed 
the tension between social purpose and technical process." For a 
profession which engages in human services, this conflict, as 
Germain indicates, overlooks the need for these two cultures to 
complement one another (Germain, 1973a, p. 325). 
Germain ( 1973a , p. 325) notes two trends with reference to 
this conflict. The first is the appearance of general systems 
theory in the behavioral sciences together with a worldwide 
"humanist push by individuals and groups ... toward active control 
over their own destinies," to which spirit the application of 
general systems theory to social work lends itself. The second is 
a set of ideas which has emerged within the profession. It was 
espoused by Gordon (1969) after Lutz's (1956> initial application of 
general systems theory to social work. Gordon blends general 
systems theory with a concern for human potential to reformulate 
the person-situation concept in systems terms. For Gordon, social 
work's expertise lies at the interface between person and 
environment. Its knowledge base and intervention focus rest upon 
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people's coping capacities and how to strenghthen these, and upon 
environmental qualities and their melioration. 
realization of human potential. 
I ts purpose is 
Bartlett (1970) elaborates on the concept of social 
functioning. She focuses on the interaction between people and 
environment, specifically on "the relation between the coping 
activity of people and the demands of environment." Unlike 
earlier emphases on behavior, the attention of this concept is 
"directed primarily to what goes on between people and 
environment through exchange between them." People and 
environment are joined in one concept and must therefore be 
viewed together (p. 116). She emphasizes the importance of 
humane values, potential and srowth, and knowledge derived from 
social work experience as well as from other fields, in efforts at 
building a model for practice (pp. 57-61, 62-83 >. 
The need has been apparent for a scientific outlook which 
encompasses the person-environment unit in a humanistically-
oriented value base. It is toward this end that the ecological 
systems approach and life model may be said to reach. 
Determinism and the Clinical-Normative Model. 
To understand the place of determinism in the development of 
casework, we examine (a) the interplay of science and technology, 
and (b) particular limitations of psychoanalytic theory which has 
provided a validating scientific framework and philosophy for 
understanding the individual in the clinical-normative model. 
With regard to the first perspective, expanding technology 
has affected the social order. Germain (1973a, pp. 323-4) cites 
Toffler' s (1971) notions of transience, novelty, and diversity, 
whose combination strains our capacities for coping, for 
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commitment, and for a sense of reality. For some this calls forth 
a sense of incompetence, "stress and uncertainty ... anxiety, 
depression ... illness, violence, various forms of escape." The 
poor, who lack environmental supports, suffer most. Institutions 
designed for resources and services, often inhibit adaptation and 
growth. Furthermore, as society has become complex, one might 
conjecture that variables with which to trace cause-effect 
relationships have become more difficult and less useful to isolate. 
The historical trend toward a more holistic view in the 
clinical-normative model reflects concern that casework may have 
been defining its own function in too narrow a fashion (Germain, 
1973a, p. 323>' "Old dichotomies of person-environment and 
subject-object ... man' s centrality" are giving way to the scientific 
and humanistic conceptions of man' s inseparability from nature in 
a delicate, continually adjusting equilibrium which requires "the 
application of compassionate concern, knowledge and wisdom ... 
[toward] human freedom and autonomy" (Germain, 1973b, p. 128>-
With reference to limitations of psychoanalytic theory, 
Peterfreund (1971) sees Freud' s clinical discoveries as 
revolutionary demonstrations that mental activity, being 
predominantly unconscious, lacks unlimited free will, and is 
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subject to universal laws--which changed our views of ourselves 
and our relationship to the world (p. 94>' These laws have 
presented some serious theoretical problems in Peterfreund' s view. 
One is drive theory's use of "cause-and-effect, linear, one-to-one, 
sum of parts explanations, such as impulse versus defense, 
driving force versus counterforce ... and so on" (pp. 81, 82). 
A second problem is the divorce of the psychic apparatus "from 
biology, neurophysiology, and evolutionary time" (p. 11>' 
Physical and psychic energy are different concepts. Physical 
energy's transformation into structure is dependent on its 
quantity. Psychic energy's transformation into ego structure is 
dependent upon its identity, qualitative character and directional 
properties (which are not inherent in physical energy), as well as 
upon the ego <pp. 51-8). 
Psychoanalytic theory has provided a psychological base for 
the clinical-normative model. Vet, for Peterfreund (1911, pp. 
61-5, 10), it confuses three conceptual languages. These are the 
languages of (a) persons, tension and self, (b) psychic apparatus 
<in a hydrodynamic physics metaphor), and (c) biology and 
physiology. Hamilton's person-in-situation concept may be seen as 
an effort to develop a broadened, psychosocial view of helping. 
The person presents psychological and biological aspects, and the 
situation presents social and physical views (Rapaport, 1959b, pp. 
63-6). Vet, determinism remains embedded in a model whose 
languages seem to present problems of compatibility. 
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Some Psychoanalytic Influences 
Historical Precursors and Conceptual Introduction. 
Freud's topographical theory, which explains man in terms of 
levels of consciousness, emerges with "The Interpretation of 
Dreams" (1900/1953). He describes psychosexual stages of 
development and libido theory in "Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality" (1905/1953>' During the next two decades, in case 
histories and other papers, he develops his ideas in clinical work. 
"Inconsistencies between [topographicalJ concepts and clinical 
observation" led to a reorganized structural viewpoint in "The Ego 
and the Id" <1923/1961 )--seen by Jones (1957, Vol. 3, p. 87) as 
the origin "of the new psychology of the ego." Id, ego and 
superego supplement and conflict with one another. The latter two 
possess conscious and unconscious aspects (Glenn, 1980, p. 6). 
Conceptions of the ego will be explored from the 
complementary vantage points of its mediating-defensive functions, 
and its adaptive and synthetic functions. The first deals with the 
metapsychology of intrapsychic conflict. The second deals with 
resources and demands of the environment, through the 
individual's relationship to his world of people, things and 
events, and his sense of unity and continuity. 
From Mediating-Defensive Functions to Conceptions of Adaptation. 
In "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (1926/1959) Freud 
presents the concept of defense in its current form as several 
pr'ocesses which pr'otect the ego fr'om instinctual demands CA. 
Fr'eud, 1936/1966, p. 43) .. As Rapapor't notes <1959a, p. 10) 
Fr'eud, in that paper', sets a cOr'ner'stone for' an ego with some 
independence fr'om the id, which through constitutionally endowed 
perceptual and affective mechanisms is autonomously active in 
curbing drives whose derivative behavioral actions could lead to 
danger in external reality, by initiating defenses through the 
signal of anxiety. Thus, external reality is made a part of 
theor'Y while the role of instinctual drives remains intact. 5 
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In this context, Anna Freud in The Ego and the Mechanisms 
of Defense ( 1936/1966, pp. 54-61), presents a summa tion of defense 
mechanisms according to their' sources of anxiety: objective, 
instinctual and superego-derived, plus the ego's later-in-life need 
for synthesis. As noted by Young-Br'euhl <1988, p. 209), Anna 
Freud thereby describes the corr'elation between various defense 
mechanisms and psychopathology, and also dr'aws "a rough map of 
defenses in nOr'mal development." By her "concept of defense 
against external stimuli" (Rapaport 1959b, p. 11) , she integra tes 
the themes of defense and reality relations. 
A firmer' place for the role of reality comes with C a) Fr'eud' s 
conception of secondary process and the reality principle, in his 
"New Intr'oductory Lectures" (1932/1964); Cb) what Rapapor't <1959a, 
p. 11) r'efers to as "inborn ego r'oots" (pr'edisposition, sic) which 
are "independent of instinctual drives," as an explicit assumption 
in Freud' s "Analysis Ter'minable and Interminable" (193711964); 
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and (c) the development by Freud (1926/1959), Nunberg (1931>, and 
Waelder (1936) of an autonomous, synthetic ego function. 
The development of ego psychology, as recounted by Rapaport 
(1959a, pp. 5-10, 11>, is next "dominated by contributions of 
Hartmann [on adaptation] and Erikson [on epigenesis and 
identity] ," built upon Freud's groundwork in ego psychology and 
psychosexual development. 
6 Hartmann (1939/1958) builds on Freud's later assumption of 
drive-independent inborn ego roots in EFao Psvchology and the 
Problem of Adaptation. He postulates an inborn, undifferentiated 
id-ego common root, out of which both structures differentiate and 
7 begin to interconnect with one another (pp. 102-3). He describes 
the newborn as not wholly dominated by drives, given inborn 
perceptual and protective mechanisms which, after the the ego and 
the id differentiate, are attributed to the ego (p. 49>' It is 
relative to an "average expectable environment" (p. 51) that "a 
state of adaptedness exists before the intentional processes of 
adaptation begin" (p. 49>' 
Underlying the concept of adaptation for Hartmann is the 
observation that "living organisms patently 'fit' into their 
environment [and) ... adaptation is primarily a reciprocal 
relationship between the organism and its environment" (Hartmann, 
1939/1958, pp. 23-4>. Man can actively utilize his inborn and 
maturing apparatuses toward improvement his relationship to the 
environment" (p. 25). Hartmann observes man's capacity to 
comply with environmental demands (autoplastic adaptation), to 
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change his environment to meet his needs (alloplastic adaptation), 
and to choose new environments. Thus, "human action adapts the 
environment to human functions, and then the human being adapts 
(secondarily) to the environment which he has helped to create" 
Cpp. 26-7>' Hartmann specifies social structure, division of labor 
and the individual's social locus as codeterminants of the 
parameters of adaptation (p. 31). 
Ego functions of primary autonomy develop to maturity in a 
conflict-free sphere, independent of the influence of drives. These 
functions include perception, memory, intelligence, thinking, motor-
activity and reality-testing. Ego functions of secondary autonomy 
may differentiate and develop, or be overtaken in regression by 
the id, through conflict. I n Hartmann I s widened perspective on 
the ego, defenses themselves may simultaneously serve the 
functions of "control of instinctual drive, adaptation to the 
external world ... and synthesis." An examples is identification 
with the aggressor (Hartmann, 1939/1958, pp. 22-37, 48-56, 51>. 
In discussing mental health, Hartmann specifies that "normal 
development involves typical conflicts, and with them the 
possibility of adaptation disturbances." A measure of mental 
health is a person's "preparedness for average expectable 
environmental situations, and for average expectable internal 
conflicts" (19391 1958, pp. 54-5). 
Rapaport (1959a, pp. 12-14) notes that Hartmann (1939/1958, 
1952), and Hartmann Kris and Lowenstein (1946), via concepts 
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which include ego apparatuses of primary and of secondary 
I 
autonomy, automatization, neutralization and binding of psychic 
energy, provides the metapsychological foundations for Erikson's 
epigenetic, psychosocial theory of development. Erikson, in 
Childhood and Society (1950>, and in "Growth and Crisis of the 
Healthy Personality" C1959a), calls on the epigenetic approach. It 
is a model for embryonic development "transplanted" from "the 
chemical exchange of the womb" to "the social exchange system" of 
society, in which one's "gradually increasing capacities meet the 
opportunities and limitations of ... culture." A healthy child with 
reasonable guidance, "can be trusted to obey inner laws of 
development, laws which create a succession of potentialities for 
significant interaction with those who tend him." "Such 
interaction must remain within the proper rate and the proper 
sequence which govern the growth of a personality as well as that 
of an organism." Through the predetermined steps of an inner 
"groundplan," the human organism attains "readiness to be driven 
toward, to be aware of, and to interact with, a widening social 
radius, beginning with the dim image of a mother and ending 
I 
with ... that segment of mankind which I counts' in the particular 
individual's life" (Erikson, 1959a, p. 52), 
At each interval, potential is unlocked for the psychosocial 
mastery of progressively more inclusive developmental tasks in 
each of the eight successive stages of the life cycle. A stage is 
marked by its ascendance prior to its "decisive critical time," 
----------- - --.. ---
30 
followed by a crisis in which the individual "is ready for a 
[mutually reciprocal] decisive encounter with his environment" to 
find an enduring "solution ... toward the end of the period." "Each 
stage," adds Erikson from a meta psychological perspective, 
"becomes a crisis because incipient growth and awareness in a 
significant part function [of personality] goes together with a 
shift in instinctual energy ... and causes specific vulnerability in 
that part" (1959a, pp. 53-4>-
Erikson (1950, pp. 44-92; 1959b, p. 121) conceives his first 
five stages of development as inseparably dovetailing with Freud IS 
respective five psychosexual stages from infancy through puberty. 
These are followed, for the first time in psychoanalytic theory, by 
the three stages of adulthood. For Erikson (1959b) development is 
a lifelong process in which later crisis resolution can have 
compensatory effects on earlier problems (Goldstein, 1984, p. 9>-
Such effects emerge most pointedly around the issue of identity. 
It is through the healthy personality that Erikson presents 
human growth. The healthy personality weathers internal and 
external conflict, "emerging and re-emerging with an increased 
sense of inner unity ... good judgment, and ... capacity to do well, 
according to the standards of those who are significant" <1959a, 
p. 51) and a preconscious "sense of psychosocial well-being" 
(1959b, p. 118>' This contributes to a sense of identity, a 
central concept in Erikson I s work (Roazen, 1976, chap. 6). 
Identity formation rests on the outcome of each successive stage 
.. - -.---.------
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(Goldstein, 1984, p. 10>' Identity is presented by Erikson both as 
a psychosocial phenomenon and as a metapsychological concept 
known as ego identity. It is more than the sum of childhood 
iden tifica tions. "It is a lifelong development largely unconscious 
to the individual and to his society" C1959b, pp. 112-13>' It is 
represented in the "tentative crystallizations" of childhood, which 
result in a person I s feeling and behaving as though he more or 
less knew who he was in the series of tentative identifications 
which begin to build expectations which then become "verified 
decisive experiences of I psychosocial fitted ness '" (1959b, p. 114). 
I 
The ego, for Erikson, must integrate "psychosexual and psychsocial 
aspects on a given level of development," while it also integrates 
new identity elements to those which already exist. From a 
metapsychological viewpoint, "earlier crystallizations of identity 
can become subject to renewed conflict, when changes in the 
quality and quantity of drive, expansions in mental equipment, 
and new and often conflicting demands ... make previous adjustments 
appear insufficient .... " The process of growth emerges from such 
"developmental and normative crises" and "provides new energy, as 
society offers new and specific opportunities." Thus, identity 
formation is "an evolving configuration, established gradually 
through successive childhood ego syntheses and resyntheses of 
"constitutional givens, idiosyncratic libidinal needs, favored 
capacities, significant identifications .. effective defenses .. successful 
sublimations and consistent roles" C1959b, pp. 115-16). 
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Erikson remains true to his psychoanalytic theoretical base 
(and professional birth with Freud> in the presentation of his 
psychosocial viewpoint as an elaboration of Freud I s developmental 
view, along with formulations which integrate his theory with 
psychoanalytic metapsychology (Erikson, 1959b, p. 121; Roazen, 
1976, pp. 1-3, 20), 
White <1963, p. 19> describes Erikson I s view as the first "to 
do justice in more than a schematic way to both the processes of 
inner development and the influence of social and cultural 
surroundings. " He elaborates that Erikson sees Freud I s view as 
narrow "in terms only of pleasure seeking and erogenous zones." 
Erikson I s broader concept of modes is seen as referring to 
generalized motor and cognitive behavior patterns. 
mode are all of a piece, so to speak." 
"Zone and 
As Goldstein <1984, p. 10) notes, Erikson has provided 
"rationale for therapeutic approaches that address the dynamic 
interplay between current life cycle needs, and ... inner and outer 
resources," including "notions of primary prevention through 
interventions aimed at improving adaptive fits between caretakes 




Some Interpersonal Conceptions. 
Sociologist Talcott Parsons (1964) presents structural theory 
and object relations as prominent in Freud's later thinking. The 
former is seen as representing the organization of personality as a 
differentiated system, while the latter is seen as dealing with the 
relation of the individual to his social milieu. Parsons (p. 34) in 
an overview of Freud's conception <1923/1961> of the ego, refers to 
the ego's structure a "precipitate" of the individual's history of 
object relations. He speaks of jdentjfjcatjon as the process of a 
person's induction "into membership in a collectivity through 
learning to play a role complementary to those of other members in 
accord with the pattern of values governing the collectivity." (p . 
42>' He sees Freud's theory of object relations as a formulation 
about socialization, (p. 34) "an analysis of the relation of the 
individual to the structure of the society" (p. 52), centering 
mainly on the earlier phases of the socialization process (p. 34). 
Guntrip (1973) distinguishes two groupings of Freud's ideas: 
The first is the id-plus-ego-control apparatus, which includes 
Hartmann's autonomous ego and its apparatuses (p. 28). He sees 
Hartmann as having extensively developed the more impersonal, 
mechanistic aspects of Freud's theory (pp. 28,43,51-5, 104-11), 
wherein "steadily developing human and personal phenomena [are 
confined] within the straightjacket of prepersonal biological 
concepts" (p. 109). 
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The second, grouping is referred to as "the Oedipus complex 
of family object-relationship situations" (Guntrip, 1973, p. 28>' It 
is a sort of personal psychology of people's influence on one 
another's lives, notably parents and children. The internal 
process of secondary identification soon takes the place of a 
child's early, actual Oedipal relations with parents. We may 
broadly say that it is the emphases on (a) the child's introjection 
of the theatre of characters, <internal objects) and (b) his 
development of a capacity to relate to these characters that 
distinguishes the object relations school from the classical ego 
psychological theory. Yet, as described by Guntrip (pp. 19-44, 
45-68, 69-102), this approach, integrates with concepts from ego 
psychology. It revolves around the person-ego (as opposed to an 
impersonal ego structure) found in the work of Fairbairn, 
Winnicott and Erikson, and sees the very beginnings of ego growth 
as the core of selfhood, and "bound up with the first and 
fundamental object relationship, that of the mother and her baby" 
(Guntrip, p. 21>. Guntrip summarizes Winnicott' s subjectively 
oriented descriptions of "a continuously helping, fostering, 
nurturing environment, accepting the infant's immature dependence 
while supporting his tentative adventures into independence, 
individuality, and finding a life of his own... through personal 
relationships" (Guntrip, p. 113>' Implicit is a recognition of the 
influence of reciprocally attached caretakers in early development. 
- -- -- ----------
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Sullivan's interpersonal psychology, developed as "his own 
independent insight, "II apart from the personal influence of Freud 
and his direct followers (Guntrip, pp. 46, 45-68; see, Chapman, 
1976, pp. 28, 223-42), has as a fundamental premise the notion 
that anxiety originates in the interpersonal encounter--rather than 
within the psyche (Sullivan, 1953, pp. 10, 8-12, 41-5; Chapman, 
pp. 81, 78-86). It may thereby be said to enshrine, as most 
basic to human existence, the reciprocal effect that human beings 
have upon one another. A number of Sullivanian concepts have 
approximate Freudian counterparts. Sullivan's developmental eras 
and zones of interaction broadly parallel notions of Freudian 
psychosexual development. Sullivan presents his own distinctive 
underlying, biology-derived, interpersonal premise which he has 
woven into his views, namely that "the living cannot live when 
separated from ... their necessary environment." This is his 
"principle of communal existence" upon which all living processes 
depend (1953, p. 31>. 
Guntrip (1973, p. 43) sees Sullivan and Erikson as having 
explored "the growth of the individual ego in its ever-widening 
social milieu." We also note Guntrip's point (pp. 43-4) that of 
the two strands in Freud's thought (a) the natural sciencel 
physiological/mechanistic, and (b) the psychodynamic/personal! 
object-relational, "it was the latter that was struggling [with 
success in the post-Freudian era] to break free and develop in its 
own right." 
The Realm of Competence and Action. 
Robert W. White <1963, pp. 16-17) writes about the state of 
ego psychology after Freud' s death. In a discussion of 
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Hartmann' s notion of autonomous ego development, White notes that 
Hartmann adheres to Freud' s concept that neutralization of 
instinctual energies allows the ego to have independent energies. 
By his explanation of ego autonomy through the principle of 
neutralization Hartmann does not challenge Freud's instinct theory. 
White (1963, p. 18) goes on to say that others saw the 
problem of ego energies as requiring "a more revolutionary 
solu tion . " He speaks of Hendrick' s ( 1942, p. 51) instinct to 
master. It lies in a proposed "basic psychobiologic urge of human 
beings' to control as large a segment of the outer world as is 
compatible with their individual limitations and those imposed upon 
them [ and] is manifested in early infancy by the exercise of 
rudimentary sensori-motor functions .... " Hendrick adds that 
pleasure is derived from this instinct through effective use of 
sensory, motor, and intellectual functions, physiologically 
available. For Hendrick (1942, p. 40), it is an "inborn drive to 
do and to learn how to do." In an extension of this thinking, 
Hendrick <1943, p. 327) formulated a "work principle" which is the 
need to derive pleasure through integration of neuromuscular and 
intellectual functions. Work pleasure is not, however, primarily 
displaced or sublimated sexual pleasure. It is, rather, "an 
expression of an instinct to master." 
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Kardiner and Spiegel <1947} propose an "effective ego," 
which, as White <1963, p. lS} states, has no hypothesis about 
energy sources. In an effort to conceptualize the development of 
wartime traumatic neuroses, Kardiner and Speigel replace the term 
"instinct" as the operational unit, with the notion of "action 
system." They study how activity in relation to the outer (as 
opposed to libidinal> world is integrated (Kardiner & Spiegel, pp. 
257-S). Along with active and passive modalities of adaptation, 
they propose a third type of adaptation which is based on the 
possibility that an organism can be overwhelmed and destroyed by 
events in the outer world; but can remain intact and continue its 
life by altered adaptive maneuvers through "actions systems." 
These become integrated in order to maintain "controlled contact" 
with, and "controlled exploitation" of the outer world (p. 260). 
White (1963, p. lS) cites Mittelman's proposal <1954, pp. 
159-61) of a partial instinct or motor urge of "motility" which is 
dominant from the second year of life for several years. 
"Motility" is proposed as a basic means of reality testing and 
integration of the period, and as directly related to the 
development of assertiveness and self-esteem. 
Drawing on the work of Hartmann, Erikson, Hendrick, 
Kardiner and Spiegel, and Mittelman, Robert White (1959, pp. 
32S-9) developed his concept of competence. It grew out of an 
effort to deal with the inadequacy of psychoanalytic theory to 
explain, on the basis of primary drives, exploratory behavior, 
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manipulation and general activity, as well as the effective ego. 
White <1963, p. 42) proposes a conception of an "independent ego 
energy" which is neither part of the libidinal nor aggressive 
instinctual drives, are not themselves referred to as drives, and 
yet are just as primary and "as basic as anything in human 
nature, and ... have a clear significance for survival" (p. 24>' 
These energies, termed effectance .. inherent in the apparatus of the 
ego, are found in satisfying, exploratory and manipulative 
behavior, which maintain and expand interaction with the 
environment, and which result in an "effect" (pp. 36, 38, 42). 
These energies "prompt the child to keep trying out the 
effectiveness of his ripening capacities for action" (p. 33). 
The stimulation, action, effort and production of effects are, 
together with a feeling of efficacy, "a primitive biological 
endowment as basic as the satisfactions that accompany feeding or 
sexual gratification, though not nearly as intense" (White, 1963, 
p. 35>' White (1963, p. 37) draws on the ideas of many, 
including those of Murray and Kluckhohn <1953, pp. 15-16,) who 
see the infant as occupied with pleasure and gratification. 
Competence is a person I s objective current capacity to 
interact effectively with his human and physical environment. It 
includes some innate abilities, but is mainly and cumulatively a 
result of learning in transaction with the environment. (White, 
1963, p. 39) 
One's sense oE competence describes the subjective side of 
one's actual competence. It describes the "accumulated and 
organized consequences" of a history of feelings of efficacy as 
these are experienced in each transaction (White, 1963, p. 39). 
In "Competence and Psychosocial Stages of Development," 
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White (1960, pp. 108-21, 137-8) takes the reader through Freud's 
(libidinal) psychosexual stages and Sullivan's (interpersonal> eras 
of development, along with Erikson's first fives stages of the life 
cycle. He proposes the supplementary addition to a psychoanalytic 
developmental view, a conception, at each level, of the growth of 
the child's capacity for action and for understanding, in addition 
to libidinal and interpersonal conceptions. Thus, for example, 
effectance and competence would be seen as "oral" "manipulative 
prowess and experimentation," or as an "anal" crisis in social 
competence and in the growth of motility. 
Gladwin (1963) believes that it is vital that someone seeking 
help learn "ways of acting" which are "useful and effective" in 
supplanting maladaptive ones. This may be done through the 
"many potential sources of strength which could be available to 
the individual person through a variety of larger social systems," 
"in the setting in which the behavior arises and in which its 
impairing effect is felt" (p. 31). For Gladwin, competence is seen 
as developing on three interrelated axes. The first is an "ability 
to learn or to use a variety of ... pathways or behavioral responses 
in order to achieve a given goal," and to choose instrumental and 
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ultimate goals. The second is a comprehension of and ability "to 
use a variety of social systems within the society, moving within 
these systems and utilizing the resources they offer." The third 
is a capacity for "effective reality testing" which includes a 
"positive, broad, and sophisticated understanding of the world" 
(p. 32>-
For Gladwin (1963), the modality through which the 
experience of competence is achieved is a setting known as the 
"ecological unit," which encompasses in one system the person and 
whatever part of his social environment pertains to the behavior 
which is being considered (p. 32>' In times of stress, it is what 
he calls the "small ecological treatment unit," (which might 
include group discussion and support) that holds forth a possible 
strategy for reversal or prevention of pathological behavior, 
through the "improvement of personal competence" (p. 34). Change 
can also be effected in intermediate ecological units (such as 
organizations) to help individuals affected by these organizations, 
by a process of changing the functioning of its members or the 
functioning of the system itself (pp. 34-5). 
-- .. _ ........ _._ .... _--_ ... _---_. 
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Some Family Practice Themes from Casework and Psychiatry 
Early Themes. 
Richmond (1917, p. 136) recognized family as central in 
individual treatment so that "the first interview is often held in 
the client's home and with members of his family present." While 
maintaining a focus on the client, she suggests (1922, p. 138) that 
a next step for casework is to bring together with the client 
"those to whom he is socially related" for first-hand observation. 
Historically, says Hamilton (1951), the family field had been 
concerned with "maintenance and conservation of family life" which 
could be threatened by "lack of income . .. handicaps and asocial 
behavior of its members" (p. 124) While social insurance and 
assistance provided for the former, the latter had been handled by 
voluntary agencies such as child guidance and marriage counseling 
clinics, churches, public schools and courts. She sees family 
counseling as a main function of a family and children's agency 
(pp. 124-5), and affirms the centrality of family in practice. 
"Most casewor~ problems are interpersonaL .. more than one person 
is likely to be involved in the treatment of the individual, and 
particularly in casework is the family unit involved" (p. 22>-
She cautions against separating family work with parents from 
"children's work" in the "child centered case" (p. 49>' 
Hollis (1964, pp. 174-5, 193) advocates selective use of joint 
interviews with client and spouse or an entire family, as well as 
home visits and a family profile for diagnostic clarification. 
42 
Sherz (1953), in discussing family-centered casework, notes 
the inadequacy of trying to understand a person out of context 
from those with whom he has close emotional ties. This could 
involve seeing more than one member of a family. Her subsequent 
emphasis (1962) is clear as to the value of a focus on the entire 
family, so as to adequately understand and work with particular 
members' problems. She accepts a selective combination of 
multiple and individual interviews, as needed. 
Sherz (1959/1963) lays out basic issues for casework 
assessment and treatment related to family interaction. It is 
axiomatic that a person and family form one interactional field, 
and that to be helped effectively both must be understood in their 
dealings with one another. "A growing point of view" is that all 
casework "should be family focused" (pp. 129-30>' She outlines 
the utility of integrating "cultural aspects into concepts of family 
interaction" (p. 130). With reference to Spiegel (1958) Scherz (p. 
131) notes that "some cultural value orientations are learned in 
childhood only through their indirect impact on conscious behavior 
and are, therefore, 'behavior without awareness, "' in the form of 
cultural values which influence individual and family values. She 
emphasizes the intertwining, mutual influences of the individual's 
ego developmental tasks and family development (pp. 132-3). She 
focuses on the consequences of breakdown in family interaction and 
pa tterns of communication (pp . 133-8), as well as on the value of 
home visits and joint or multiple office interviews for assessment 
and treatment (pp. 138-44). Sherz introduces these conceptions by 
._--_ .. _ ... _ ....... _._---
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noting their origins in casework practice, as well as in a 
ct'oss-fertilization between casewot'k and psychiatry (p. 129>' 
As recounted by Guet'in (1976), the family movement in 
psychiatry begins in the late 1940's and early 1950's, with 
t'elatively independent developments in diffet'ent areas of the 
countt'Y. Majot' tht'usts emet'ged ft'om (a) frustrated effot'ts "to 
apply conventional psychiatric pt'inciples to work with 
schizophrenic families," and ft'om (b) effot'ts to deal with beha voior 
problems and delinquency in children (p. 3>' Some early family 
therapists emerged from child guidance and psychoanalysis. Bowen 
I 
(1975, p. 368) notes that the psychoanalytic principle of the 
pt'ivacy of the treatment relationship (to prevent contamination of 
the transference by a thet'apist's contact with a patient's 
relatives) would split the treatment of a hospitalized patient and 
family members among diffet'ent therapists, and may account for 
the family movement's early "undet'gt'ound" status in psychiatt'y. 
As described by Haley (1971 a, pp. 1-7) , early notions 
coalesced around joint observation of the entire family rather than 
use of t'eports by one person. This led to interventions being 
geared to change ways in which members of a family would deal 
with one another. Family therapists began to think of a 
psychiatric problem as an expression of a family problem, and saw 
a need to reconceptualize the wot'k. Vet, since no theoretical 
model existed for this 1 notes Haley 1 therapists struggled to find a 
theory which would fit their practices. He cites efforts of 
practitioners into the 1960' s with varied emphases 1 including work 
with diads, triads, extended kin and social context, and 
ecological networks; use of varied orientations including role 
theory, information theory and systems theory; and the treatment 
of families in moments of crisis. 
Olson <1970, pp. 503-4) presents an overview of pioneering 
efforts of practitioners whose disillusionment with individual 
approaches to treatment moved them to a focus on the family 
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rather than on the problem child, who is seen only as a symptom 
of a broader family pathology. Walsh <1983, p. 467) cites three 
pioneering investigations of the 1950' s which involved observation 
and conceptualization of whole family processes. The investigators 
included Lidz and colleagues, at Yale; the NIMH teams of Bowen 
and colleagues, and Wynne and associates; and the Palo Alto 
group of Bateson and others. "These investigations," says Walsh, 
"all attended to ongoing, repeated transactional patterns. 
Regardless of origin, patterns were observed .to operate currently 
in cycles that maintained or reinforced disturbed behavior in the 
identified patient. A complex circular chain of causality was seen 
to connect the actions and reactions of all family members:" 
As Guerin notes <1976, p. 7) the late 1960's and early 1970's 
saw "an intensified ideological war between analysis and systems 
people. " Battles focused on such issues as "the sanctity of the 
transference, and the necessity of the concept of the unconscious." 
In 1971, with the death of Ackerman, the family momvement's "most 
creative and zealous psychoanalytic proponent ... the center of the 





Beels and Ferber <1969, p. 285> note that the "definite and 
. agreed-upon purpose" of the treatment relationship among family 
therapists is to effect "changes in the system of interaction, not ... 
in the behavior of individuals." Change in the individual is seen 
"as a by-product of system change." The therapist's commitment 
is to a family's functioning, before that of individual members. 
The therapist is, however, seen as working to promote family 
growth and differentiation. 
Beels and Ferber (pp. 285-301) delineate broad and 
overlapping clusterings of family therapists according to style. 
Those who tend to lead and directly control the treatment are 
viewed as conductors. Those who allow themselves to be caught in 
it, and then utilize their inclusion in the family webb as material 
for understanding and treatment, are seen as reactors. Reactors 
seem to gain entry in a more complex and less direct manner than 
do the conductors. Reactors-analysts are described as working in 
various ways with psychoanalytic conceptions. Systems purists 
(also reactors) do not subscribe to these tenets, and are aligned 
only to systems principles. Membership in these groups seems 
more related to therapists' styles than to a background presence 
or absence of a psychoanalytic orientation. 
For Olson, (1970) the systems approach has challenged many 
assumptions by focusing on the person in his live situation, rather 
than out of his environmental context (p. 504>' While he cites 
important conceptions of kin networks, teams and multiple family 
.. -.- ...... _ ... ---
46 
groups (p. 514), Olson points to systems theory as the most vital 
contribution to family therapy. The individual is seen as an open 
system, relating to others in the family system which has a 
quality of wholeness and responsiveness, and which may be 
understood through communications and transactions (pp. 517-20). 
The GAP Report of 1970 on "The Field of Family Therapy" 
(pp. 565-6) describes family theory as combining "two bodies of 
knowledge: personality dynamics and multipersonal system 
dynamics." The integration of these two levels is seen as a 
distant goal. It further notes that some proponents emphasize the 
transactional or multipersonal level "as a replacement for rather 
than an addition to our knowledge about the individual system 
level or mental organization." 
Jackson (1969) advocates that psychiatry shift to viewing the 
individual in the larger context. He outlines the principles of 
systems theory, its suitability to the interpersonal context, and its 
reorganization of world view in relation to causality. To Jackson, 
this view does not deny the value of individuality and subjective 
experience, but does emphasize "a new dimension in the study of 
human behavior, an interactional perspective which all who would 
involve themselves in the affairs of mankind have a responsibility 
to recognize. Attention to the individual in the extreme is 
artificial and cannot be the basis for realistic actions" (p. 395). 
Haley (1971 b) points to a number of premises which family 
therapists seem to share "about human problems and· the nature of 
change despite the fact that they work with families in quite 
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different ways" (pp. 227-8), The premises incude conceptions 
which are strikingly similar to those of the ecological approach. 
These include (a) the view of family therapy as an orientation to 
human problems rather than simply a method; (b) primary focus on 
interpersonal interaction over focus on the individual; (c) more 
emphasis on the present and less on causal factors; (d) diagnosis 
as being less extensive rather than a long, formal procedure; 
(e) the therapist viewed as part of the diagnosis; ef) emphasis on 
the positive direction in which conflicts must move as opposed to 
interpretation of hostility; and eg) greater emphasis on problem 
definition over formal method as key to the work (pp. 228-34). 
Auerswald ( 1969, pp. 373, 373-86) joins the "small bu t 
growing group of behavioral scientists who advocate a realignment 
of current knowledge and reexamination of hUman behavior within 
a unifying holistic model, that of ecological phenomenology," whose 
implications for psychiatric treatment and human services he 
outlines. Auerswald <1971, pp. 267-8) speaks of the linear and 
the ecological as contemporary forms of thinking which, broadly 
speaking, represent the pre- and the post-electronic generations. 
He declares that techniques are needed in family therapy to bridge 
the generation gap produced by this social mutation of younger 
people's thinking. In a description of an ecological view of 
family work, he proposes an "intersystems conference" at a 
convenient site, of all family members and related persons from 
various other systems "who have issued a call for help," or who 
have "an interest in the family or its members" <1971, p. 277). 
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Sherz (1970), with reference to social casework, discusses 
the theory and practice of family therapy. Family is "the unit of 
investigation and treatment. II As a system, it is seen as two or 
more units relating to each other so "that if there is a change in 
one it affects the other and the reaction of the second in turn 
affects the first." It is "a regularly interacting, interdependent 
system forming a unified whole, transacting life events among its 
members" (p. 223). As an "open ended system," "members enter 
and leave" during its life-cycle. Each family system has its 
unique "biological, cultural and social forces, with its own 
recognizable role formations," patterns of behavior, communication, 
emotional reactivity and coping, as well as being unique in its 
values and modes of relating to its larger social community. As a 
gestalt, it is "larger than the sum of its parts" (p. 224>' When 
a couple's marital projection system stabilizes into an equilibrium, 
it becomes self-perpetuating in its behavioral and affective 
expressions (pp. 226-7). Family developmental tasks are seen as 
paralleling those of its members (p. 229). "Rules, roles, 
identifications, alliances and collusions" emerge in communication 
patterns and represent the family structure <p. 236). 
Some influences of systems theory through casework and 
psychiatry in conceptualizing family therapy, and in the direction 
taken by family treatment in social casework have been briefly 
sketched. These influences both reflect and integrate with 
holistic, ecological thinking as it has developed at the direct 
practice level of social work. 
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Some Group Work Themes and Influences: 
Historical and Conceptual Notes 
The roots of contemporary group work are found in the latter 
nineteenth and early twentieth century settlement, youth service 
agency, recreation and adult education movements (Reid, 1981, pp. 
45-102). Early settlements in America were dedicated to the welfare 
of immigrants served in their own neighborhoods (pp. 53-5>' The 
early youth ·service agencies, such as V's, Scouts, Boys Clubs and 
Jewish youth agencies were usually local endeavors (p. 63), which 
served to fill leisure time with new interests and to provide 
"protection against the problems created by inner city life in a 
rising industrial society" (p. 62>' By the turn of the century, in 
the debate about the choices of large-scale or small group 
activities, Reid notes that a conviction was growing "that it was 
better to work intimately with a few rather than superficially with 
many," to help the individual effect positive life changes in a 
group process of joining with others toward common ends (p. 73). 
The reacreation movement, which included social workers, 
encompassed development of parks and playgrounds, use of schools 
as social centers, and recreational youth organizations such as 
II-H, campfire girls, and fraternal and youth organizations with 
cultural and religious commitments (Reid, 1981, pp. 91-6>' The 
functions of the adult education movement were (a) educational 
remedia tion, (b) occupational advancement, (c) "relational" 
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improvements, including parent-child education, Cd) pursuit of 
wider interests, and Ce) political orientation to influence social 
reform in the progressive era (pp. 96-100), By the end of the 
1920's, group process and direct member participation in both the 
adult education and recreation movements were seen by 1920 as 
means of enhancing problem-solving and social skills, providing 
support and enrichment, and preventing "delinquency and social 
maladjustment" Cp. 101), 
Moralistically, much early practice assumed that character 
components "could· be taught" in specific learning, regimentation, 
competitive sports and playground activities. In reaction, with 
Grace Coyle's influence in the 1930's, Dewey's ideas of progressive 
education were introduced (Reid, 1981, pp. 112-15), In a 
discussion on the collective thin king process, Coy Ie <1939, p. 79 ) 
sees the need for a consensual instrument, such as agreed-upon 
assumptions which may change, "through which the group puts its 
purpose into action." 
The group was an established service modality by the mid-
twenties (G. Wilson, 1976, p. 15>' Neighborhood centers became 
sociologists' laboratories for building a conceptual language to 
describe a group and its activity--so that by the early 1930' s 
workers were using terms such as "purpose, structure, social 
process, status and role, and stages of group development." 
Social psychology concepts such as acceptance, rejection, conflict 
and control were common (p. 17). 
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By the late 1930's, concern for method had evolved into 
group work training in social work schools, the start of a 
professional association, and the incorporation in 1935 of a Group 
Work Section of the National Conference of Social Work (G. Wilson, 
pp. 16-17, 19-22>' 
In the 1940's, group work's alignment with social work grew 
clearer as its foci on both human relations and program elements 
were clarified by Coyle <1946~ 1947), Cohen (1947) and others, to 
distinguish it from recreation. It increasingly entered social work 
rela ted agencies such as children's institu tions, hospitals and 
churches. In 1946 the American Association for the Advancement of 
Group Work was reconstructed into the professsional social work 
association known as the American Association of Group Workers 
( Reid, p . 145 >. 
As Reid <1981, pp. 132, 155-63) points out, the sociologist 
Bogardus in his 1930' s writings, shaped the idea of therapeutic 
ends for group work. From the "activity group therapy" of 
Slavson, in the mid-thirties, along with child guidance work of 
Redl, Konopka and others, group work had expanded into 
psychia tric hospitals by the late 1940' s. Literature from the late 
forties to the mid-fifties included Wilson and Ryland's Social Group 
Work Practice (1949) which combined knowledge in social science, 
psychiatry, social work method and record-keeping, and the use of 
media in problem-solving and in individual and group 
I 
development. Konopka <1949, 1954) dealt with use of group work 
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method for disturbed children, unwed mothers, the "aged," and 
prisoners. Klein (1953) in valuing the transmission of culture, 
role of the agency, and selective use of home visits, saw group 
work as imparting democratic concepts, and social responsibility to 
educate people in their roles as citizens. Philips (1957), with an 
emphasis on the nature and use of group work skills, stressed the 
utility in society of mutual, interdependent cooperation. 
From 1959 to 1963, deliberations of the Group Work Section of 
the NASW Practice Committee on the nature of social group work led 
to an understanding of areas of difference between group work and 
other social work methods. These include group methodology, 
differential use of common bodies of knowledge (with emphasis on 
social psychology and group dynamics), emphasis on program 
media and service systems (over sociocultural notions of society 
and personality). There was also the view of a different group 
work emphasis °in defining some purposes of social work. This 
included "the restoration of personal and social dysfunctioning, 
the prevention of social and personal breakdown, the promotion of 
normal social growth, especially in stress periods, and the 
provision of opportunity for personal enhancement and citizen 
participation" (Reid, p. 185). While the "purpose, focus, goals 
and sanction ofi the service" are affected by its setting and the 
people it serves, notes Reid <1981, pp. 183, 183-9), the group 
method of practice remains basically the same. 
In response to the Committee's study, Schwartz (1964) 
described what he saw as three models of group work practice, 
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while Rothman and Papell (1966) subsequently identified three 
I 
models, each emergent in response to service needs. These are 
summarized as follows. (a) For Schwartz, the medical model, seen 
as akin to Rothman and Papell' s remedial model, focuses on 
investigation, diagnosis and treatment of a problem. (b) His 
organic system, similar to the reciprocdl model found by Rothman 
and Papell, conceives a "network of reciprocal activity" for an 
entire situation. (c) Schwartz notes a scientific model, which 
resembles problem-solving steps in science; while Papell and 
Rothman describe a social goals model whose purpose resembles 
that of community organization (Reid, 1981, pp. 189-90; Northen & 
Roberts, pp. 370-1). 
The Encyclopedia of Social Work (1971) presents differences 
which become blurred between (a) the preventive and 
rehabilitative approach of Garvin and Glasser (1971, pp. 1263-72) 
(b) the developmental approach of Tropp (1971, pp. 1246-52) and 
(c) the interactionist approach of Schwartz. (1971, pp. 1252-63) 
Northen and Roberts (1976, p. 371) found a comparative analysis 
of approaches,represented in several divergent, contemporary 
papers to be rather difficult. 
Reid (1981) summarizes that "on a continuum, there are two 
polar views, with various people taking stands at stages in 
between." (p. 191) The extreme of (a) the preventive and 
rehabilitative approach (also known as the remedial, or 
organizational model> focuses on the "formed" group as a means by 
which the worker can meet specific, studied and diagnosed 
operationally definable goals for each "selected" member. Social 
and cultural norms stipulate the criteria with which to describe 
problem behavior and expected degree of change (pp. 191-2, 
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193-5). Proponents of (b) the interactionist (or reciprocal) 
approach see themselves as" humanist and existentiali"st, and view 
the group as "a system of mutual aid wherein the worker and the 
members are engaged in the common enterprise of carrying out the 
group goals" (p. 191). They conceive a helping process which 
serves "both the individual and society," by mediating needs of 
both, in an organic, "symbiotic" relationship (p. 195). A 
reciprocal relationship between member and group is assumed, with 
the worker serving as mediator and enabler in "the convergence 
between client need and agency service" (p. 198) toward correcting 
and preventing relationship imbalances. Rehabilitation, service 
provision and prevention are included. Attention is focused on 
relational processes over outcomes. Current functioning rather 
than diagnosis is the basis of assessment. Agreement on mutual 
identification of common ground, obstacles, interests, expectations 
("vision") and "contracts" is central to assessment and 
intervention (pp. 195-9). The basic compatibility of a systems 
framework with Schwartz's (1976) approach is evident when he 
speaks of the capacity inherent in systems terminology (p. 181) for 
an active, reciprocal view. He states: "The model of the open, 
organic system offers us the opportunity to put together all the 
""" ---"-"""---
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dimensions we need into an image of the helping relationship in 
action" (p. 180), 
In Tropp's developmentdl dpproach, as in the interactionist 
view, the group as a microcosm of society is a means through 
which people help one another in their growth and development. 
Emphasis is on natural growth processes. The group gives 
members and worker an experience of authenticity in communication 
through effective task performance. Assessment embraces the group 
and the individual (Reid, 1981, pp. 199-200>' 
Reid (1981, pp. 202-5) cites the social goals approach as 
I 
resembling community organization methods in its effort to deal 
with problems related to the social order and to social value 
orientation. The foci are social consciousness and responsibility, 
with the worker having responsibility for their cultivation. Group 
work services are conceptualized at the community level, of which 
the agency is an integral part. The worker facilitates group 
process, so as to free the members and their group process to 
facilitate change. 
We have seen emergent themes of mutuality, interdependence 
and interaction, as well as incorporation of an open systems 
approach, and emphasis on natural growth processes. In addition 
to the focus on the collective, there is a recognized place for the 
individual and for the larger community in group work theory. 
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An Ecological Systems Approach and the Life Model 
Some Historical-Theoretical Notes on Systems Conceptions. 
Systems theory, as an alternative to the linear-mechanistic 
approach, presents possibilities for more holistic and organismic 
theory and practice than its predecessor on two counts. First, it 
makes a break with mechanistic notions of causality. Second, while 
norms do not disappear--a model must have norms to operationalize 
its value base--the systems approach treats norms from a relativist 
perspective, based on the state of a system at a particular time. 
Bertalanffy (1968, p. 11) traces the emergence of general 
systems theory to Kohler's contribution to Gestalt psychology in the 
1920' s, which dealt with inorganic "gestalts". Its major axiom is 
that the perception of an object is determined by the configuration 
or context of which it is a part. A perception is determined by 
the relationship among the various components of a perceptual 
field, and not by the fixed characteristics of certain components. 
In the late 1930's, Lewin (1939/1951, pp. 148-53; 1943/1951, 
pp. 53-6; 1946/1951>, in his field theory, draws this relativistic 
metaphor into the realm of the animate individual's social 
behavior. He draws upon two disciplines. From the mathematics 
of topology Lewin borrows axioms for the graphic definition of 
structures as the relationship among spaces with open or closed 
boundaries. From physics he draws principles for the dynamic 
description of action and interaction by these structures, over time 
(Cartwrigh t, 1959; Hall and Lindsey, 1970, pp. 197, 225-6 >. 
, . 
57 
Bertalanffy (1968), in the 1920' s, advocated a conception of 
organismic biology which sees the living organism as an active 
. whole, whose parts are mutually interdependent and interactive, 
and whose biological unity is interdependent with the external 
environment (p. 12). General systems theory challenges' old 
scientific views against purposive behavior and teleology as 
"mechanistic". In general systems theory I Bertalanffy sees a 
revolution in scientific thinking. It bypasses the limitations of 
analytical procedures in which an entity is investigated by 
resolving it into its parts and reconstituted from the sum of its 
parts. General systems theory recognizes the interactive 
relationship among parts, unaccounted for in the earlier view (pp. 
17-19>' Thus, problems once unmanageable for science may be 
"progressively explored" (p. 23). His aim is a "better 
understanding, explanation, prediction, control of what makes an 
organism, a psyche, or a society function" <1969, p. 36). This 
aim presents opportunities to expand social work's knowledge and 
practice bases. 
Basic Systems Conceptions. 
The part-whole relationship. In a systems conception, the 
whole is equal to more than the sum of its parts. In a simplified 
illustration, a square board and four sticks are a square board 
and four sticks. Put them together in one way and you have a 
table. Change the relationship of these components, and you have 
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an empty picture frame. Change their rela tionship again, and you 
have the frame of a pyramid. Add hinges to the "legs" to create 
a folding table to store in a narrow space. Thus, relationships 
among the parts of these simple inert systems give to the whole 
potentialities which it would not have if seen merely as the sum of 
its parts. 
Transactions. These relationships are aatively conceived in 
living systems terms as processes called transactions, which 
maintain or enhance the system. Transactions occur at interfaces, 
the "surfaces" or boundaries which two or more parts have in 
common. The process of information crossing interfaces constitutes 
a transaction. We learn about the state of the system, its proces-
ses and structures by observing transactions among its parts, and 
between it and other systems. Transactions serve as primary 
data. Other information is derived or inferred, based on our 
understanding of how systems function in toto (Stein, 1974, pp. 
66-72) . In an ecological perspective, transactions a·re "continuous 
reciprocal exchanges in the unitary person: environment system, 
through which each shapes, changes, or ot~erwise influences the 
other over time" (Germain & Gitterman, 1987, p. 489 ). 
We have previously reviewed the implicit values of 
determinism and holism as they have reappeared in major 
reformulations of a clinical-normative model for casework. 
Movement has been away from a rigid determinism, toward more 
holistic and organismic approaches. General systems theory 
certainly fits with this trend. The emphasis on transactions 
allows for an organismic viewpoint. 
belies its potential for holism. 
Its encompassing quality 
Eguifinality. The principle of equifinalit.y may be seen as 
an "anti-determinist" principle. It means that a living system's 
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"final state" may be attained from varied beginning conditions in 
diverse ways. One particular history alone is not the only route 
to a particular state, with all cybernetic systems, whether livirig 
or non-living (Miller, 1969, p. 125>' Gray and Rizzo (1969, p. 
15) note that "equifinality is characteristic of open systems 
tending toward a steady state. Equifinal phases are reached from 
different starting points." They are maintained for an interval 
until progressive forces induce a "new equifinal phase." 
A living system is an open system. The relatively open 
boundaries of the system, and of its component subsystems, allow 
for communication of "information" which helps to maintain and 
enhance the internal organization of the system. A relatively 
closed system, however, will move toward further disorganiza tion, 
entropy and eventually cease to exist as a system; it will become 
merely the sum of its parts. Hence, the acceptance of a living 
systems approach acknowledges the principle of negative entropy 
as necessary to the enhancement of life processes and their 
progressive organization. It is a process in which the living 
system restores its own energy and repairs breakdowns of its 
organization (Miller, 1969, pp. 72-5). 
----_. __ .... - .... 
The concepts of teleology and purposeful behavior. For 
Bertalanffy, '" purposefuness' in the living world means only 
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that ... events are arranged so as to guarantee the maintenance of 
the organism .... This is not an anthropomorphic interpretation of 
happenings in the living world, but a simple observation of an 
apparent and essential characteristic of living things" Cl975b, p. 
69). Thus, the issue of purposeful behavior is seen as a 
legitimate scientific question <1975a, p. 43>-
These concepts are actively rejected by mechanistic science 
as "unscientific, metaphysicaL .. remnants of primitive animistic 
thinking" CBertalanffy, 1975a, p. 43>' In the linear-mechanistic 
approach, determinism is operationalized through assumed "laws" of 
nature. A person, group or society has little control over these 
laws (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 16). Thus, the person, group or 
society largely develops without its own purpose, yet purposefully 
must try to affect its own development. 
The conflict between determinism and free will runs deep in 
modern psychology and social science. Psychoanalysis has dealt 
with the conflict by calling upon the concept of overdetermination, 
which is a form of linear causality, in which several historical 
lines of causation sequentially or simultaneously determine an 
effect (Freud and Breuer, 1895/1955, pp. 173-4, 212-213, 263, 
287-90; Munroe, 1955, pp. 54-5). 
The living systems approach minimizes this polarity by 
accepting the notion of purposeful behavior. Self-maintenance, 
elaboration, and differentiation toward increased organizational 
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complexity are seen as the purpose of a living system. Entropy 
and disorganization need not be ultimate ends. We may observe a 
system's attempts to maintain this steady state, toward which a 
living system is deemed to strive. I t reflects the purpose of the 
system. This purpose is not, however, so much inferred out of 
choice as out of necessity. Miller elaborates that those systems 
which lack purposive movement toward a "focal condition" (which 
is a future degree of organization equal to or greater than that of 
the current steady state) will disorganize through entropy. 
Systems theorists attribute the choice of self-maintenance to 
purpose rather than to chance, for living systems (Miller, 1969, 
pp. 121-5>' 
Etiology is seen in terms of forces and situations 
(Auerswald, 1969, p. 377>' The state of organization, whether 
steady, increasing or decreasing, is the result of the state of 
each system component in active relationship to other components. 
Etiology is reflective of the past through the mechanism of 
feedback over time. Feedback enables a system to continuously 
assess its steady state, which is never static (without reference to 
particular "causes" which inevitably, by particular "laws," might 
lead to a particular steady state). Change from one state toward 
another state occurs via exchange of information (transactions) 
which are monitored through feedback. A system continuously 
assesses feedback in order to move toward, or away from, or 
maintain a particular state (Miller, 1969, pp. 114-18, also 68-9, 
100-08) . 
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Some Historical-Theoretical Notes on Ecological Conceptions. 
The word ecolog.v derives from the Greek oikos: a house or 
place to live in, a habitation (Shepard, 1969, p. 1). Since its 
first use by the biologist Haeckel in 1868, notes Hawley <1950, p. 
3), it "has become generally recognized as an important branch of 
the biological sciences." 
Darwin I s theory of evolution may be seen as laying the base 
for a conception of common bonds among organisms (Shepard, 1969, 
6). Ecology deals with the relationship between organisms and 
their environment. I t is based on a view of "life as a system of 
dynamic interdependencies." Every organism, man included, is in 
a continuous process of ad.justing to an environment which is 
external to itself (Hawley, 1950, p. 3>' Organism and environment 
represent one functional unit. In the larger context, ecology 
refers to the adjustment to, and use of environment by an 
organized aggregate living population (Hawley, p. 66>' With a 
focus on human groups and their capacity to manipu·late their 
environment, McHarg (1969, p. 328) provides a broad description of 
ecology as a study of interactions of organisms with environment 
which contains other organisms. As stated by Rogers (1960, p. 
vii), human ecology is seen as "the study of the relations between 
man and his environment, II as each affects the other. 
Nevertheless, as Shepard states, ecology cannot be studied 
directly. "Only organisms, earth, air and sea can be studied." 
Ecology is "a scope or a wa y of seeing," a perspective ( 1969 , P . 
1 ) . This view requires a shift in our frame of reference and 
attitude toward life, so that relationships among things are as 
seen as being as real as the things, themselves Cp. 3). 
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An ecological perspective provides knowledge about the 
delicate relationships between people and their "changing physical 
and social environments." Ecology concerns "itself with the 
adaptive fit of organisms and their environments and with the 
means by which they achieve a dynamic equilibrium and 
mutuality." She elaborates that ecology provides a metaphor for a 
helping profession "concerned (a J with the relationships between 
human beings and their interpersonal and organizational 
environments, (bJ with helping to modify or to enhance the quality 
of transaction between people and their environments, and (cJ with 
seeking to promote environments that support human well-being" 
(Germain, 1973a, p. 326). 
The ecological metaphor provides an environmental context in 
which to apply the life model in a systems framework. We 
conceive interventions in natural life processes in a person I slife 
space. In contrast, casework in a medical-disease metaphor 
requires contrived processes in a created setting. At the service 
level for Germain, casework in the ecological metaphor encompasses 
the entire person in a "fluid real-life situation." It utilizes the 
healing and growth potentials of "human adaptive and coping 
capacities," and real social supports (Germain, 1973b, pp. 130-1). 
Basic Ecosystems Conceptions. 
Ecosystem. The term ecosystem was coined in 1935 by 
Tansley, a British plant ecologist. It specifies a holistic unit, 
composed of vegetation and its environment, which includes 
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climate, soils and animals. It refers to an entire site or habitat 
and everything included in it. There have been two trends in the 
use of the term ecosystem in contemporary literature. One focuses 
on productivity and energy relationships within the ecosystem. 
The other deals with the methodological problems of actually 
describing the ecosystem in toto. It is in the second area that 
notions of the "human ecosystem" in psychology and sociology are 
central (Egler, 1968, p. 247). 
"Systems theory and its various derivatives," says Willems 
(1977, p. 54) "offer promising tools for representing 
interdependence and simultaneous, time-related complexity." An 
ecological-systems approach may be seen as an attempt to apply 
the life-principles of the open system to the human ecological 
field. We choose the components of this field by ascertaining the 
processes within it which are necessary to the maintenance of life. 
These processes are transactions, operationalized as 
"communications processes" at interfaces between components the 
system. These "communications processes" include notions of 
transformation and exchange of matter and energy from a more 
concrete viewpoint, and the exchange of information from a more 
abstracted viewpoint (Stein, 1974, 18-24, 37-8; Miller, 1969, pp. 
68-83) . 
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Adaptation and fit. Hawley in his work on human ecology 
I 
sees "the central problem of life" to be adaptation "to those 
external conditions which provide the materials for existence, but 
which also impede and limit expansion" <1950, p. 16). Adaptation 
is a reciprocal concept which we may see expressed through the 
concept of fitness. 
Fitness, says Dubos (1972) "denotes fine adjustments among 
the various components of a system" (p. 180). Fitness of the 
oganism to the environment is conditioned b progressive, evolving 
adaptation over time. Fitness of the environment to man involves 
man' s design of his environment not only to avoid disease and 
pain, but to "aim at creating conditions favorable for the 
development of man' s anatomical physiological potentialities" (p. 
190>. "Man ... does not react passively to physical and social 
stimuli. ... He selects a particular niche, modifies it, develops it 
to avoid what he does not want to perceive, and emphasizes that 
which he wishes to experience" (Du bos, 1968, p. 49 >. 
Goodness-of-fit is an expression of the mutual, ongoing, 
suitedness an,d fit of the environment to human needs, both in 
smaller molar settings, as well as in the larger community. As 
stated by Alexander (1970>, "an irregular world tries to 
compensate for its own irregularities by fitting itself to them, and 
thereby takes on form" (p. 42). In applying this notion to design 
for human needs, he speaks of a "good fit" as opposed to a 
"misfit" as "a condition of harmony ... in the ensemble" (p. 48>' 
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Dubos <1965, pp. 256-79) implies a relatedness, even an 
equivalence, between health and "adaptive fitness," which 
constitutes not only a reciprocal adaptation between species (or 
person) and environment, but a range of capacities and limitations 
for such adaptation in past inheritance, current life, and 
anticipated future behaviors. 
In the ecological perspective, humans and the human 
environment reciprocally shape one another in ongoing adaptive 
processes. Social structure and institutions, and cultural 
expectations and norms in a historical era, "must supoport 
reciprocity, that is, they must be nutritive" (Gitterman & Germain, 
1976a, p. 2>' 
Stress and coping. Stress is a transactional concept which 
refers to a substantial state of "imbalance between the perceived 
environmental demands and people I s perceptions of their response 
capabilities" Coping is a transactional concept with a twofold 
requirement. It requires not only that the individual possess 
capacities and skills to deal with environmental demands, but that 
society provide the learning opportunities, motivational incentives 
and supports for the individual to develop and sustain the inner 
biological, psychological, affective, cognitive and perceptual 
processes which are needed for effective coping (Gitterman & 
Germain, 1976a p. 3>' Simply put, when coping goes well, a state 
of adaptedness, of fit, may be said to exist between person and 
environment. 
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The Life Model: Antecedents. 
If we combine living systems principles and the metaphor of 
human ecology, we have what may be called an ecological-systems 
approach to understanding people. A model for practice which fi ts 
with that approach is the life model. It may be traced to 
Bandler I S work C 1963, p. 33) in ego psychology. He enunciates a 
foundation on which to build principles of ego-supportive 
casework, by starting with the assumption of "progressive forces" 
and "regressive forces" in opposition. "Other things being equal, 
progressive forces are the stronger." Mental illness is seen as 
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"an expression of blocks, obstructions, interferences, arrests and 
fixa tions of the progressive forces, which leads to ... strengthening 
.and reinforcement of regressive trends. Our therapeutic task ... is 
twofold." One task is to identify and provide help in removing 
these obstacles. An orientation toward pathology makes this task 
central for many psychotherapists. A second task, which tends to 
be "neglected," is to identify progressive forces with which we can 
ally and mobilize at an approriate time. 
Oxley C 1971, p. 628) further develops the life model by 
linking it to five forces of natural change which are not mutually 
exclusive. These are Cal maturation, (b) interaction, (c) action, 
Cd) learning, and (e) crisis resolu tion . 
Chin C 1969) distinguishes between a model for "change" and 
a model for "changing". The former explains how a system 
undergoes change (i.e., its processes). For the latter, the 
change-agent uses what he knows of technical processes to help 
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the client system make choices about the scope and direction of 
change, and then facilitates change in the client system (pp. 
308-11) . Chin proposes the use of systems concepts, includung 
concepts of development over time, to formulate an intersystem 
model for changing. While the model is implicitly presented in a 
community organization context, the author envisions its 
applicability to "diagnosing" different sized "units of human 
interactions--the person, the group, the organization, and the 
community" (p. 298). 
If we conceptualize change through intervention as occurring 
within a system, we must then determine the perspective which 
provides the largest number of effective "points of entry" into the 
system to facilitate change. Bandler <1963, p. 31) proposes life 
itself, "the natural process of growth and development and the 
rich trajectory of the life span." Oxley links "change" to "life' s 
natural processes of maturation and growth" <1971, p. 628) which 
occur for an individual. Thus, the life model may be said to 
provide a framework for the description of change in both 
developmental and current terms. 
Oxley r s <1971, p. 633) suggestion that in terventions be 
chosen with an eye toward facilitating the "natural change 
processes" is supported by Germain <1973a, p. 326) who notes that 
practice in a life model may provide needed action concepts to 
guide the practitioner in engaging a person' s progressive forces 
and adaptive potentialities, and in "mobilizing the environmental 
processes as helping media," and changing the environment. 
The Life Model: Initial Formulation. 
The conception which made the life model unique as it 
emerged in the latter half of the 1970's was Ca) the joining of 
emphasis on both persons and environments with (b) an effort to 
integrate method specialization (Gitterman & Germain, 1976b, p. 
601) . In their presentation on the integrated approach of an 
"ecological-reciprocal perspective" to the Council on Social Work 
Education, Germain and Gi tterman ( 1975), espouse a focus on 
reciprocity in the person-environment problem conception, and 
mutuality in the helping process. 
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In "Social Work Practice: A Life Model," Gitterman and 
Germain C 1976b, p. 602) present a conceptual base for the life 
model. It is "through an ecological perspective and a reciprocal 
conception of social work function [that] people and their 
environments receive simultaneous professional attention." The 
notion of "problems in living" encompasses issues implicit in 
"personality states" and "environmental states. II People are seen 
as "evolving and adapting through transactions with all elements 
of their environments. II As per Hartmann's conceptions of 
alloplastic and autoplastic adaptation, people are seen as forming 
the environments in which they live, and then having to adapt to 
their creations. 
The authors (Germain & Gitterman, 1975, pp. 2-4; Gitterman 
& Germain, 1976a, 1976b, pp. 602-3) implicitly call upon the work 
of Gordon (1969) and Bartlett <1970> with reference to the functions 
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and tasks which emerge from the profession's purpose of improving 
people's coping capacities and environments by a transactional 
emphasis on the person-situation interface. A three-phase helping 
process applies to all modalities. In the three cited articles 
(1975; 1976a, 1976b), the authors specify three areas of problems 
in living which are faced by individuals, families and groups. 
These are (a) transitions in life, (b) environmental obstacles and 
(c) dysfunctional interpersonal processes. Through contracting, 
problems and/or needs are identified and partialized in a joint 
worker-client endeavor, to be mutually melliorated over time and 
eventually evaluated. It leads to a mutually defined, partialized 
division of labor: The client's focus is life tasks; the worker 
follows shifting ·client concerns, utilizes knowledge and skill in 
communication and in action which restructures situations, and 
draws upon environmental processes and resources. 
Transitional problems and needs include periods in 
individual development when age-specific, maturational processes 
"transact with phase-specific environmental nutrients." Status-role 
changes occur during one's lifespan which mayor may not 
coincide with biologically determined developmental stages, from 
parenthood to retirement, to migration, job change, or the 
stigmatized status of being a psychiatric patient. Transitions also 
include expectable and exceptional crises, such as losses which 
are unexpected, premature or catastrophic, and whose immediacy 
and enormity set them apart from role transitions. Shifts, 
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replacements and mobilizations of adaptive patterns, coping 
capacities, sense of identity, and environmental resources are all 
called into play. It is important that there be opportunity for 
resolution of life tasks in life situations which fit with a client I s 
sense of time and space, life style and aspirations (Gitterman & 
Germain, 1976b, pp. 603-5). 
The realm of help with environmental problems and needs 
concerns itself with adaptive issues arising from both social and 
physical environments. Social networks, institutions and 
organizations comprise man I s created social environment to which 
he must adapt. Physical environments contain natural and man-
made things, and time and space (Gitterman and Germain, 1976b, 
p. 605>' Included in the social environment are service 
organizations, some of which may be tuned into client need, while 
others may be more geared to institutional homeostasis. Being a 
client, in some instances, may be stigmatizing (p. 605-6). Social 
networks of family, friends, neighbors and peers meet needs for 
rela tedness, recognition, protection and cultural iden tifica tion . 
They may also reinforce deviance and undermine autonomy. Some 
people lack adequate (or any) social networks. It is through the 
drawing on adaptive attachment behavior and/or the development of 
new relational experiences that a client may be helped to create 
and relate to an environment which enhances life processes. 
Arrangements of physical space (whether in home, classroom or 
hospital ward) "may invite or discourage particular behaviors," 
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and must be considered in evaluating maladaptive coping patterns. 
Interventions directed toward spacial variables or toward a 
client's experiences in the natural world, "enhance relatedness 
and increase the nutritiveness of the environment" (pp. 606-7). 
Maladaptive interpersonal problems and needs in families and 
groups include relationship and communication patterns which "may 
be poorly understood or altogether outside the members' 
awareness." Patterns such as power struggles, scapegoating and 
double bind may serve latent functions of maintaining system 
equilibrium, with maladaptive consequences for some members. 
Assessment may reveal sources of interpersonal conflict such as 
(a) discrepancy between life transition tasks of the collective and 
the individual; (b) "dysfunctional accommodation to environmental 
pressures and inadequacies;" (c) discrepant orientations of 
members to "power and love;" Cd) "normative conflicts among 
members;" and (e) problems related to the group's composition. 
Interpersonal barriers may also show up between client and 
worker. These are seen not as resistance, but as transactional, 
maladaptive relationship processes and communication distortions 
which arise from affecti've, cognitive, perceptual, transferential 
and countertransferential incongruities and discrepancies in 
client-worker transactions. The worker must remain continuously 
vigilant concerning possible barriers, and bring them into open 
discussion for mutual attention (Gitterman & Germain, 1976b, p. 
609>' 
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Parallel Development of Related Formulations: I nteractions of 
People and Environments in a Unified Practice Framework. 
In Social Work Practice: Model and Method, Pincus and 
Minahan C 1973) present a practice framework, whose "common core 
of concepts, skills, tasks and activities which are essential" to 
practice, reflect a professional unity and cohesiveness C p. xi). 
They see social work's function as concern with "interactions 
between people and their social environment which affect the 
ability of people to accomplish their life tasks, alleviate distress, 
and realize their aspirations and values," by Ca) enhancement of 
people's problem-solving and coping capacities, Cb) linkage of 
people with systems which provide them with resources, services 
and opportunities, Cc) promotion of humane effectiveness of these 
systems and Cd) contribution to social policy (Pincus & Minahan, 
1973, p. 9>-
Their intent is (a) to work directly with connections between 
dichotomous elements of "person/environment, clinical practice/ 
social action, and microsystems/macrosystems." Cb) Work may take 
place with people who are not identified clients but who affect 
planned change efforts. (c) MethodCs) of practice and size of the 
system(s) addressed are based on the "task at hand. II Cd) The 
frame of reference derives from the profession's function and 
purpose, and is not tied to a substantive theory. (e) The model is 
deemed useful in a variety of situations and settings. C f) I t is 
guided by a goal-oriented, deliberate, planned-change view of 
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practice, based on tasks in which the worker engages "in action 
as he works to change elements in a social situation in order to 
achieve a specified goal or outcome." The model is conceived as a 
base for practice in any method, in a generalist or specialist 
orientation (Pincus & Minahan, 1973, pp. xii-xiii). 
The authors <1973, pp. 9-14) observe three characteristics of 
a social work frame of reference These are (a) the performance of 
life tasks in a context of "resources and conditions" and which 
allow people the capacity to cope; (b) interaction with resource 
systems such that people's problems are seen as a function of 
their social situation; and (c) the relationship between people's 
private troubles in a social situation and policy issues which bear 
on these troubles. They cite C. Wright Mills· <1959, p. 8) to 
distinguish between resolution of personal troubles as immediate 
and personal matters, and as public issues which transcend both 
inner life and local environment. They note Schwartz's 
formulation <1969, p. 38) of the linkage between family or 
individual problem solutions and the public issue domain in the 
arena of the social agency, namely that "a private trouble is 
simply a specific example of a public issue, and ... a public issue 
is made up of many private troubles." 
In a community organization orientation, the authors declare 
that activities of the social worker "can be viewed in relation to 
four types of systems" (Pincus & Minahan, 1973, p. 54>. (a) The 
change agent system (worker and agency) carries the change 
... ..... . ._ ... -_._-----
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responsibility, and is influenced by its own inner and outer 
constraints and conditions and by the client system. (b) The 
client system, which may include potential as well as actual 
clients, engages the social worker's services as a change agent 
with some sort of working agreement or contract as to problem and 
intent. (c) The target system comprises the people whom the 
change agent needs to influence, directly or indirectly, in the 
accomplishment of his goals. Client systems and target systems 
often overlap, as when different members of a family seek <client 
system), or need (target system) help. (d) The action system 
includes the change agent and people through whom he works to 
achieve goals and influence the target system (pp. 53-68). 
Outcome goals are the envisioned state of a planned change 
effort. They are conceived, not merely in relation to the client in 
isolation, but "in relation to the outcome goals of all systems 
involved in a planned change effort" (Pincus & Minahan, 1973, p. 
87). Design and implementation of tasks to achieve of outcome 
goals is "the heart of practice." In order to link purpose and 
task, the worker must draw on practice skill and social science 
knowledge. The authors identify eight vital practice skills for the 
translation of purpose into task. These comprise the processes of 
(a) problem assessment, (b) data collection, (c) initial contacts, 
(d) con tract negotiation, (e) action system forma tion , (f) action 
system maintenance and coordination, (g) influence use, and 
finally (h) termination (pp. 96-8>' 
.. _. _._ ... _-_. __ ._--_ ..... __ .- ... -
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Of interest in this four-system view of social worker 
activities is the influence of community organization as developed 
in the 1950's and 1960's with social science theory drawn from the 
group dynamics movement whose roots go back to Kurt Lewin and 
field theory. While the group dynamics movement was not well 
received by early group work leaders, for its use of experimental 
methods with human emotions in the 1940's (G. Wilson, 1976, p. 
28; Hartford, 1971, p. 14), its concepts later made their way from 
the social sciences (Hartford, 1976, p. 50) and from community 
organization into efforts to broaden practice (e.g., Lippitt, Watson 
and Westley, 1958). 
Parallel Developments of Related Conceptions: Focus on 
Environments in the Structural Approach. 
Middleman and Goldberg introduce their book Social Service 
Delivery: A Structural Approach to Social Work Practice (1974), 
by stating that vital measures of service, in addition to quality, 
are its nature, goal, distribution and delivery; and its 
accessibility to the poor and powerless (pp. 4-5>' The authors 
define the "microlevel" of practice with a unit of attention labeled 
"plight of individuals." "The "macrolevel" view of people in society 
comprises a "perspective of general problems such as poverty and 
delinquency. " The structural approach is a "microlevel practice 
model, consistent with [a] .•. social welfare-through-social-change 
philosophy [sic]" (pp. 5-6). 
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The structural approach stresses environmental adjustment to 
I 
meet the needs of individuals, as contrasted against other practice 
orientations which seek to help individuals adjust to situations, 
gain insight, or change ways of thinking and acting (9). The 
two assumptions of the model are (a) that individuals' problems 
are a manifestation of social disorganization, and (b) that "social 
change is the obligation of the social worker, and begins with the 
direct service conc;eptualization of a response to a suffering 
individual (Middleman & Goldberg, 1974, pp. 12-13>' 
Two dimensions, which the authors <1974, pp. 18-23, 24) 
visually depict as two axes on a graph, known as "locus of 
concern" and "persons engaged" are utilized to describe four 
conceptual categories of activity, visually pictured as four graph 
quadrants, with which social work is concerned. These categories 
include activity which involves the worker's direct contact with a 
particular sufferer (a) out of concern for that sufferer, and (b) 
out of concern for a related category of sufferers; and direct 
contact with others (c) out of concern for a category of sufferers, 
and (d) out of concern for a particular sufferer. The first two 
I 
categories involve direct engagement of one or more people to 
benefit them, or to benefit of others like them. The third includes 
research, policy development and social planning; while the fourth 
includes community-oriented practice. This model for research and 
policy planning, is seen as enabling focus both on the service, 
and on gaps in its delivery to underserved groups. 
--------- -,--, ,-- ,----
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Middleman and Goldberg C1974, pp. 28-31> see this four 
quadrant model as allowing for a conceptualization of 
specialization which is related to the actual work, rather than a 
conceptualization which evolves for historical reasons and is later 
justified with partial theories. Practitioners whose work covers 
all quadrants but that of direct contact with "others" out of 
concern for a "category of sufferers," is seen as being involved in 
the service delivery realm. Those social workers who work in all 
quadrants except direct service to a "particular sufferer" out of 
concern for that sufferer are seen as specializing in social policy 
and planning. 
The approach's four principles follow: (a) Accountability to 
the c1ient(s) includes a contract to operationalize accountability. 
(b) Following the demands of the client task(s) requires the 
worker to flexibly move from one type of service quadrant to 
another (such as from direct service to a sufferer, to service to 
others on behalf of the sufferer. (c) Maximizing the potential 
supports in the client's environment involves modifying eXisting 
structures and the creation of new ones, to meet people's needs. 
Finally, (d) an assumption of least contest requires the worker to 
exert the least amount of pressure needed to accomplish a client 
task, with minimized counterpressure and resistance in the target 
systems (Middleman & Goldberg, pp. 32-53>' 
Roles of advocate, mediator, broker and conferee are seen as 
enabling for the client in task accomplishment (Middleman & 
Goldberg, 1974, pp. 54-80), The role of advocate is a difficult 
-------------,,-
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one, in providing help to a powerless client. The worker must 
attend to the ongoing importance of both informed client choice and 
pitfalls of conflict escalation between client and target system. 
He must adhere to the principle of least contest and enter a 
system at the lowest possible hierarchical level, proceed upward, 
and be ready to shift stance when concession is obtained (pp. 
55-9) . The role of mediator, formulated in social work by William 
Schwartz, is based on the concept of mutual aid. Mediation, in 
this practice model, presumes a not-yet operational but nonetheless 
existing, complementary or identical common bond between parties, 
I 
which a mediator must help the parties to rediscover Cpp. 59-65). 
The role of broker, linking clients to community resources, assumes 
the existence of clear, complementary interests of client need and 
agency service. The authors (pp. 65-72) describe brokerage as 
the oldest social work role, originating with friendly visitors and 
settlement house workers. It entails location, interpretation and 
creation of resources for those in need. The role of conferee, 
involves a "conference" encounter in which the worker and 
otherCs), equally obligated participants, who .jointly consult, 
compare opinions and deliberate, and develop action to be 
implemented. It is a decision-making process which in some 
helping relationships, may be the worker's principle role. In some 
situations, movement into conferee roles for worker and client may 
highlight initial exploration and task accomplishment, at the 
beginning and ending phases of the work. 
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In their effort to move toward greater precision in practice, 
Middleman and 'Goldberg <1974, pp. 83-7) emphasize skill. They 
define "skill" as the production of specific behaviors which are 
directed toward specific outcomes. There are twenty-seven specific 
behaviors which are tied to conditions which facilitate their use. 
These behaviors are conceptually grouped into six skill areas: 
Ca) Stage setting calls for behaviors which needed to initiate 
interaction. Cb) Attending involves taking in data. (c) Engaging 
feelings, and Cd) engaging information refer to behaviors which 
deal with and take in both the affective and informational content 
of messages. Ce) Managing interaction involves behaviors which 
monitor message flow. (f) Engaging barriers refers to use of 
behaviors which reduce or remove barriers to task accomplishment. 
Ongoing evaluation is referred to as analytic behavior. It 
involves Ca) utilizing a frame of reference Ca theory) through 
which to impart meaning to data and Cb) cognitively exploring 
alternative explanations, from the points of view of both patterns 
over time, as well as moment-to-moment phenomena. Other 
components of analytic behavior are the understanding of 
(c) social contexts, Cd) of overt and covert motifs and Ce) of 
underlying metamessages which contradict expressed themes 
(Middleman & Goldberg, 1974, pp. 87-9>' 
Work which is not directly part of direct engagement with 
client tasks in service delivery is given the term "metawork." 




category. These mayor may not be supportive of service delivery 
(Middleman & Gold berg, 1974, pp. 153-5 >. "The plight of workers 
'in bureaucratized systems who cannot find time to serve the 
enormous number of clients at least partially springs from the 
disproportionate amount of metawork to work, ritualized by the 
agency through history and tradition" (p. 155). In this context, 
attention to the metawork and to the structure of and forces within 
the agency itself as an organization is vital as the metawork 
impacts on agency effectiveness, staff morale and productivity, 
program, and ultimately on service delivery (pp .170-8). 
For Middleman and Goldberg (1974, pp. 183-9), choice of 
social science theory has political implications, based on what is 
and is not emphasized. Theories are tools to be used in the 
performance of professional assignments. Social theories which 
locate the problem in the environment are seen as being compatible 
with values which underlie the structural approach. By virtue of 
its view of the probelm source as lying within the individual, 
psychoanalytic theory is seen as incompatible with the structural 
approach. 
Parallel Development of Related Formulations: Action and 
Competence. 
Maluccio and Marlow (1974) note the literature' s ~ack of a 
comprehensive formulation about "contract." They clarify its 
purposes as a shared opportunity for explicitness in a process of 
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articulating differential expectations, roles and responsibilities It 
enhances client self-determination, is open to reformulation, is 
flexible, and signifies joint contributions to a positive outcome. 
Maluccio (1974, p. 30) discusses action as a practice tool in 
casework. He sees no theoretical approach which provides 
sufficient rationale for the use of action in practice, nor for the 
devlopment of practice-related principles about its use. Maluccio 
(p. 31> examines uses of action in casework. He drawson the ego 
psychology formulations of Hartmann, Erikson and White who view 
the person as an active, and not simply reactive, life participant. 
Examples of action include (a) role playing in family therapy, to 
enhance client capacity to cope, through concrete experience; and 
(b) encouraging parent-child participation in social activities in 
residential treatment to promote competence and a positive sense of 
self. This is seen as congruent with principles of ego psychology, 
which highlight the value of action for autonomy, competence, 
self-image, potentiality, creativity and mastery. It also makes 
alive the tenets of client participation. and self-determination. It 
enables the worker to "identify, mobilize, and ally himself with 
the client's potentialities, natural life processes, and adaptive 
patterns." It coincides with "a revitalized casework method 
patterned after life itself," and with the use of purposive activity 
to stimulate "growth, adaptation and progressive forces." 
Maluccio (1974) conceptualizes the use of action as a 
diagnostic tool, an instrument of treatment, a culmination of 
- -- ---_._.-----
treatment, an outcome measure, and a means of mobilizing people 
and resources "in the client's ecological context" (p. 31). He 
distinguishes between use of artificial activities provided for a 
client's benefit (such as role-playing and activity groups) and 
action which occurs naturally in a client's life (such as social 
interaction, work, and play). Maluccio sees the la tter' as more 
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meaningful and potentially more effective, as it is closer to the 
individual's life process of growth and adaptation (pp. 31-2>' As 
a central rationale, he cites White's formulation of effectance, 
emphasis on the ego strengthening effect of successful interaction 
with the environment, feeling of efficac.Y, and "cumulative 
development of a sense of competence." Thus, "engagement in 
purposive, goal-directed activities can stimulate the person's 
coping efforts and strengthen his adaptive capacities" (p. 32). It 
counters helplessness, low self-esteem and poor reality-testing 
which may be experienced in the helping process (p. 33). 
For action to be effective, a client must be ready, 
moti va ted, and experience tension such as anxiety or a hopeless 
dream (Maluccio, 1974, p. 33>' Mutual effort is vital to help a 
client evaluate alternatives and reach agreement on meaningful 
goals, tasks and procedures to be achieved by and with the client 
with support systems and not in isolation. The systems theory 
concept of equifinality may enable the worker to recognize the 
possibility of varied pathways to the same result. Emphasis is on 
the growth potential of life events through action (pp. 34-5>' 
CHAPTER III 
Theoretical and Historical Considerations 
Since the Late 1970' s 
Some Developments in the Ecosvstems Perspective 
On Ecological Inquiry. 
8A 
Bronfenbrenner in The Ecology of Human Development <1979, 
pp. 18-21) takes an interesting position on inquiry and research. 
He refers to McCall <1977, p. 336) who sees naturalistic inquiry as 
limited in its ability to provide necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the manipulation and control of relevant variables, toward the 
unequivocal demonstration of causes for many major behaviors. 
Bronfen brenner (p. 20) rejects McCall's "implied dichotomy between 
rigor and relevance and the assumed incompatibility between the 
requirements of research in natural situations and the applicability 
of structured experiments at an early stage in the scientific 
process." He sees the experiment as a powerful, basic heuristic 
tool. For Bronfenbrenner, an experimentalist view of research on 
human development (a) has ethical and practical limitations for 
manipulation of variables, (b) dictates rather than serves the ends 
of inquiry, and (c) excludes the breadth of naturalist observation. 
Yet a naturalist position need not exclude a place for a rigorous 
experimental approach. 
Two themes about ends and means of ecologically-oriented 
human development research stand out for Bronfenbrenner (1979). 
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First (as in the naturalist paradigm), the main purpose of the 
ecological experiment is not hypothesis-testing, but discovery of 
"systems properties and processes that affect and are affected by 
the behavior and development of the human being" (pp. 37-8>' He 
describes the Soviet transforming experiment by citing a verbal 
communication with Professor A.N. Leontiev that American 
researchers seem to seek to explain how a client has become what 
he is, while those in the Soviet Union strive to discover how he 
may become what he is not. This involves an informed "systematic 
alteration and restructuring of existing ecological systems" to 
challenge prevailing social organization, belief systems, and an 
analysis of results in systems terms, with an eye to discovery of 
new social forms as contexts for realizing human potential (pp. 
40-1). Second, "the understanding of human development demands 
more than direct observation of behavior; "it requires examination 
of multi-person systems of interaction not limited to a single setting 
and must take into account aspects of the environment beyond the 
immediate situation containing the subject" (p. 21>. Inquiry need 
not be limited to the environment with which the sub.ject is in 
direct contact; it may also be remote and still have a direct effect 
on the human phenomenon under study. This refers to the 
reciprocity and interdependency of proximal as well as not-
immediately-present persons, environments, settings and processes in 
systems terms (pp. 41, 68>' For research findings, Bronfenbrenner 
conceives interactions as the centerpiece of main effects in 
ecological research (p . 38). 
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On Knowledge Building in Social Work. 
Gordon <1983, pp. 182-3) extrapolates on his agreement with 
E. J. Thomas's position (1980, p. 91) about knowledge building in 
the human services, to indicate that there is a valid difference 
between research which emphasizes technological irinovation for 
human services and methodology geared toward behavioral science 
knowledge building. Gordon sees the advancement of social work 
not as contingent upon particular research technique or 
methodology, but rather as resting upon the structure of social 
work knowledge, itself. Thus, ecclecticism (useful in both practice 
and research) may result in the use of different approaches in 
method development. Such ecclecticism, however, is useful only 
within· the context of the broader paradigm. Ecclecticism, for 
Gordon, cannot exist in an informed and usable fashion without a 
blueprint from which to serve as a basis for deciding on the nature 
of the problem is. 
Gordon (1983) sees the ecosystems approach as possibly 
providing "a conceptual framework for understanding the context of 
social work practice and the problems with which social workers 
deal" (p. 182). He highlights a "slow but documentable 
evolution ... [in] a growing recognition that social work has a 
frame of reference (maybe a crude paradigm) different from that of 
other disciplines: consideration of both person and environment in 
any effort to resolve a problem (p. 183>-
Gordon ( 1983, p. 184) sees a deficit in the general use of 
"human behavior" as the implicitly sought change in social work 
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practice, and as the generally utilized dependent variable in 
research. He believes that such research language--and by 
extension practice thinking--has tended to sidetrack the profession's 
ability to bring together conceptually the person and the 
environment as the two sources of independent (so called "causal") 
variables; and has sidetracked the profession's working toward a 
restatement of the dependent variable in a manner which accounts 
for a dual professional focus. 
Gordon (1983, p. 184) states that (a) "shifting the critical 
dependent variable from behavior over to the growth and 
development of individuals involved in attaining their human 
potential on the one hand and improving their environment on the 
other extends the dual focus from cause alone to outcome." 
(b) Establishing as th,e "new independent variable the match 
between the coping behavior of the individual and the qualities of 
the impinging environment," underscores that both environment and 
coping patterns are modified by man in order to effect a match 
which brings about change. In a summary look to the future, 
Gordon sees the profession's major task as firming up its basic 
frame of reference in pursuit of "a conceptual elaboration of the 
interface between the person and the environment and the ways of 
assessing and changing both the person's coping patterns and the 
impinging environment when this interface does not result in a 
match that is conducive to the development of man and all aspects 
of the environment." 
On the Perspective: An Overview. 
Meyer (1983a), pointing out the need for "a linkage between 
method and purpose" (p. 8), speaks of the ecological systems 
perspective as an integrating "conceptual umbrella beneath which 
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all practitioners can practice with an ecclectic repertoire to carry 
out a common purpose" (p. 5>' She sees consensus about models for 
practice rendered impossible by the large number of contemporary 
proliferating practice models, which in her view necessitates a 
common perspective for practice (p. 8>-
Meyer sees a need for an approach which considers context as 
a more inclusive transactional perspective under which various 
models may find a place to be called upon by a clinican. This 
requires a shift in the profession's central concern from an 
orientation which is focused on methods and skills to one in which 
a knowledge base is at the foundation. A knowledge base serves 
as the lens through which to view phenomena with which they work, 
determine needed interventions, and choose indicated methods 
through which to meet case requirements C1983a, p. 26). She views 
earlier, longstanding emphases on method as having resulted in 
models which highlight the process of practice C1983b, p. 243) (and 
in some models, such as the psychosocial model, client-related 
content as well>. With the exception of the life model (as well as 
crisis intervention, and Siporin' s "Situational Assessment and 
Intervention"), no model addresses "substantive psychosocial 
problems. " The life model has begun to do so with its "general 
89 
definitions of problems, such as transactional life events, 
I 
environmental obstacles, and interpersonal obstacles" (1983b, p. 
243) . 
Meyer (1983a) sees the life model as built around a unified 
process that enables it to meet practice requirements with 
indi viduals, families and groups. It supplants the professions 
linear approaches (p. 28>' As a practice model, "it attempts to 
apply the [ecological] metaphor directly, through interventions and 
goals, as an instrument of direct social work practice" (p. 29). 
Eco-systems theory is described as "a metatheory that offers social 
work practitioners/clinicians a way of thinking about and assessing 
the relatedness of people and their impinging environments; it does 
not specify the what (problem definition) or the how (methodology) 
of practice" (p. 29 >. 
For Meyer (1987), Gordon's and Bartlett's work on formulating 
a foundation for social work practice with emphasis on its common 
base, permitted the social worker "to be released from an a priori 
commitment to methodology," which would set the stage for the 
possibility of a more holistic view of case-related issues and 
I 
intervention possibilities (p. 413). She elaborates that "the 
purpose of a perspective on practice is to bind together social 
workers who are all doing different things to carry out the same 
purposes" (p. 414). 
Basic Premises of the Life Model 
In The Life Model of Social Work Practice, Germain and 
Gitterman note <1980, pp. ix-x, 2-7) their collaborative effort to 
develop an integrated practice method with individuals, families, 
groups, organizations, and aspects of communities. Their 
assumption is that there are many common skills in working with 
people, regardless of their level of organization. They contrast 
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pre-twentieth century, subject-object, fragmenting efforts toward 
certainty against the Eastern view which they liken to [post-
positivist] holistic efforts to understand the world. The shift has 
been represented by movement from a view-obstructing, within-the-
person problem of the medical-disease metaphor, to the ecological 
metaphor which focuses on an adaptive, evolutionary interchange 
and goodness-of-fit between people and their environments. 
Basic concepts in earlier articles (Germain & Gitterman, 1975; 
Gitterman & Germain, 1976a, 1976b) are operationally elaborated 
with numerous examples from practice. Stress, "a psychosocial 
condition generated by discrepancies between needs and capacities, 
on the one hand, and environmental qualities on the other," comes 
from three "interrelated areas of living: Life transitions, 
environmental processes, and interpersonal processes." "Life 
transitions impose new demands and require new responses." The 
environment may support or interfere with transitions, or "be a 
source of stress," to the individual, and to primary groups and 
their interpersonal processes (Germain & Gitterman, 1980, pp. 7-8). 
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The profession's social purpose, suggested by Gordon (1969) 
and Bartlett ( 1970), is the source from which the life model flows. 
It is the matching of people and properties of the environment "to 
produce transactions that will maximize growth and development, 
and improve environments" (Germain & Gitterman, 1980, p. 1). It 
is from this purpose that function, tasks and roles derive. It is 
through (a) problem definition, (b) client and worker roles, (c) 
phase of the helping process, (d) assessment and (e) professional 
action, by the worker who functions in the midst of the person-
group-environment encounter, that people and their environments 
I 
are helped to "overcome obstacles that inhibit growth, development 
and adaptive functioning" (pp. 1, 10). 
A problem occurs at the person-environment interface. Client 
and worker, in transactional relationship, bring to the encounter 
the influence of interacting forces in their respective life space. 
Transactional difficulties which create barriers to the helping 
process are seen not as resistances but as expressions of 
discrepant perceptions and expectations in relation to status and 
role, agency structure and function, and professional perspective 
(Germain & Gitterman, 1980, pp. 10-16>' 
It is through the assessment process that client and worker 
mutually seek to understand both objective facts and subjective 
reality. The empathic worker formulates hypotheses which may be 
modified in light of client feedback, outcomes of actions by worker 
and client, and worker-client interaction. The worker's stance 
involves integration of scientific rigor and humanistic compassion. 
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Assessment, a "habit of mind," is present in all phases, and is 
occasionally formalized at points in the helping process (Germain & 
Gitterman, 1980, pp. 18-19). 
Action involves a worker's range of skills and techniques, 
"to increase self-esteem, problem-solving and coping skills, to 
facilitate primary group functioning, and to engage and influence 
organizational structures, social networks and physical settings." 
These are "directed to adaptive capacities and environmental 
properties, and their interaction," in the context of client action, 
self-regulation, and achievement of competence. A mutual process 
occurs to determine a client's motivation and readiness for action 
in the context of available and responsive support systems 
(Germain & Gitterman, 1980, pp. 20-1). 
The three phases of the helping process, described in 
operational examples--initial, ongoing and ending--"ebb and flow 
in response to the interplay of personal and environmental forces 
... [and) are not always distinct in actual practice" (Germain & 
Gitterman, 1980, p. 17 >. 
The initial phase requires the worker's informed, cognitive 
and affective preparation to enter the client's objective reality 
and subjective life-space. Preparation may include the worker's 
use of role playing, attention to her own identification with the 
client's situation and to the reverberation of her feelings and 
reactions. In her welcoming, eliciting and taking in the client's 
presentation, she works toward the development of a mutual 
I, 
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understanding of next steps. She attends to situations of sought, 
prof erred and imposed services, with differential expectations and 
'explanations to clients in their mutual exploration and definition 
of the problems, tasks and goals. This process constitutes 
contracting and requires close attention to issues of client choice. 
Contracting engages the client, equalizes power discrepancies, 
addresses reciprocal accountability and gives focus and structure 
to the client-worker endeavor. The worker's skills must encompass 
both inquiry and caring (Germain & Gitterman, 1980, pp. 17, 
35-75L 
Three concepts deal with the worker's dilemma of how broad 
and deep to explore when the client's stresses call for resolution. 
(a) Relevance refers to how related an area is to the predicament 
at hand. (b) Salience refers to the dominant features of a 
client's situation. (c) Individualization is the effort to promote 
focus on the whole, unique person in his social context (Germain & 
Gitterman, 1980, p . 52 >. 
Choice of modality is considered by the process of the 
worker's looking at the nature of the problem, the relationships 
and the common concerns and needs of the people involved 
(Germain & Gitterman. 1980, 57-8). Time and locale, including 
rapidity of response, duration and location of service and of 
specific contacts must be addressed--always with thought to the 
cultural orientation, and physical and age-related needs of the 
clients (pp. 59-61). 
The ongoing phase involves the worker's helping the client 
deal with coping tasks related to three sources of stress: life 
transitions, environmental issues and interpersonal processes. 
This entails a flexible use of modalities, organizations, social 
networks, physical settings and temporal service arrangements 
(Germain & Gitterman, 1980, pp. 17-18>' 
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Life transitions include the effects of universal biological 
growth and developmental changes in the context of a multitude of 
cultural meanings and social forces. The worker must be in 
synchrony with clients' biologically triggered individual (and 
family> life cycle and reciprocal cogwheeling of generational needs 
and tasks. When all goes well, there is a release of innate 
adaptive capacities (such as cognitive development> and the growth 
of acquired adaptive capacities (including human relatedness and 
self-regulation> (Germain & Gitterman, 1980, pp. 77-89>' Cognitive 
development or regression in the stress of life transitions may 
result from status and role changes. A new status may be 
devalued, or out of synchrony with a person I s life cycle, or too 
complex for a person I s coping capacities (pp. 89-96). Crises are 
distinguished by their enormity, immediacy and time-limited 
nature. They are frought with hazards of regressed functioning, 
as well as potential for growth (pp. 96-9 >. Worker roles in life 
transitions may be that of the enabler who promotes development 
and sustenance of adaptive capacities, as well as the direct, 
instrumental teacher and the mobilizing enabler (pp. 99-102), 
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Environmental problems and needs are both social and 
physical. The social environment includes organizations (such as 
helping agencies). Their internal and external boundaries may be 
too open, with for example, insufficient effort to serve a client 
adequately before deciding on discharge; or too firm, so as to 
duplicate services rather than make appropriate referrals. 
Authority functions, policies, informal structures and latent 
functions of an agency may have a negative bearing on service if 
they are not understood and borne in mind by the worker. A 
client's social network of linkages among significant others may be 
a source of support and help. Its lack is stress-producing. Life 
cycle events and transitions as well as geographic and social 
mobility are part of the environment, and bear on the creation or 
dissipation of stress (Germain & Gitterman, 1980, pp. 137-47>' For 
heuristic purposes, within the physical environment, the authors 
distinguish the built from the natural world as shaping one 
another, and affecting and being affected by social environment 
and culture, from one's neighborhood to one's self-concept (pp. 
147-51) . Processes of problem definition, exploration and 
contracting are continuous in the context of varied worker roles of 
Ca) the collaborative mediator who helps the client and social 
system each to reach out to the other; Cb> the infuential, 
pressuring advocate; Cc> and the creating, motivating, and 
resource providing organizer (pp. 151-5>' 
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Maladaptive interpersonal process are sources of stress in 
families and formed groups which, as collectives, share similar 
interpersonal process. Legal and kinship ties of family 
membership are contrasted against the time-limited .joining of 
members in a formed group to work on common tasks under agency 
aegis (Germain & Gitterman, 1980, p. 203). 
Procreation and socialization of children are described as 
uni versal family functions in (a) traditional multigenera tional 
extended families, (b) reconstituted (or step)families, (c) communal 
families; as well as in (d) post-industrial nuclear families, and 
their variant one-parent families whose adult members may have 
been divorced, separated, widowed or never-married. Each type of 
family has its own particular areas of vulnerability to stress. 
The authors note that a common characteristic of female-headed, 
single-parent families is poverty plus a "severe shortage of hands" 
(Germain & Gitterman, 1980, p. 206) to do needed work. 
Maladaptive patterns of communication and relationship must be 
understood in the structural and cultural contexts of a family 
system. Attention is vital to spousal, parent-child and sibling 
subsystems, as well as to subsystems of extended family and 
non-related household members as well (pp. 203-12). 
The formed croup is generated under agency aegis to work 
on life tasks, as a bounded system. Its two main functions are to 
provide an ongoing nutritive group-environment interchange, and 
to establish and maintain a system of mutual aid among its 
members, toward the release of individal growth potential. When 
these functions are effected successfully an adaptive balance is 
achieved. When internal or external stress upsets tha t balance, 
the group copes to regain it, but may do so with maladaptive 
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patterns of communication and relationship. Formational elements 
such as size and composition may contribute to maladaptive coping 
patterns (as when a group is too large and heterogeneous to relate 
to members' intimate problems). The group fulfills its function 
through the development of a culture and social structure which 
mediate between group needs and environmental demands; and 
between individual needs and group demands. It is through the 
social structure that a network of roles emerges which provides for 
role-allocation and decision-making. Roles may shift and change; 
the social structure may be too tight or loose. An individual's 
autonomy, for example, may be reduced, and social interchange 
with the environment may be limited in a group whose structure is 
too tight (Germain & Gitterman, 1980, pp. 212-13). 
It is through the social structure, with its relationships and 
communication patterns, that a group emerges. Through members' 
values, knowledge and beliefs, the group develops norms with 
regard to rights and responsibilities, and develops styles of work, 
relationship and communication. When group norms are ambiguous 
or unevenly enforced, discrepancies arise which may create 
maladaptive communication patterns and relationships (Germain & 
Gitterman, 1980, pp. 213-15). 
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Maladaptive interpersonal patterns may emerge as 
(a) factionalism, where alliances may undermine the security and 
status of non- affiliated members; (b) monopolism of the manifest 
group process by one member, which undermines the purpose and 
task achievements of the group; and (c) scapegoating of one 
member with the consequence that some manifest group issues may 
be suppressed (Germain & Gitterman, 1980, pp. 215-17). 
It is through a multidimensional understanding of a family 
or formed group that data and impressions about structure and 
process are gleaned. It is with the participation of all members 
that structure, norms, values and goals, as well as maladaptive 
interpersonal patterns are explored and worked within the process 
of assessment and intervention. The worker deIines the problem in 
transactional terms as being located in the system or a sub-
system, and not in anyone individual (Germain & Gitterman, 1980, 
pp. 219-20), 
The worker may utilize enactment techniques such as role 
play, role reversal, soliloquy, or role enactment of an event; 
'sculpting' to create a person's physical-structural representation 
of a relationship; and cognitive tools such as the genogram, the 
ecomap, between-session assignments to clarify or improve 
relationships and communications; and audio- and videotape to 
enable members to observe themselves in a session (Germain & 
Gitterman, 1980, p. 239) . 
In the ending phase, a termination which is related to the 
helping process, along with mutual, client-worker evaluation, 
makes for a sense of closure for both client and worker (Germain 
& Gitterman, 1980, p. 18>' The authors outline a four stage 
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termination process, although every client may not go through each 
stage. The decision to end may be mutual, or imposed by the 
nature of the setting, as in the ending of a hospitalization. It 
may represent the end of a planned short term service; or it may 
be brought about by unexpected events, such as illness of client 
or worker. Regardless of its origin, termination poses specific 
tasks for worker and client (p. 255). 
It begins with the worker's preparation in a review of her 
knowledge of the client, the client-worker relationship, and their 
respective experiences and methods of coping with separation. She 
anticipates both her own and the client's reactions. Temporal, 
organizational, and modality factors may bear on the anticipated 
ending. A permanent separation mayor may not mesh with an 
agency's temporal structure, such as the ending of service in a 
school setting at the end of, or during an academic year. 
Disclosure of a student worker's status prepares both client and 
worker for a separation date, as does planned short-term 
treatment. Termination may induce less stress in family and 
group modalities when members retain the relationship to one 
another after a worker's departure. Preparation and anticipation 
of the loss of valued attachments may clarify positive outcomes 
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and increase the possibility that someone will seek service again, 
when in need (Germain & Gitterman, 1980, pp. 255-60, 292-4>' 
Four stages of separation are described. (a) Denial may 
serve as an adaptive maneuver to ward off anxiety, and give the 
person time to take in the meaning of a loss. It is followed by 
intense (b) negative feelings in various forms, including physical 
symptoms, self-destructi ve behavior, regression, excess dependence 
and anger at a projected experience of the worker's incompetence--
all of which the worker, in an empathic and detached mode, 
accepts as real to the client. Once these feelings have been 
successfully confronted, there may be a freedom for worker and 
client to experience a shared (c) sadness about the separation. 
There are three tasks in the (d) final release stage which allow 
the client an opportunity to integrate the service experience. 
These are recognition of gains and of uncompleted work; 
development of future plans such as termination, transfer, referral 
or self-directed tasks; and final good byes and disengagement 
(Germain & Gitterman, 1980, pp. 260-70, 292-4). 
Finally, evaluation invloves the worker's assessment of 
outcomes, with identification and explanation of what was and was 
not helpful. When practice is based on mutual agreement between 
clients and worker with regard .to problem definition, goals, 
planning and action, it tends to be easier to assess outcomes with 
clients. Evaluation adds to knowledge, to accountability of worker 
and agency to clients, to regulatory and funding bodies, to 
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research questions and to agency service (Germain & Gitterman, 
1980, pp. 278-94). 
Germain and Gitterman (1980, p. 297) discuss the worker's 
professional influence in the agency, with an eye toward 
improvement of the goodness-of-fit between needs and services 
They examine the external and internal effect of societal, 
professional and bureaucratic forces on the agency. Social values 
and norms affect human service organizations, for example, via 
private or public funding and regulatory bodies, and available 
financial aid to the poor. Such aid may be punitively given. An 
agency may be out of touch with contemporary social needs, and 
be unable initiate programs. Professional interests and ideology 
may conflict with those of clients, especially if an agency is 
fraught with competing interests and internal struggles (Germain & 
Gitterman, 1980, pp. 297-300), "Interdependent societal, 
professional and bureaucratic forces can CE'eate practices" which 
are self-serving, "at the expense of client interest" (p. 300), It 
is in three related areas that client problems tend to originate. 
I 
(a) The agency's definition of its services and purpose may pose 
a problem for client utilization, if need and problem are seen as 
existing within the client, so that external factors get little 
attention. Such a problem definition may reflect professional 
preferences, perhaps with ensuing Cb) structures and procedures 
which are unresponsive to client needs. The agency unit designed 
.. _ .. _ .. _._. __ ._--
to cope with community and bureaucratic forces may instead 
delegate such authority to staff and show little leadership. 
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(c) Service arrangements may then be inadequate or inaccessible 
(pp. 300-2>' 
It is seen as a social worker's responsibility to maintain a 
watchful eye on organizational processes which have a bearing on 
services to clients. When problems arise in these processes, the 
worker must try and modify them (Germain & GHterman, 1980, pp. 
300-2>' The authors have enumerated a five-phase procedure 
through which the worker may influence her agency to be more 
responsive to the needs of its clients. It is through attention to 
clients' expressions of need, review of records and other data, 
and attentive listening to· colleagues that a worker begins her 
(a) preparation phase with problem identification. She considers 
possible solutions, and tentatively identifies a change objective 
and particular means through which to attain it. She then begins 
a formal (b) initial organizational analysis by assessing which 
environmental forces and interpersonal forces are likely to be 
supportive and constraining of the plan. She also assesses her 
own influence. After she is satisfied in having sufficient 
information, the worker targets appropriate points of entry for the 
change effort. In the (c) entry phase she prepares to influence 
the organizational structure (especially the informal structure) 
toward responding favorably by positioning herself to influence the 
system by her competence, her influence upon others, her 
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appropriate use of client feedback, and the management of stress 
to which she has heightened in her getting agency personnel· to 
focus on the problem. Cd) The engagement phase involves the 
worker's use of demonstration, especially for problems related to 
professional function and program; collaboration, notably in "open" 
agencies where there we find goal consensus, as well as even-
handed resource distribution or staff personal relationships; 
persuasion, where power is unevenly distributed, and where there 
is no overall goal consensus; and conflict utilized with caution 
I 
and attention to inherent risks, notably when adversarial actions 
I 
may be called for in the face of sharp dissent about goals and 
methods. The achievement of a desired outcome calls for the phase 
of (e) implementation and institutionalization. This stage may be 
undermined by negation, delay, or scaling down by agency 
executives who may be uncommited or opposed to the change. 
Other impediments to implementation may be in slow "organizational 
machinery," incompatibility of the change with existing agency 
structure, and unclear or opposed staff who distort the change in 
carrying it out. Finally, "when the change in an organization's 
purpose, structure and procedures or service arrangements is no 
longer perceived as a change, but [rather] as an integral part of 
its ongoing activities," the innovation is considered to have been 
ins ti tu tionalized, and a stable staff member is handed the 
responsibility for its maintenance (Germain & Gitterman, 1980, pp. 
303-39) . 
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Toward Integrating the Person Focus 
I deas from Ego Psychology. 
Germain (1978a) sets out to identify similarities between ego-
psychology and general systems theory by translating the latter 
into ecological concepts, and then connecting these to ego theory 
(p. 535). Given ecology's concern with adaptation and the 
relations between organisms and their environments, Germain 
assumes its natural affinity with ego psychology, whose focus is 
on adaptation and relationship of the person to the environment. 
She declares that "general systems theory, the ecological 
perspective, and ego psychology call attention ... [to] the 
importance of the environment, and to the complexities of its 
relation with human development and functioning" (p. 548). 
Included are (a) conceptions of adaptation, and an (b) equating 
of the presence of stress with a lack of growth, or even of 
disorganization, when environmental nutriment (biological for the 
species and psychological for the ego) is inadequate. Also 
included are (c) the concepts of dynamic equilibrium (in systems 
theory), goodness-of-fit or adaptation (in ecology), and epigenetic 
development with cogwheeling of generations (in ego-psychology). 
Finally, (d) the concepts of negative feedback and equifinality in 
general systems theory and ecology are likened to autonomy, 
self-regulation and reciprocity in ego-psychology (pp. 539-49>' 
I" 
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Mishne (1982, p. 550) proposes a route toward integrating 
ego psychology with an ecological systems approach. For Mishne, 
a clinician's focus on understanding ego functions and development 
in the intrapsychic system enables her to understand a client's 
"ability to negotiate (transact with) other systems. The ecological-
systems approach, says Mishne, fails to recognize psychoanalytic 
theory as explaining normal as well as pathological development. 
Germain and Gitterman (1983) restate that the life model in 
no way denies that personality is important in social functioning, 
"nor does it fail to consider and to help with the internal pain of 
anxiety, guilt, depression, despair, helplessness, self-hatred ... and 
the consequences of such pain for social functioning." They stress 
that the life model reconceptualizes that problems in living which 
arise in some instances from maladaptive exchanges with past 
environments, may lead to dysfunctional psychological states which 
are perpetuated through exchanges with current environments. 
Goldstein (1986) holds that ego psychology's "emphasis on 
normal coping strategies, adaptation, mastery, competence, 
cognitive processes, person-environments transactions, 
biopsychosocial factors in development, and the impact of life-
stresses and social change holds enormous promise as a unifying 
theoretical underpinning for a distinctive conception of social work 
practice." She continues that refinements which deal with 
"interpersonal relationships and internalized object relations in 
normal and pathological ego development have provided an 
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in-depth dimension for understanding human behavior" (p. 380). 
In a focus that is specific to either person, environment, or their 
matching, Goldstein illustrates how ego assessment may help a 
practitioner determine whether interventions might be directed 
toward "[ a] nurturing, maintaining, enhancing, or modifying inner 
capacities; [b] mobilizing, improving or changing environmental 
conditions; or [c] improving the fit between inner capacities and 
external circumstances" (p. 389). Goldstein elaborates on ego-
supportive approaches which call for differential conceptualization 
and application of inner deficits and resources, relationships, and 
environmental conditions and opportunities, in individual, family 
and group interventions over time (pp. 392-7>' 
On the Ecological Context for Human Development and Interaction. 
Bronfenbrenner, in The Ecology of Human Development, (1979, 
p. 22) utilizes principles of Lewin's topology of life space, 
ecology and systems theory to present a framework for human 
development and interaction in an ecological context. He cites 
Lewin's equation that B=f (P, E) , and notes little emphasis on the 
"environment factor" in psychological studies of human 
development.· With emphasis on a person's perceived reality, 
topologically represented as life space, he defines the ecological 
environment. It is a nested arrangement of concentric structures, 
each contained within the next, in which people relate reciprocally 
to one another and to their physical environments over time, 
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through transactions in relationships which may be proximal or 
distal, direct or indirect, and physically present or cognitively 
evocative. He specifies three levels of system hierarchy, micro-, 
meso- and macrosystems, (with four types of system) which for 
Greif and Lynch <1983, p. 58) divide the realms of "person, 
family, group, community.. society, culture and institution into 
operationally defined areas." For Glossup (1988), Bronfenbrenner' s 
focus on the person's immediate settings and their larger contexts 
is basic to an ecological frame of reference. 
The "pattern" of activities .. roles and interpersonal relations 
which a person experiences in a given setting (which includes 
physical characteristics) constitutes a microsystem. Examples are 
a family or a class at school. A mesosystem represents "a system 
of microsystems" in which the person participates, as in "relations 
among home, school, and neighborhood peer group." An exosystem, 
whose level of hierarchy may be that of micro- or mesosystem, 
involves one or more settings in which events affect or are 
affected by a person who is not an active participant. For a 
child, this may be a parent's workplace or a schoolboard's 
activities (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, pp. 22-5>' The macrosystem 
refers to overarching ideological, institutional and organizational 
patterns (8) in a culture or subculture which reflect the content 
and form of its micro-, meso-, and exosystems, and the beliefs 
which underlie consistencies among its systems (p. 258). Examples 
include "system blueprints" for a classroom in the United States as 
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opposed to France, or for home and day care centers for well-to-do 
versus poor families in each country. "Intrasociet~l contrasts" of 
"socioeconomic, ethnic, religious ... su bcultural groups are 
macrosystem phenomena" (p. 26). 
The importance of the interrelationships among people and 
environments and their shifts is recognized. Interpersonal 
structures are reciprocal interpersonal units such as dyads (or N+l 
systems), and larger units (N+2 systems) which generate the 
"second order effects" of a social network when all participants 
are not present at the same time and place. The distribution of 
power among relationship participants changes over time as a 
person develops. The concept of role involves a context for 
reciprocal interpersonal expectations, "a set of activities and 
relations expected of a person occupying a particular position in 
society, and of others in relation to that person" (Bronfenbrenner, 
1979, 6-7, 85>' Molar activit.v represents a continuing process of 
events which are directly, reciprocally interactive, or internally 
evocative of past or planned interactive events, and are 
environmentally related. Examples are building a tower of blocks 
or conducting a phone conversation (pp. 6-7, 45-8>' Ecological 
transitions represent shifts which occur when "a person' s position 
in an ecological environment is altered as a result of a change in 
role, setting, or both." They instigate and are affected by 
developmental processes; and "are a joint function of biological 
changes and altered environmental circumstances; thus they present 
..,.,..,,..,..----,-..... : ....... -"~.-- ... --.. 
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examples par excellence of the process of mutual accommodation 
between the organism and its sYrroundings that is the primary 
focus of ... the ecology of human development." These can occur at 
any system level of the environment. Examples are birth of a 
younger sibling (micro-system transition), or a visit to a friend 
in another culture (across macro-system boundaries) (pp. 26-7). 
Difficulties in operationalizing an ecological framework for 
human development are highlighted by Garabino (cited by Glossup, 
1988, p. 9): "Almost everything in the context of development is 
variable, almost nothing is fixed." Glossup (pp. 9-13) notes the 
complexity of Bronfenbrenner I s building upon Lewin I s 
phenomenological life-space of the person. Glossup sees the 
framework created by Bronfenbrenner as integrative for abstract 
bodies of knowledge, each aspect of which informs us of a partial 
dimension of human experience and development. Thus, for 
Glossup (p. 13), Bronfenbrenner provides us with "a formal theory 
complete with a conceptual language, [thirteen] theoretical 
propositions, and [fifty] empirically verifiable hypotheses." 
Challenging Ideas about Human Development. 
Germain (1987) advances ecological concepts about human 
development in our contemporary world. She examines the 
applica bility of biology I s phylogenetic metaphor to stage models of 
social development which embody "questionable assumptions" (pp. 
565-6) : (a) Stages, life-tasks and va.lued outcomes are seen as 
110 
universal regardless of "culture., race, ethnicity, social-economic 
status, gender, sexual preference or disablement." (b) A fixed, 
epigenetic sequence of stages derived from embryology may not 
apply to social and emotional development. (c) Focus on the 
significance of mother over father in the first year of life may not 
hold up to research findings on the "genetic, biochemical, and 
neuro-physiological aspects of some psychopathologies" (p. 566). 
Germain Cl987, p. 567) proposes cohort theory and the 
concept of life course as alternate models through which to see 
human development. She explains a birth cohort to consist of all 
persons who having been born at a particular time, were exposed 
to the same sequence of social and historical shifts at the same 
ages. The experience, notions, attitudes and values about 
collective life and personal aspirations of the members of a 
particular birth cohort thereby differs from that of any other birth 
cohort, such as those persons who went through adolescence in the 
1950' as opposed to the 1980' s; or those who had become elderly in 
1900 as opposed to those who will attain such age by the year 
2,000. "Cohort" and "generation" differ as concepts. The latter 
defines a kinship context for cohorts of specific persons or 
families. One cohort' s members do not follow the patterns of 
preceding cohorts as they move through the developmental process. 
Size and life conditions of cohorts vary. There may be less 
competition among members of smaller cohorts for the same 
opportunities. "Sex ratios within cohorts bear upon opportunities 
for pairing and parenting. Thus, development is relative to 
culture and is also time-bound." 
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Cohort theory is seen as transactional over time. Each 
cohort is affected by its predecessors' marks, and each leaves its 
imprint for future cohorts. With reference to Riley (1985), Germain 
<1987, pp. 567-9) describes how a different context for development 
exists for each sequential cohort. With the contemporary increase 
in the rate of social change coexisting cohorts display marked 
differences, each having its own unique experience," norms and 
agenda for institutional change. I n a direct reference to Mead's 
discusssion of "Prefigurative Cultures and Unknown Children" 
<1970, pp. 64-97, 84), Germain (p. 568) notes how differences are 
so radical between cohorts that parents worldwide can no longer 
foresee their children's future lives, and children can no longer 
imagine what their parents' lives were like in childhood. 
Germain cites Riley's (1978) admonition against cohort-
centrism. Germain (1987) notes that the stage models of Freud and 
Erikson emerged from their clinical experience with patients with 
whom they shared a zeitgeist (p. 568). She sees the new 
interdisciplinary concept of life course, developed collaboratively 
by sociologists, anthropologists and historians, as fitting with 
cohort theory. Life course conceptualizes development over 
individual, family and historical time. Life transitions are 
"person-environment processes rather than isolated ... [or] 
predetermined ages and stages of experience" (p. 568). In a 
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citation of Hareven (1982), Germain (pp. 568-9) goes on to state 
that life course accounts for synchrony between individual life 
transitions and collective family configurations under social 
conditions which are changing. She points out that roles and 
beha viol's which were once reserved for particular age or gender 
cohorts now involve non-traditional cohort-crossovers such as older 
fathers and men as homemakers. 
For Germain, concepts of attachment, affiliation and 
loneliness serve as alternate ways of understanding human needs, 
behavior and realtionships. 
Germain (1987, pp. 571, 578n) distinguishes object relations 
theory from attachment theory as developed by Bowlby. She notes 
that object relations theorists refer to attachment as synonymous 
with object relations, which "arise gradually out of the libidinized 
feeding relationship." She also distinguishes attachment from 
dependency. Bowlby (1973) describes affectional attachment 
behavior as not only related to mediation of nutrition and 
reproduction, but to mediation of the needs of a community of 
species for protection. 
Germain <1987, 570) explores the relationship of attachment 
theory to the development of competence. She cites Bowlby (1973) 
on affectional bonding in which he sees the capacity for 
developing affectional ties as genetically innate to humans, having 
been selected into the gene pool by the environment over the 
course of evolution out of its value in species' survival. Infant 
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attachment behavior with reciprocal parental caretaking behavior 
I 
represent affectional bonding which in adulthood is seen in pair 
formation, sexual bonding and affectional bonding. For Bowlby, a 
person's seeking the comfort of trusted others is healthy and by 
no means regressive. Germain ( 1987, p. 571) cites Weiss ( 1982) on 
"Attachment in Adult Life." In her noting how attachment 
behaviors may vary with culture, she speaks of the importance of 
adult attachment behaviors including those to peers, "who are 
perceived either as sources of strength or as supporters of the 
individual's capacity for mastery." Attachment theory, for 
Germain (p. 571), emphasizes the significance of primary 
attachments over the life course, as well those of "social networks 
of kin, friends, workmates, neighbors and so on." 
Germain (1987, pp. 571-2) cites Weiss (1973) on loneliness to 
distinguish attachment from affiliation, also important in 
adulthood. Emotional isolation and loneliness, a result of loss of 
a primary attachment figure· (as in death or separation), must be 
relieved by development of another such attachment, following a 
completed mour~ing process. Relief from social isolation and 
loneliness, due to loss of affiliation (as in migration or job loss), 
requires membership in another network of affiliation with mutual 
interest and support. Germain cites Bowlby (1973, p. 45), as well 
as research by Ainsworth and Bell (1974) and by Sroufe and 
Waters (1977), to explain that a child's attachment security, which 
involves mother's available presence for a young child (sic), as 
llA 
an organizer of behavior correlates with greater freedom in 
environmental exploration, and promotes a positive self-concept 
with belief in one's own competence. These findings are, for 
Germain, congruent with White's concepts (1959) of inborn 
effectance, the experience of efficacy, and the sense of competence 
"that one can affect one's environment." 
In findings from Stern's infant research, (including, 1977; 
1985, pp. 11, 47-8>, Germain (1987, pp. 573-5> highlights evidence 
of the newborn's genetically responsive predisposition to the human 
face, voice, and body, in its intrinsically responsive and capable 
nature, and its innate ability to coordinate knowledge between 
sensory modalities. Stern concludes that a consistent confusion 
between self and other by the infant through a long stage of 
symbiosis is unlikely. 
Germain (1987, pp. 575-6) cites research and writings by A. 
Thomas (1981), by A. Thomas and Chess <1977, 1980), and by 
Chess, Fernandez and Korn (1980) which characterize the human 
brain's flexibility and plasticity, which impart a unique capacity 
for human learning during the life course. Plasticity is seen as 
enabling physically handicapped children to find alternate 
pathways in development which are congruent with thei-r capacities 
and limitations, and which may indeed be out of sequence or 
different from what is specified cognitively and emotionally in 
stage models development. Thus, the brain's plastic potential 
holds forth promise of corrective change, so that inadequacies in 
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early care which may have significance are not automatically seen 
as causing irreversible damage. It is implied that stage models 
of early life experience do a disservice to the potential and 
resilient qualities which are human, and to the importance of 
development as a context throughout the life course. 
Two non-stage models of development of the full life course 
are cited. Bronfenbrenner's (1979) model recognizes the influences 
of biological and cultural factors, and the psychological processes 
of perception, motivation, emotion, thinking, and learning but has 
not specifically incorporated these into its framework which focuses 
I 
on development (a) at various levels of ecological context (from 
dyads to large units) (b) via ecological transitions. Stern's 
(1985) model of lifelong development of "four senses of self" and 
"four domains of self/other relatedness" replace notions of critical 
periods and predetermined stages. For Stern, a problem in living 
can emerge "in any sense of self or domain of relatedness at any 
point in life," without necessarily reflecting an early psychogenic 
experience which must be dealt with for a successful outcome 
(Germain, 1987, p. 576). 
I n summa tion , Germain <1987, p. 577) notes the need for 
continued exploration of the importance of "nonuniform pathways of 
individual development and collective life in contemporary society." 
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Toward Integrating the Physical Environment Focus 
The role of the physical environment in human behavior has 
traditionally been given little emphasis in the "psycho-social" view 
of social work. Some recent conceptions are cited which are 
intended to reflect seminal ideas about the role of the physical 
environment in human interaction and social work practice. 
Germain (1978b) addresses the man-made physical environment 
in a review of space as a physical and psychological construct in 
an ecological practice framework. Space relates to status and 
social interaction, and to cognition and perception (p. 515>' 
Emphasis is on reciprocity "between the social and physical 
environments and their interaction with culture, personality, and 
behavior" (516). She describes the place of man-made space in 
(a) human development, (b) dwellings and (e) behavior. 
1. Spacial styles in human development involve "perceptions 
and conceptions of distance, direction, density and vertical-
horizontal, left-right, up-down orientations" (Germain, I978b, p. 
516). These arise in childhood through culturally patterned action 
and interaction with and upon the environment, and involve an 
internalization of aspects of spacial organization, as well as a 
developing awareness of self from non-self, inner from outer space, 
in the experience of distance and separation from mother, in a 
reciprocal and ever-widening, social circle of the child. Since 
social experience occurs in physical surroundings, we might see 
I· 
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life-space as expanding in childhood, adolescence and adulthood; 
and contracting in old age. Germain cites (a) the intrusiveness 
of a young child who works on issues of initiative in the 
exploration of others' space; (b) the territorial relations of the 
school years characterized by peer in-groups and out-groups, with 
increasing distance between child and family as he reaches into 
"space occupied by school, recreational organizations, 
neighborhood" (p. 517); and (c) the adolescent expansion of peer 
territories into widened variety of home-ranges, including secret 
physical and inner spaces, with more distance and autonomy from 
family; to (d) the adult "habitat of dwelling, neighborhood and 
community [which] must provide a physical environment capable of 
supporting the full range of human needs and interests as they 
evolve biologically and culturally." Germain continues that 
distorted behavior may occur where appropriate settings are 
unavailable, and where lack of fit between human needs and 
spatial characteristics impedes successful resolution of life tasks 
(p. 518L 
2. The dwelling encloses interior space and excludes outside 
space. It reflects how people see both their interior intimate 
selves and the public facades shown to others. Germain C1978b, 
pp. 518-20) cites Cooper on "The House as Symbol of the Self" 
(1976), to highlight the issue of threshold between private and 
pu blic space and its cultural origins. Examples are cited by 
Germain of spacial arrangements and behaviors which interfere 
with growth and development. These include the hidden thresholds 
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and closed interior doors of a home, which interfere with nutritive 
interchange both between a family and the outside world and 
among its isolated members; or a lack of semipublic space in a 
public housing project which interferes with the development of 
informal networks around which supports, mutual aid or social 
contacts of lower- and working-class neighborhoods could coalesce. 
She notes the importance of the interaction between physical and 
social environments. In impoverished service facilities, staff and 
residents may become used to inflexible physical structures, which 
with simple modifications might personalize and humanize a 
setting, to enhance a client's individuality, dignity, and 
autonomy. She refers to a poor fit between client needs and 
activities, and the physical environment as a setting deprivation, 
in which a space is not experienced as a place which is part of 
one's sense of identity, autonomy, and social competence. 
3. The active use of the physical environment in one's 
functioning constitutes spacial behavior. Germain <1978b, pp. 
520-22) brings together conceptions of Henry <1973, pp. 36, 76), 
8 9 Kantor and Lehr <1975, pp. 66-77) , Altman (1975) , and others to 
layout the behavioral use of the physical environment (a) in 
maintenance of territorial boundaries and the regulation of 
distance/closeness among family members; (b) in the "interaction 
between internal forces of perception, cognition, and emotion on 
the one hand, and the spacial features of the physical setting 
mediated by the social environment and the culture, on the other;" 
(c) in the understanding of the unpleasant psychological-social 
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states of crowding and isolation; Cd) in the concept of personal 
distance as an individual's spacial bu b ble, a buffer or shell 
which, with cultural meanings, may enhance or interfere with 
adaptedness; and Ce) in the importance of socially set territorial 
markers to provide cues to people about role relationships toward 
enhancing the stability of social organization, and how these 
markers may be built into housing design to facilitate development 
of mutual aid responses both for security and social interaction. 
For Germain C1978b, p. 522), spacial behaviors reflect a 
person's adaptive potential in transaction with the spacial aspects 
of the physical environment. Supportive environments facilitate 
growth and adaptation; depriving environments induce stress to 
impede growth and adaptive functioning. 
A distinction between natural and man-made environments is 
not so easily rendered, as Wohlwill (1983) shows. Some 
distinctions are gross, as those between the realms of C a) rock, 
sand, shoreline desert, woods mountains, and plant and animal 
life; and Cb) "cities and towns, houses and factories, as well as 
tools and implements for human needs." The value, purpose and 
legitimacy of distinctions between the two realms, and between the 
differential human responses to each is an issue raised by 
Wohlwill Cpp. 6-7). He illustrates "boundary-line problems" in 
differentiating these realms with images of a natural and an 
artificial lake, whose distinguishing marks might be clear only to 
biological and geological scientists Cpp. 7-12>' 
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Wohlwill (1983, pp. 12-19) proposes a perceptually based 
ecology of natural environments through which it would be possible 
"to identify a set of stimulus attributes in terms of which natural 
environments may be differentiated from man-made ones" (p. 12). 
He draws on work in perception to point out that while the 
artificial world is composed of 'natural' materials, its form tends 
to differ greatly from forms which characterize the "natural 
domain." Stimulus attributes include differences in lines, edges, 
gradations, shapes, colors and textures, which tend to be less 
regular, more curved, gradual, rough and irregular in the natural 
world; and more regular, rectilinear, sharp, discontinuous, abrupt 
and smooth in the man-made world, to the casual observer. He 
looks at olfactory and auditory differences as well. 
Wohlwill (1983, pp. 21-30> considers three other views to 
distinguish nature from the man-made world. The first, (a) "the 
notion of nature as a manifestation of ... growth and change" (p. 
21) extends the stimulus-characteristic framework to encompass our 
perceptions of change over time (pp. 22-3>' The notion of (b) 
"nature as a refuge" differentiates "our contacts with the world of 
nature from the conditions of our everyday lives" (p. 25). An 
individual's getting little acknowledgement of his presence from 
the wilderness may be at the heart of its restorative powers for 
some, and provoke anxiety in others who depend on responsiveness 
from the environment (pp. 23-6>' Finally, (c) "nature as a 
symbol" involves the differentiation of meanings of the natural 
environment to people in different historical times, or in different 
---_._---- -_. 
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contemporaneous cultures. We see this if we contrast the view of 
the first white American settlers for whom the hostile environment 
needed taming, with that of today's environmentalists who praise 
and protect it. This change reflects not only shifts in people's 
experience of nature, but also actual environmental changes such 
as the "reduction in forms of animal life dangerous to man" and 
the invention of protective equipment for people who venture into 
natural areas (p. 28). It also reflects the urban decay and 
suburban sprawl of everyday environments which afford a very 
different contemporary context in which to evaluate the natural 
environment (p. 28). 
Wohlwill (1983, pp. 30-2), in citing limited research on the 
developmental origins of the naturallartifi{:':':.o.l differentiation, notes 
that children from age six or seven onward respond readily in 
terms of the "nature" as opposed to "man-made" categories (p. 31). 
This reinforces the notion, untested across cultures, that the realm 
of nature represents a "natural" category, and that the capacity 
to differentiate from the man-made realm is set at an early age. 
Wohlwill (1983, pp. 32-5) proposes a research program to 
locate perceptual, cognitive and affective origins and ~timulus 
determinants of an individual's concept of "nature." The 
concept's high level of abstraction calls forth an intricate 
cognitive structure with a rich context of connotative associations 
connected with it. Wohlwill is, however, clear that while human 
beings may thrive in rather artificial settings such as the space 
shuttle, our evolutionary heritage may well underlie a preference 
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for stimuli from the natural environment of which we are a 
functional part, and which may never be totally substitute for the 
man-made environment. 
Germain (1983, p. 124) descdbes the physical environment as 
a dynamic transacting part of our life space, to which we must 
adapt, and which we must also use for our adaptive needs. 
Germain sees what human beings fashion as being no less 
'natural' than what other species build. (We might think of this 
in a bird' s nest, for example.) For Germain, it is merely 
convenience which makes this arbitrary distinction useful. 
In citing Searles (1960, p. 120fn.) on schizophrenic versus 
normal development, Germain (1983, p. 124> suggests that the two 
differ in relation to the natural environment in a manner which 
parallels differences in relatedness to other humans, such as in 
the capacity for self- other (parallel to environment-other> 
distinctions. She states that for Searles, "the years of childhood 
and youth are spent in differentiating one's self from the social 
environment .of significant others and the physical environment of 
nature and cherished physical objects." The rest of one's life is 
spent in working to reintegrate both worlds "while maintaining 
separateness and individuality." She comments on biologists' 
doubts of the human capacity to retain physical and mental health 
unless one remains intimately in touch with the world of nature 
which has shaped human nature (e. g., Du bos, 1968, pp. 149-51). 
Fresh air camps for children and mothers, notes Germain, grew out 
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of settlement workers' implicit appreciation of the natural 
environment as part of the unit of attention in their awareness of 
"the needs of inner-city residents for renewal and refreshment in 
the natural world." Contemporary applications cited by Germain 
include camping for inner-city families (Vassil, 1978), overnight 
trips for chronic psychiatric patients (Shearer, 1978), wilderness 
therapy for delinquent and disturbed youths (Cataldo, 1979), and 
use of pets for isolated individuals who live alc;me (Bikales, 1975>-
Germain <1983, pp. 125-6) notes how time and space, as 
dimensions of both physical and social environments, influence 
behavior and social relationships around the issues of both 
physical arrangements, and environmental rhythms and cycles 
which have biological, social, cultural and psychological 
components which must be accounted for in assessment and 
intervention planning. 
Germain <1983, p. 126) cites Altman's (1975) transactional, 
perceptual paradigm which suggests that "personal and spatial 
behaviors" (to which she adds "temporal" behaviors) serve to 
maintain a chosen degree of openness or closedness of one's 
self/other boundary and its relationship to the unpleasant 
phenomenological states of crowding or isolation, with the 
concommitant experiences of physical and emotional stress. With 
reference to Draper (1979), Germain (p. 126) notes that among 
behaviors which control interchange across the self/other boundary 
are personal distance and territorial behaviors; "nonverbal, 
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paraverbal, and verbal behaviors. II Among environmental 
interventions one might consider changing the temporal or spatial 
arrangements in the physical environment so as to make both 
privacy and sociableness into viable alternatives. 
For Germain, (1983, p. 127) "elements of physical and social 
environments may be analyzed in terms of their potential 
usefulness for social workers." These include "social networks, 
natural helpers, mutual aid systems, the natural ·and built worlds, 
and relevant concepts of space and time." 
Germain (1983) notes that the clinical relevance of the micro-
environment derives from ways people experience and take action 
in it. "The clinical relevance of the interaction between people 
and their environments may involve Ca) changing aspects of the 
social or physical environments; (b) protecting, supporting, or 
mobilizing aspects of the environment that support growth; and 
(c) designing and using environmental instruments of help; adding 
or subtracting someone or something to or from the life space; or 
otherwise restructuring life situations" (p. 111 >. The physical 
setting, natural or built, shapes the social interaction within it. 
A setting's social structure influences the use of its physical 
space and responses which are evoked" (p. 111) . Cultural values 
and norms influence the meaning of nature (as respected or 
exploited, for example) and can be influenced by the physical and 
social environment (p. 112>' 
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Toward Integrating the Social Environment Focus 
On Reciprocitv in Family Practice Approaches. 
Walsh <in 1983) looks forward from the early years of family 
therapy through the early 1980's, to outline several contemporary 
models of family therapy with varied emphases. 
1. Growth-oriented approaches include (a) the psychodynamic-
transgenerational model which, deriving from a psychoanalytic 
tradition, emphasizes parents' unconscious re-enactements of their 
own intrapsychic conflicts which originate their early family 
rela tionships. A shared process of projections and introjections 
between spouses, parents, and children is based on respective, 
complementary needs. The therapist, as a catalyst, encourages 
awareness of covert, unconscious, intense feelings and shared 
defenses, their origins and consequences. (b) The Bowen Famil.Y 
Systems Model focuses on differentiation of individuals from family 
of origin--with genogram work in at least three generations. In 
(c) the experiential approaches .. the therapist is a facilitator to 
diminish propogation of old pains in current interactions, through 
I 
change efforts which correct self-worth, communication, systems 
processes and family rules (Walsh, 1983, pp. 473-6). 
2. The problem-solving approaches include (a) the structural 
model which emphasizes the patterning of interrelationships between 
a person's behavior and his environmental context. It focuses on 
structure, su bsystems and boundaries. When transactions are 
repeated, they form patterns which create the structure of the 
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family. Symptoms indicate an imbalance in the organization of a 
family, notably in the its hierarchical arrangement with a lack of 
clarity in parent and child subsystem boundaries. This may be a 
maladaptive reaction to new environmentally-induced needs. The 
action-orientation of structural family therapy is founded on a 
belief that behavioral change takes place independently of insight 
by family members. (b) Strategic and Systemic Models also have a 
base in communication theory. Focus is on the current social 
situation of an identified client through which a presented problem 
is seen as an act of communication. The therapist works to state 
the problem in behavioral terms which are solvable through 
directions and paradoxical instructions designed to alter the cycle 
of feedback which maintains behavior symptoms. In (c) Behavioral 
Learning Approaches, emerging from behavior modification and 
social learning traditions in clinical psychology, social 
reinforcement depends upon is adaptive behavior as opposed to 
symptomatic or maladaptive behavior (Walsh, 1983, pp. 476-9). 
3. Other approaches include (a) multiple-impact approach 
(Langsley and Kaplan, MacGregor and others) where all members of 
a family join to meet with a team when one member is in crisis to 
strengthen coping capacities and mobilize health-oriented 
interpersonal processes. Use of (b) multiple family groups 
provides mutual learning and support toward facilitating 
integrated readjustment of hospitalized psychiatric patients and 
their families. (c) Social network intervention, was "developed by 
Speck and Attneave from their appreciation of the value of tribal 
------ -_._-
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meetings for healing purposes in many cultures." "The 
intervention team convenes a meeting of all members of the kinship 
system, friends, neighbors, and everyone of significance to a 
family presenting a problem," based on a view that people can 
better deal with crises "when they can share coping strengths with 
others in their natural social networks" (Walsh, 1983, p. 480). 
Walsh (1983) notes that "most current teachers and 
practitioners of family therapy attempt to combine or integrate 
family therapy models" (p. 481). All approaches "focus on direct 
assessment and change of the relationships among individuals, 
I 
rather than [on] problems "inside" the individual symptom bearer 
or derivatives in transference phenomena. This is perhaps the 
major distinction of the family systems orientation from traditional 
individual treatment models." Transference has a diminished role 
because family relationships are present, first-hand, in the 
treatment room; and when they occur, st4tes Walsh, "are redirected 
for expression and change back into the natural relationship 
network." The therapist, by attending to the system, "can 
anticipate reactions to change and has more power to alter 
symptom-maintaining patterns," which impact intrapsychically on 
individual family members; and change in particular members has 
potential benefit for all, not merely the symptom bearer (p. 484). 
While family and group treatment both focus on the collective 
and its communication processes, family therapy stands out for 
Walsh, in its "convening [of] the natural relationship unit that 
has a shared past, ongoing interaction, and future, as well as its 
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own values, goals, language (verbal and nonverbal), and 
loyalties" (Walsh, 1983, p. 484). It is defined by its systemic 
focus. I n some cases, as in Bowen's model, individual sessions 
may be utilized to plan for change in the system (p. 484). Walsh 
refers to family therapy not as a single approach to treatment, 
but instead as "a flexible model that can be tailored to fit 
specific client needs and treatment situations," and where 
"contracts and objectives are explicitly formulated with families, 
and strategies and techniques follow a clear direction, based on a 
sound assessment of the family system" (p. 485>. 
Hartman and Laird <1983, pp. 27-9) outline contemporary 
views and definitions of family. Traditional social science 
definitions structurally define nuclear and extended, to legal .. 
coniugal, and consanguine relationships. With Richmond's 
definition of family (cited by Hartman and Laird, p. 28) as "all 
who share a common table," they contrast notions of "family" with 
those of "household." The latter allows for crossovers between the 
family and non family boundaries of our contemporary society. The 
functional approach of sociology, which sees the family in terms of 
its functions, such as child- rearing, meeting of adult affectional 
needs, and social value transmission, has unresolved issues about 
the functions families carry out. They cite Speigel <1971 r p. 144) 
who, in a search to define "family r" saw great varieties of 
structures and functions, so that any study of the family must 
refer to the social and cultural contexts in which it is located. 
. ,. 
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Hartman and Laird (1983. pp. 29-31), in seeking definitions 
of family which, like Richmond's promote a pluralistic perspective, 
. ela bora te on two Cd tegories . Family of origin accounts for 
biological roots and consanguine rela tionships in one's vertical 
(multigenerational> and horizontal (kinship) blood, adoptive and 
ficti ve ties. The family as the intimate environment, a functional 
concept, is built on marriage, parenting, or other mutual decision 
by two or more persons to contemporaneously share needs for 
living space, closeness, and roles and tasks, to meet biological .. 
social, and psychological needs of people in an intimate network. 
Hartman and Laird <1983, pp. 72-4) see principles of the 
ecological metaphor as providing guidelines for family-centered 
practice. This includes the conception of "problem" or "need" in 
terms of (a) environmental deficits, "dysfunctional transactions" 
between systems, dysfunctional adaptive strategies, or interrupted 
growth, as opposed to disease within the individual; and 
(b) "outcomes of the transactions of many complex variables," in a 
"feedback model of change," rather than reflective of linear 
causation (p. 72>' Additionally, (c) life experience provides a 
model and "primary instrument of change" (pp. 72-3>' (d) Change 
in one system part impacts on all system parts, so that a minor 
intervention can produce a major change, by stopping or reversing 
a deviation-amplifying process in a system (p. 73). (e) Action 
principles include the not'ione that natural means are preferred 
over artificial means; the least intervention with potential to 
achieve the objectives is preferred (which could include preference 
for short-term treatment over long-term help); and a variety of 
means may be utilized to produce a pparticular effect, which is 
the principle of "equifinality" (p. 711). 
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Hartman and Laird <1983, p. 157) discuss the family in its 
ecological context. They compare the role of the ecologically-
minded social worker with that of the shaman, healer of many 
cultures. Each is seen as cognizant of powerful influences and 
interplay among individual, family, ·culture and environment. 
Each takes note of the individual's distinct but not separate 
psychic and physical realities which interact to influence one 
another in all action. A shaman provides avenues for "confession, 
atonement, and resto'.'ation" of a person into the family and tribe. 
He may assume varied roles such as "physician, magician, priest, 
moral arbitor, representative of the group's world view, agent of 
social control, or initiator of change." Both shaman and 
ecologically-minded social worker may share a focus on the 
complex interrelationships among physical, social, psychological, 
and cultural forces, and see these "as influences in the production 
of disease, deviance, and dysfunction .... " 
Hartman and Laird (1983) discuss the eco-map, originally 
developed by Hartman as a tool for in public child welfare 
workers to use in examining the needs of families. Its visualized 
boundaries enclose the individual or family in the life space which 
includes the major systems and all their interrela tionships which 
reciprocally bear upon the subject. It shows the flow into and 
out of a family system of resources and energy. I ts rendering is 
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a shared worker-client process and encompasses concrete life 
connections, as well as connections "to those human, personal, 
psychological, social, and spiritual influences which also shape 
our lives." The eco-map highlights "deprivations which may erode 
family strength." As it is developed, "family and worker should be 
able to identify conflicts to be mediated, bridges to be built, and 
resources to be sought and mobilized" (pp. 158-9>' An assessment 
of family needs and environmental resources to meet these is drawn 
up to cover specific needs such as nutrition, shelter, protection .. 
health, belongingness and intimacy, communication and mobility, 
education and enrichment, resources for the spirit, autonomy with 
effectance and mastery, and generativity (164-6>' With the aid of 
the eco-map, questions are considered about the family's relation 
to (a) the ecological environment, (b) the family-environment 
boundary, (c) the internal family system and subsystems, and 
(d) the worker, agency and service network (pp. 166-71 >. 
Examples are given of work with (a) a deprived family, (b) an 
overburdened family, and (c) a socially isolated family (pp. 
171-84>' The value of the eco-map, note the authors, "hinges on 
its usefulness as a blueprint for carrying out planned change." 
Its retrospective use may highlight changes which might have 
earlier precipitated current difficulties (pp. 184-6). 
In synchrony with the ecological metaphor, Aponte (1979) 
illustrates the use of "diagnosis" (or assessment) in family 
therapy as an ongoing process, not a product, in the 
.. - -_ ....... _-_._-----
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understanding of a family's structure by focusing on relationships 
and communications of subsystems and their members. Diagnosis in 
family therapy for Aponte, means understanding a human behavior 
module in its own ecological context (pp. 109-10). It allows a 
clinician to see how forces converge in a context to produce an 
action at a particular moment in time. The structural family 
therapist, for Aponte, "utilizes the ecological context as the 
framework for his or her diagnostic effort" (p. 110>' 
The therapist seeks information to the extent that it may 
help to solve the problem at hand, stopping short of comprehensive 
study. Forces which have created a problem are deemed to be 
active in current behavior and transactions. Thus, she works to 
create a context in which central structures will be "reexperienced 
and reenacted among family members and with the therapist." 
Furthermore, each intervention during the course of treatment is 
seen as flowing out of a progression of diagnostic hypotheses 
about the individuals and their relationhips within and outside the 
family as these bear on the problem at hand. Hypotheses are put 
aside or confirmed. If they are confirmed, it will be important to 
elaborate on them during the therapy (Aponte, 1979, pp. 110-12>-
In an interview, Aponte C1979, pp. 108-9) focuses on the 
subsystems of father and sons to support father's understanding 
and leadership role; on the sibling subsystem to enable brothers 
to deal with one another supportively; and on the spouse 
subsystem, to help the wife see and support her husband's 
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strengths. As Germain's introductory statement to Aponte's chapter 
points out (pp. 107-9), Aponte's interventions are geared to alter 
the system's structure, so as to allow transactions among system 
parts to shift in a positive direction. Apon te 's use of tas k to 
engage family members directly with one another in session and at 
home is quite clear. 
Hartman (1979) sees the extended family as a resource for 
change. "The family," she writes, "is a powerful biological, 
emotional, and social system that exists in space and through 
time" Cp. 242). It is through the family that we come to do what 
we do and become who we are. Yet, "much of the impact of the 
family system exists outside of awareness, not because it has been 
necessarily repressed or relegated to the unconscious, but because 
it is so much a part of the self" (p. 245>' A major goal of 
treatment for Hartman is helping the individual "begin to remove 
obstacles to growth, to become increasingly different from the 
family system, and to move to a higher level of differentiation." 
She goes on to say that "people who are sufficiently differentiated 
can be away from their families without emotionally cutting 
themselves off, and can be close to their families without becoming 
lost in the system" (p. 244). Toward this end she conceives of 
helping the member(s) to objectify family proscriptions, "to step 
outside of the system so that ... family rules can be recognized in 
the family and in the self" (p. 245). The method is a step-by-
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step, time-consuming task of fact-gathering about a family over 
time, while organizing the data with clientCs.) through the joint 
construction of a genogram which becomes a tool for understanding 
Cpp. 247-58). She explores intergenerational identification toward 
understanding connections between members of the current family 
and those of the family of origin via sibling order, family 
expecta tions, themes and heroes and heroines (pp. 256-7). 
The general goal, a diffusion of tensions in nuclear family 
by means of opening channels into the extended family, is seen by 
Hartman C1979, p. 262-4) as a general phonomenon. The use of 
"the extended family system as a resource for and arena of change 
is one way of translating ecological principles into practice" (p. 
262). The person is seen as being in the family, and the family is 
seen as being in the person. "The focus of study and of 
intervention is on the transactional relationships between the 
person and the family in space and through· time and the 
assumption is made that a change in either family or person will 
bring about changes throughout the system" Cp. 263>' Hartman 
conceptualizes this in systems terms, noting that continued 
differentiation is a natural occurrence when living systems remain 
open. The worker's role in an egalitarian power relationship is 
to help the clientCs) in Ca) objectifying the family system, 
C b) identifying, planning and rehearsing change strate.gies and 
Cc) discovering and overcoming obstacles to change C263-4). 
On Reciprocity in Networks, Mutual Aid and Mediation through 
Group Processes. 
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Swenson <1979, pp. 214-15, 233-5) describes conceptions of 
social networks and self-help/mutual aid as presenting 
opportunities to reformulate in an ecological perspective certain 
basic practice elements which are vital for the development of any 
practice model, including the life model. The concepts are 
(a) problem definition, (b) view of the person, (c) worker-client 
relationship, (d) goals of helping, and (e) service delivery 
arrangements. The concept of mutual aid is seen as cutting 
across these five elements in its tying network theory integrally to 
the life model. 
Swenson <1979, pp. 215-17) highlights various kinds of 
primary groups in which emotional bonds, as opposed to merit, are 
implied basic determinants of membership. She cites studies which 
demonstra te (a) vigorous existing extended family groups in 
working class industrial urban society; (b) primary-group-like 
"work groups" for whose members self-image, success and vitality 
of relationships are invested in the group; (c) friendship and 
support groups, and by extension (d) neighborhood groups, 
exemplified by apartment building groups for adults and (e) local, 
informal play groups for children; and (f) the inclusion by people 
in their primary-group-like collectives of local professionals in 
membership, such as a competent doctor or a fair-minded welfare 
worker. Swenson cites Litwak and Meyer's point Un Swenson, 
1979) that such "primary social groups and formal organizations 
can exist in interdependence and maintain their uniqueness and 
strength" (Swenson, 1979, p. 217). 
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The flexibile boundaries and interconnected qualities of 
varying magnitudes suggested by the idea of network, for Swenson 
(1979, p. 218) refers to the subjective community of persons, 
groups and parts of institutions that have meaning for us. 
A major function of network is mutual aid. I t includes 
instrumental support (assistance in task accomplishment and 
resource provision), and nurturance (which includes various forms 
of emotional support). The full network or a part of it may 
provide a person with a meaningful focus (Swenson, 1979, p. 
223-28) . 
Germain <1983, pp. 119-20) sees growing professional interest 
in social networks based on the importance of attachment bonds in 
human development. The loneliness inherent in social isolation 
can be relieved only by engagement in a social network. An 
example is cited in widow-to-widow programs in which new widows 
are able to receive support and guidance from peers who have 
faced similar situations and tasks, although the pain of the loss 
itself certainly cannot be relived in any substitute attachment. 
She sees social networks, systems of mutual-aid, self-help groups 
and natural helpers as environmental instruments which are vital 
to primary prevention as well as to restorative interventions. 
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Germain (1983, p. 121) continues that experience suggests 
that two human motives are involved in natural helping systems. 
The first motive, altruism, is described by E. O. Wilson (1978) as 
basically genetically determined with its intensity and form being 
shaped by culture. For other biologists it is described as learned 
by humans in their social environment. The second motive is the 
need for reciprocity, to give and receive, which is to help oneself 
through helping others. Reciprocity, through self-help groups and 
professionally led formed groups .. is seen as making possible thre 
success of mutual aid "among kin, friends and neighbors." 
Lee and Swenson (1986, pp. 361, 368-9) elaborate on the 
concept of mutual aid. They cite the "generic vision" of 
Schwartz (1961) which emphasizes mediation, skill, process, affect, 
reciprocity and the mutual aid enterprise of. the group. They 
elaborate on related conceptions. Informal social support is 
differentiated from professional help through formal agencies. It 
is seen as being of great influence on the outcomes of problem 
situations of high stress and crisis. The "helper therapy" 
principle empl;tasizes the enhancement of effectance, competence and 
maturity of the non-professional helper who, as a client, is helped 
by helping others. Self-help groups, note Lee and Swenson, 
clearly utilize notions such as mutual aid and helper therapy in a 
conception in which people's needs for one another are emphasized. 
They cite Katz and Bender's (1976, p. 9) definition of self-help 
group as "voluntary, small group structures for mutual aid and 
accomplishment of special purpose." 
Cited by Lee and Swenson (1986, p. 370) is Levy's 
descriptive classification of self-help groups with four types of 
focus: (a) conduct reorganization or self-control, as with 
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addictions; (b) mutual support, to deal with common stress issues; 
(c) well-being enhancement, for groups whose members are subject 
to discrimination; and (d) personal growth. 
The self-help concept implicitly focuses on (a) insufficient 
response from "existing institutions" (Katz & Bender, 1976, p. 9); 
and on (b) gains from shared predicaments; as well as greater 
readiness (c) to accept one's problem, (d) to want to change and 
(e) to develop and resume competencies (Katz, 1965) generates an 
implicit "reevaluation of professional helping." Yet, as Lee and 
Swenson (1986) note, the foregoing positive assumptions about 
self-help are the same assumptions made by social group workers 
about the group work process <1986, p. 370>. They (pp. 373-4) 
adapt Toffler's (1971, 384-5) suggestion for the use of "situational 
groups" as a key future key social service. Toffler describes 
these as "temporary oganizations ... for people who happen to be 
passing through similar .life transitions at the same time." People 
are thereby helped to cope with a shared, "common adaptive 
experience" through (a) implicit, mutual identification, and 
(b) the strengthening of members who come to see their problems 
more objectively by trading ideas and insights, and suggesting 
alternatives. The authors, noting that Toffler is referring to the 
mutual aid group, cite Schwartz's <1959, pp. 114-15) view that the 
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rise of group work agencies and mutual aid groups provided a 
needed balance against the forces of industrialization, through the 
positive effects of group association. 
Gitterman (1985/6, pp. 30-2) ties the life model more 
explicitly to its group work roots in his retrospectively elucidating 
the central ideas of Schwartz I s reciprocal model. The notion of 
reciprocity was woven into his writing. The "symbiotic" 
relationship seen between man and his societal needs models the, 
relationship between the individual and his nUl·· ing group, and 
his formed and natural groups, which serve as the baslc medium 
I 
for individual/social exchange. It is the through the practice of 
the profession that the worker mediates among competing and 
varied interests and demands which emerge in specific 
"transactions between individual member needs and group 
requirements; and between group needs and agency services" (p. 
30). "As members invest themselves in the mutual aid system, says 
Gitterman, they examine their behaviors and perceptions and 
experiment with responses which are more adaptive. They also 
achieve a sense of collective strength, a bond through which they 
usually test the worker I s authority. A successful "taking and 
sharing" of power moves the members of a group to a more 
intimate level while they unanimously experience increased 
confidence and mastery over obstacles in their environment. The 
group may thus become a major force "for organizational and 
social influence and change." 
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Gitterman (1985/6, pp. 33-5) reiterates Schwartz I s four-phase 
social work method which was not intended for group work alone. 
The events in these phases have counterparts in the life model 
conception. (a) In the preparatory "tuning in" phase, the worker 
prepares for the group experience. (b) In the "contract" phase, 
both worker and members begin together to mutually identify and 
agree on the conditions of their work, the purpose and role of 
agency, worker and members are specified in a frame of reference 
for the work which follows and helps keep the group on track. 
(c) The work phase is the period during which the group purpose 
is operationalized. Cd) In the termination phase the worker 
leaves and the members too may separate. Gitterman (p. 36) 
summarizes that the force in Schwartz I s position is that the 
symbiotic potential, which at times may exist as a skewed and 
parasitic reality, "provides the worker with a vision of a 
reciprocal, relationship, and therefore a clear and visible 
professional function." 
Shulman and Gitterman (1986, pp. 4-9) rela te the life model 
as a perspective to the mutual aid group as a vehicle for work 
within the model, and the mediating function of the group worker 
as the means through which the profession I s purpose and the 
worker I s function are carried out in such a group. The varied 
stages of development and intergenerational cogwheeling are 
described to illustrate a multitude of life transitions which 




Environmental pressures are represented by degree of availability 
(through organizations, with the help of social networks) of needed 
. resources (goods, services, opportunities) based on economic 
privilege and other harsh realities. Maladaptive environmental 
processes which generate stress may be generated by such varied 
sources as group or family composition and structure, 
environmental expectations and limitations, and developmental 
transitions. 
In the mutual aid group, individuals use one another to 
create many helping relationships which, as the authors state in 
citing Schwartz (1961), is a necessary part of the group process 
and embodies a common need beyond the particular tasks for which 
the group was formed. Shulman and Gitterman <1986, pp. 9-15) 
identify nine mutual aid processes in an effective small group. 
In (a) sharing data, members provide for one another what in 
their respective experiences have been helpful ideas, facts, beliefs 
and resources. (b) The dialectical process "consists of one or 
more members advancing a thesis, other members countering with 
an antithesis, and the group members attempting to develop their 
own synthesis," in efforts to deal with difficult problems. 
Cc) Discussion of a taboo subject engages the courage of 
individual members or may put a person in touch with hidden 
feelings which may enable the person to present the group with a 
difficult problem requiring mutual aid. Cd) The "all-in-the-same-
boat phenomenon" is the "healing process which occurs when one 
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realizes that one is not alone and that others share the problem, 
the feeling, the doubts, and all the rest." (e) Mutual support 
comes from members and the group as a whole, as empathy and 
understanding in the face of one I s difficulty or trauma. 
(f) Support's inverse, and equally vital component is mutual 
demand, which involves confrontation or demand of members upon 
one another, in a growth process. (g) The group may help a 
member with a 3pecific problem through individual problem 
solving. (h) Rehearsal, which is a form of role play, can help a 
member to prepare for an action needed toward resolving a 
problem. Finally, <i) the "strength-in-numbers phenomenon" may 
enable group members to feel safe enough to initiate steps toward 
problem-resolution. It is only through the skill of the worker and 
group that the potential for mutual aid may actually emerge in the 
group. Obstacles to be overcome include societal taboos and 
aspects of the group's culture. 
By extension of the general function of social work in 
society, the social worker as mediator in the group, "mediates the 
individual/group engagement" (Shulman & Gitterman, 1986, p. 16>' 
As the authors cite in Schwartz's work <1961, p.157, 159-161>, a 
principle task of the mediating function involves the worker's 
attempts to "search out the common ground between the individual 
and the group." This may involve the pain inherent in one 
member's problem, and the pain of the other group members which 
may ca4se them to withdraw from that individual (Shulman & 
Gitterman, 1986, 15-19 >. 
._ ....... _ .... _ .. - .---
.......... - _ .... -._----
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The worker's function in relation to the group process is 
found in the mediating function. The worker's function in relation 
to the content of the group's problems, its members' "troubles," is 
dealt with by the worker's use of knowledge which emanates from 
the life model as well as from his skill in helping clients with 
their sources of stress, as manifest in person-environment 
transactions. Thus, for Shulman and Gitterman (1986), social 
work's function with reference to environmental concerns focuses on 
helping the group and its members to utilize organizational and 
network resources which are available, and to influence those 
environmental forces toward being responsive. "Mobilizing and 
strengthening the goodness-of fit between natural and formed 
groups and their social environments provides social work with a 
core mediating function. With maladaptive interpersonal processes, 
the social work function is to help group members to recognize the 
obstacles and to learn to communicate more .. openly and directly 
and attain greater mutuality in their relationships" <p. 19>' This 
involves the worker's examination of members' latent messages, his 
taking the professional responsibility of following clients' leads, 
and his joining their natural life processes <p. 20). 
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On Reciprocity in the Communitv Context. 
Germain <1985, pp. 30-2) conjectures that a general disfavor 
of biological ideas in the eyes of social scientists may be due to 
the destructive impact of Social Darwinism, despite early work in 
human ecology by urban sociologists in the 1920's and 1950' s. 10 
She sees a similar rejection in community organization which 
reflects social science influences. Where community is the 
environment of individuals and primary groups, it is integral to 
them, and is a force to be understood and worked with by the 
ecologically-oriented social worker. She sees the life model's 
integrated practice method as lending itself to practice at all 
levels of human organization, including community. 
Germain <1985, p. 32) sees a community not only as (a) the 
environment of its component individuals, families and groups; but 
as (b) the client itself. Interventions made on behalf of the 
community as an entity serve members' well-being. 
I n discussing transactional outcomes, Germain (1985, pp. 
39-40> cites Hawley's (1950) idea of communal adaptation: While 
processes of adaptation and adaptedness exist in individuals, in 
ecology they refer to communally organized units (or species) I as 
they achieve fit with the environment over evolutionary time. The 
ecologically-oriented social worker's unit of attention must include 
a community's transactions with its larger physical and social 
worlds, and with its physical settiz:tgs, culture, social structure. 
Germain ( 1985, pp. 40-2) conceptualizes the transactional 
processes of stress and coping at a community level as the 
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collective outcome of the shared stress and coping experiences of a 
proportionately large number of individual community members. 
Some habitats, based on location and structure, minimize needed 
available time.: or their physical settings of dwellings, buildings, 
villages, and urban layouts spatial arrangements may not support 
the social settings needed for family, social, work, and religious 
life, in a fashion which fits with age, gender, culture and life 
styles. Such habitats are not supportive of health and social 
functioning for individuals and families. They may produce or 
contribute to stressful isolation, disorientation, and despair. 
In addressing intervention issues, Germain <1985, pp. 41-2) 
notes how vital it is that practioners have knowledge and skill to 
approach the work in new ways toward habitat mprovement. These 
ways might include controlling shared habitat conditions; replacing 
lost networks; and developing mutual aid systems to exchange 
resources and information, and to reciprocally meet people's needs. 
She describes Glaser's 1972 work with public housing tenants in 
stairwell collectives as having positive consequences for family, 
individual, and group life. The work may begin at any system 
level, from the collective level of all families who meet on a 
stairwell, to the family or individual. Habitat improvement may 
require community level advocacy to mobilize group efforts to 
influence public policy on housing design and location, 
transportation neede, uee of school facilities as community centers, 
and day care for children and disabled and older adults, as well 
as workplace issues on time, safety and family-life matters. 
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Germain <1985, pp. 42-4) recognizes that habitat evokes 
spatial and temporal behaviors to create a social environment. 
Stress may be aroused in community members "when there are 
violations of biologically based spatial needs and temporal 
rhythms, cultural orientations to space and time, or 
psychologically based need for, or experience of, space and time 
exerted by the spatial arrangements of the community's 
institutions" (p. 43). An example would be the space and time 
arrangements of a community's health care resources and their fit 
with the time and space orientations of residents whose work 
hours, values and norms, differ from those of "outside" providers 
(p. 43>' While the conditions pertaining to space and time which 
generate stress within the habitat are essentially experienced by 
individuals and primary groups, interventions may be called for 
at the community level. Community-oriented programs must operate 
in the interest of individuals and families, the development of the 
community itself, and the quality of urban and rural life. 
In the ecological metaphor, niche refers to the status which 
an individual or group occupies in a social structure, notably in 
relation to issues of power and oppression. The health-promoting, 
growth-supporting elements of a human niche differ with society 
and historical time. Germain <1985, p. 45) cites DeLone (1979) to 
note that in our society, it is generally assumed that niche is 
shaped by one's set of rights, including a right to equal 
opportunity. Millions occupy niches that do not support human 
needs and goals, as a result of "political and economic structures, 
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systems of education, health and mental health care, child 
welfare, juvenile justice, welfare, work and media." This 
suggests the centrality to social work of efforts to influence all 
levels of government policy. An ecologically-oriented social worker 
at the community level must deal with community empowerment, 
support for community strengths and the reshaping of "nonsalutory 
niches," to the extent allowed by knowledge and skills. 
As per Cottrell (1976, p. 197), Germain (1985) links a set of 
four ecologically-based adaptive outcomes of people to community 
outcomes for community social work: 
1. The competent parts of a competent community (a) are 
effective collaborators in the identification of problems and needs, 
(b) achieve consensus on goals and priorities, (c) agree on ways 
to implement goals, and (d) collaborate on needed actions. A 
competent community can manage collective life problems, because 
its members possess skills in discussion, problem-solving, conflict-
management and resource location--skills to be modeled and taught 
by the community-oriented social worker (Germain, 1985, pp. 45-6>-
2. A self-directed community is concerned with achievement 
and maintenance of inner strength in systems of mutual-aid and 
natural support. A practitioner' s ability to enable a community to 
control its destiny by helping people to rediscover their capacities 
and collective resources, embodies empowerment, to prevent internal 
disorganization or external tyranny (Germain, 1985, p. 47>-
3. A community's identity bears on where its boundary is 
drawn and on which groups are included and excluded, with their 
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respective and varied life styles, values and norms. The social 
worker's focus of helping diverse groups to develop reciprocity 
and mutuality through active involvement in meaningful and 'real' 
activities, contributes to a community's identity and pride in a 
context of self-directed competence (Germain, 1985, p. 48). 
4. Human relatedness, as an ecologically-focused adaptive 
outcome for people, rests on a "sense of belonging" and "is the 
essence of community." "Relatedness to others and to the physical 
setting evokes the reciprocity of caring and being cared about" 
(Germain, 1985, p. 48) This includes use of natural networks and 
shared affiliations to transcend harsh conditions and maintain 
communication channels between disparate groups. "A community 
laced with natural support systems," whose location, support and 
encouragement is a social work function, is more likely to be self-
directing and competent, with a solid sense of identity (p. 50), 
. To Germain (1985, pp. 49-50) the ecological view suggests 
community-level points of entry for primary prevention in programs 
which promote health and adaptive functioning among community 
members and prevent negative outcomes for those at-risk. 
Programs may focus on (a) life transitions, including 
developmental stages such as puberty, status changes such as 
retirement, role-conflicts for working mothers, or crises. Programs 
focused on (b) interpersonal processes in collective life might be 
directed to families, groups, social networks. Those which bear 
on (c) environmental issues might focus on environmental 
improvemen ts. 
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Toward Integrating the Dual Focus: On the Person-Environment Fit 
Germain (1981, p. 323) sets an agenda for further 
development of the ecological approach. Social work, to fulfill its 
potential "in the postindustrial, prefigurative society of the 
1980's," will require expanded "knowledge about environments and 
people-environmment relations." The environment's being 
conceptualized less carefully than the psychological realm, 
coincides with some practitioners' preference for knowledge and 
skill in individual, family and group interventions, which are 
seen as "direct" and more vital than "indirect" environmental 
work. For Germain, "social provision, concrete services and 
environmental manipulation (as in foster care) are exceedingly 
complex [sic)." They entail creating a match between peoples' 
needs and goals and their environments "by [a] selecting among 
environmental options, [bl creating environmental instruments of 
help, ,and [c 1 intervening in people-environment transactions in 
order to release adaptive capacities and improve environments." 
Germain (1981, p. 331) notes the utility of conceptualizing 
I 
environmental complexity, toward the development of "practice 
principles, skills and techniques for work in environments." She 
notes how little is known about what is a nutritive environment, 
in light of the variability in peoples' needs, capacities and 
aspirations, and little knowledge about reversing the "effects of 
noxious environments." She calls for research focused on "the 
transactional nature of adaptation, stress, and coping." 
.. _. -- .... --------
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The concept of person-environment fit is treated by Coulton 
(1979, pp. 159-60, 171-2; 1981, pp. 26-7), in health care and 
health care research, as a multidimensional concept, based on the 
degree of congruence between a person's needs, capacities, and 
aspirations and the resources, demands and opportunities of his 
environment. Such fit may vary in a lifetime from maximum 
congruence, to severe discrepancy when conditions include 
discrimination, limited environmental resources and opportunities, 
or limited individual capacities. Optimal fit, with facilitated 
performance, is conceived when one's capacities and aspirations 
are consistent with environmental demands and opportunities, and 
when one's needs can be met by available environmental resources. 
A persisting lack of fit, or discrepancy, contributes to 
dissatisafaction, distress, frustration, illness or psychological 
disturbance. Interventions may optimize fit by changing 
characteristics of person, environment, or both. 
Coulton (1981, pp. 27-34) presents a set of research-
developed dimensions of person-environment fit. These comprise 
(a) physical dimensions, and (b) psychosocial dimensions, which 
include role performance and role expectations, interpersonal 
relationships, cognitive capacities in the form of knowledge and 
understanding of experience, capacity to regain order and control, 
and capacity to engage in activities. Other dimensions are (c) the 
extent of one's repertoire of behaviors and (d) one's capacity to 
engage necessary economic resources. She also developed a 
typology of interventions for health care, conceptualized according 
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to target and goal, to guide the social worker in deciding on 
whether to emphasize person, environment or both in interventions. 
Weick (1981, pp. 140-1> proposes concepts intended to 
reinstate the person-in-environment paradigm in a way that allows 
for a person to be seen as acting "in the broadest possible 
environment. For Weick, the concept of environment is strengthened 
if it is seen as a multidimensional field of both internal and 
external factors. She explores four possible environments which 
shape behavior. 
The (a) internal-social environment contains "personal 
I history, intrapsychic processes, emotions, thoughts, aspirations 
and beliefs, all of which contribute to the individual's behavioral 
style and characteristic responses." The C b) external-social 
environment holds influences of "culture, social structure, 
technology, and economic and political arrangements." Together 
these have formed "the basis of the person-in-environment 
paradigm." It has enhanced our interactive understanding of 
behavior in social environments to the exlusion of the physical 
(Weick, 1981, p. 141), Extension of the environment concept to the 
realm of (c) internal-physical and Cd) external-physical 
environments challenges the distortion of the mind-body dichotomy. 
It calls on social work to include physical, genetic, metabolic, 
organic functioning of the person together with environmental 
conditions which pose a threat to the challenges and limitations of 
our adaptive capacities. For Weick the four environmentally 
conceived influences provide a broader diagnostic base (p. 141-2>' 
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Health, in this view, is defined "as a qualitative expression 
of the interaction among environmnents." "Good health represents 
a state of positive interaction among the various spheres, while 
ill-health is its disruption." Weick proposes an intervention 
approach which is health-based as opposed to pathology-based and 
which is synchronous with the life model: A client is seen as 
having the ability to heal himself. A worker may help the client, 
who is seen as a subject rather than an object, to mobilize his 
own healing forces. The premise is that people are endowed with 
two vital capacities: "the power to see things clearly and the 
power to change." This "radical" view "puts individuals directly 
in touch with the power to affect their lives" (Weick, 1981, p. 
142) . 
Germain (1983) in recounting emerging theory a bout people-
environment transactions, speaks of heredity and environment as 
complementary with intelligence and culture, "transcending 
biological, psychological, and environmental limits" (p. 112). 
Referring to Dobzhansky, she voices the assumption that all 
personal characteristics have a genetic potentiality, but their 
actual occurrence in an individual depends on environmental 
experience. Some characteristics, for which she cites Hartman's 
sphere of primary autonomy, are less environmentally dependent 
for expression than others, such as those which pertain to the 
sphere of secondary autonomy. "But," she goes on, "all represent 
a mixture of genetic endowment and environment experience, 




be influenced" (p. 113). Drawing on Dubos, (1968) she comments 
on the adaptive demands beyond psychological and biological 
'limits, which are placed on humans by self-created, urbanized, 
technological environments. Given the evolved plasticity of 
humans, nonsalutory environments can be tolerated more than is 
good for the quality of life. "Physiological and behavioral 
responses may maintain an intimate adaptive balance but may 
result in degenerative and chronic physical disease or emotional 
disorders later," as with an undernourished child who adapts with 
restricted activity, but pays a lifetime price in abnormal brain 
development (Germain, 1983, 113). 
Germain <1983, pp. 114-15) remarks on how little is known 
about nutritive environmental qualities, and how much is assumed 
based on cultural idiosyncracy and values. Examples of such 
erroneous assumptions are that babies can form only one primary 
attachment, such as to mother, with the exclusion of father or 
others; or that "slum neighborhoods" with openly poor physical 
plants and less visible rich social networks are disorganized. 
More research on issues such as person-environment fit (Coulton, 
1981) or the fit in agency-client arrangements CMaluccio, 1979a) is 
seen as needed. 
In dealing with person-environment transactions, Germain 
C 1983) sees the social worker as trying to change feedback loops 
at the level of person, family or group, to "interrupt negative 
feedback processes that prevent needed change in behavioral 
systems or positive feedback processes that escalate change beyond 
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the system's limits" (p. 115). Furthermore, interventions may 
occur in varied forms, in different parts of a system, as in the 
case of depression, where interventions might be geared to 
interrupt feedback processes "that sustain and intensify the 
problem" between the person and family member, network, or 
organization such as workplace, school, or agency (pp. 115-16). 
Coping responses serve as feedback processes, to reveal how 
the organism is doing. Stressful experience elicits coping 
responses of a physiological (adrenalin releasing), cognitive 
(problem solving), or behavioral <information seeking) nature. 
Effecti ve coping ma y reduce or elimina te stress. If stress is 
int:ensifed or not released, results may include physical illness, 
emotional disturbance or social disruption with more stress 
ensuing. Germain elaborates on how maintainance of sufficient 
internal comfort and self-esteem is needed to allow for effective 
coping and problem solving. Such a state requires internal 
resources, social supports, information, time for strategy 
development and action, and effective cultural solutions. Our 
professional responsibility falls in the spheres of (a) reducing or 
changing environmental demand, through environmental instruments 
or advocacy; (b) perception of that demand through reappraisal 
with the client system; and (c) supporting and mobilizing more 
effective client coping responses (Germain, 1983, pp. 116-18>-
Complex organizations, says Germain <1983, p. 122), are 
among environmental forms which humans create to solve complex 
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problems and achieve particular goals in various areas of life. 
Social workers may help their agencies' bureaucracies to function 
responsively to client needs and to professional imperatives, by 
calling on organizational theory. Organizational properties vital 
to change efforts by social workers are centralization, 
formalization and stratification, which are manifest in an agency's 
formal and informal systems. 
Centralization reflects distribution of power through authority 
in the formal system, and via influence in the informal one. 
Formalization refers to rules which contribute to the maintenance 
of efficiency, impartiality, and fairness." I nformal rules maybe 
found in norms and traditions, and may render service more 
effective. Rules may also be rigid regulations which subvert 
goals by serving organizational needs to the exclusion of client 
needs. Stratification reflects agency reward distribution. Status 
and prestige, for example, may call forth greater income and 
larger work space, and can interfere with change efforts which 
threaten staff self-interest (Germain, 1983, pp. 122-3). 
An oranizational analysis or assessment provides the 
wherewithall to determine feasibility of the goal of change, and a 
plan of strategies through which to achieve it. Once a plan is 
settled on, its implementation is achieved through change efforts 
with a range of skills such as "program demonstration, joint 
problem-solving, persuasion, negotiation, and bargaining" 
(Germain, 1983, p. 123>' 
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Parallel Developments 
On Ecological Competence and Assessment. 
For psychologists Sundberg, Snowdon and Reynolds (1978, p. 
180), assessment aims to discern individual characteristics of 
importance to decisions in person-society relationships. They 
define competence as connoting "a search for positive 
characteristics, particularly capabilities for coping with life 
si tu a tions. " They cite Bloom' s <1977, 250) sta temen t a bou t 
competence in relation to community mental health, that among 
concepts which "link individual problems to characteristics of the 
social system, the most compelling have been the concepts of 
competence and competence building." 
As psychologists with roots in a tradition of measurement, 
Sundberg et al. (1978, p. 203) state that "if assessment of 
competence is to succeed, it must avoid the pitfalls of excessive 
individualism which characterizes much of the history of 
assessment of intelligence." They call for "as much attention to 
assessment of the environment or situation as to the individual." 
They point to the medical model as tending to • blame the victim' 
and to some radical therapists as tending to blame only the 
environment. They cite three major environmental dimensions 
identified by Moos and his colleagues: relationship, personal 
development, and system maintenance and change. 
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Sundberg et al. (1978, 196, p. 207-8) propose a 
conceptualization of assessment of ecological competence to account 
for complex person- environment interactions. The notion would 
(a) avoid old labels which arise from intelligence measurement and 
psychopathology; (b) account for the multipotentialities of clients; 
(c) consider diverse cultural contexts; (d) not utilize normative 
judgments to reject clients; and (e) assess current as well as 
potential environment when assessing a person. They propose tha t 
the notion of adaptation requires assessment of both the motives of 
the individual and the demands and resources of the environment. 
Competence implies an ecological situation in which individuals 
actively move through settings which provide "nutrients" or 
supports for certain kinds of self-expression and coping, but not 
for others. Thus, competence in functioning and coping relates to 
the particulars of the environment in which they occur. They 
recommend the expansion of community programs which focus on 
"life changes, life-long learning, and general enhancement of 
coping skills and quality of life" (p. 208>' They recommend a 
future combining of personal (micro) assessment with program 
(macro) assessmen t . 
Some Further Notes on Competence. 
Maluccio ( 1979b ), ha ving previously addressed the growth 
potential of action in life events, promotes the therapeutic 
potential of life experiences in the actual life contexts in which 
they occur. He cites theorists from varied disciplines around the 
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definition of competence. He refers to White's view (previously 
cited) of competence in relation to the ego. He notes the 
knowledge and skills needed by the individual in Gladwin's view 
(previously cited>' He summarizes Foote and Cottrell's (1955, pp. 
45-60) definition of competence as "the ability to perform certain 
kinds of tasks and to control the outcomes of episodes of 
interaction. " He sees Smith's social psychological view as 
influenced by three sets of mutually corresponding factors (a) in 
the personal system, hope, self-respect, a sense of efficac.v in 
con trolling one's destin y; and ( b ) in the social structure 
opportunity, respect b.v others .. power. Maluccio (pp. 285-6) sums 
up these varied formulations with G. Allport's (1961) view that 
competence (as borrowed from White) is not merely a need, but a 
life motive unto itself, through which we survive, grow and become 
"self-actualizing. " 
Maluccio (1979b) sees a twofold use for the concept of 
competence in social work practice: to restructure environments, 
and to propel adaptive processes in clien t systems (p. 286). 
Toward these ends, life as the arena of change is where 
experiences, events and processes may be used for their 
therapeutic value as an avenue of effective help through action. 
A client's situation then becomes the focus of opportunity for the 
use of striving, coping, and goal-directed action" (p. 289>' It is 
in the life-space interview, developed in residential work with 
disturbed children by Redl (1959), that clinical and growth-
producing exploitation of life events can occur. I t is organized 
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around the child's life experience in relation to issues which 
become the focus of the interview by a person whom the child sees 
as part of his natural environment or "life space" (pp. 293-5). 
Environmental restructuring as a principal means of helping, 
ma y be used as a force through which to promote "people's efforts 
toward competence and adaptation," notes Maluccio (1979b, p. 296). 
In this spirit a vital worker function is to help the client to 
seek, modify or create opportunities. This occurs in "milieu 
therapy" as well. 
Maluccio (1981) further integrates the notion of competence 
with an ecological approach "by providing guidelines and action 
principles for social workers engaged in work with individuals, 
families or groups," based on facilitating natural adapative 
processes and promoting competence in clients' interaction with 
their environment (p. 2>' He defines four approaches to 
conceptualizing competence. 
1. The achievement approach equates competence with 
achievements through one's own efforts (Maluccio, 1981, p. 3). 
2. In the internal antecedents approach, motives, 
personality traits and cognitive skills set the stage for 
competence. He includes White's formulation here, which for all 
its richness, does not really describe what is included in 
competent behavior, nor how to go about facilitating it (Maluccio, 
1981, pp. 3-5>' 
3. The behavior-environment interactions approach, which 
includes I nkeles' and Gladwin's formulations, emphasizes societal 
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as opposed to psychological referents such as social requirements 
and role performance. It also includes Smith's views which 
integrate behavior and environment by linking the personal system 
and the social structure. For Maluccio, these views enhance 
White's formulations, especially because they add the essential 
factor of social feedback or social reinforcement to White's notion 
that a person's actions are simply intrinsically rewarding and 
motivating (Maluccio, 1981, pp. 5-6). 
4. In the ecological approach, Maluccio <1981, p. 7) refers 
to the conceptualization of ecological competence of Sundberg et al. 
(1978). Maluccio notes that "in traditional formulations, 
competence is generally considered a property or trait of the 
person." In contrast, in the ecological approach, competence 
becomes a transactional concept, an attribute of the transaction 
between person and environment. Such a notion of competence 
which is not a direct attribute of a person, is difficult to 
conceptualize. He nevertheless elucidates the components of 
ecological competence, which he believes "can sensitize us to the 
importance of what is happening between people," their "needs, 
qualities, and coping patterns and ... the properties of their 
impinging environment." 
Maluccio <1981, pp. 7, 9) illustrates the in terpla y between 
the three major components of ecological competence and some of 
their suggested constitutent aspects. He notes that specific 
constituents apply in specific circumstances and vary with culture. 
Thus, "it is useful to think in terms of general capacities or 
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qualities that are universally required (such as the capacity to 
gather and use information) and particular capacities or qualities 
that are needed in specific contexts (such as certain skills 
required in industrial societies)." 
The first component consists of a person's (a) capacities and 
skills. These cover diverse realms such as "cognition, perception, 
intelligence, language, and physical health;" and qualities such 
as flexibility, tolerance for diversity and anxiety, reality testing 
and judgment; and diverse proficiencies which might include 
athletics, as well as interpersonal and emotional skills (Maluccio, 
1981, pp. 7-8>' As Mechanic notes (1974, p. 33) this also depends 
on the efficacy of solutions which one's culture provides, and the 
adequacy of a society's preparatory institutions to reach these 
solutions and the accompanying skills. The second component, an 
individual's (b) motivational aspects, includes interests, hopes 
and aspirations which would comprise his "effectance," or 
"competence motivation" as described by White. The third 
component, (c) environmental qualities--such as resources, 
supports, demCl-nds and institutional pressures--impinge on an 
individual's functioning at a particular time. "Effective behavior 
requires 'goodness of Ut' with complementarity, between 
environmental demands and supports" (p. 8). In a citation of 
Mechanic (1974, p. 33), Maluccio emphasizes that "the ability of 
persons to maintain psychological comfort will depend not only on 
their intrapsychic resources, but also--and perhaps, most 
importantly--on the social supports available or absent in the 
community" (p. 8). 
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Maluccio <1981, p. 12) strikingly ties competence-oriented 
practice to the life model by citing eight themes which are common 
to both. These include Ca) the humanistic perspective; Cb) the 
definition of problems in transactional terms; (c) assessment which 
includes competence clarification for the client system, the 
environment and their fit; Cd) role emphasis for clients as 
resource (rather than carriers of pathology), and for workers as 
enabling agents; (e) the client-worker relationship defined 
especially in terms of mutuality and authenticity; (f) life 
processes and experiences (including creativity) as the main focus; 
(g) use of environment emphasized; and Ch) client feedback 
utilized regularly. 
As Maluccio <1981, pp. 22-3) sees it, "competence-oriented 
social work practice can play an essential triggering function: It 
can serve to set in motion or mobilize the client's coping 
capacities, natural life processes, and strivings toward growth." 
He cites his own study C 1979b) of client perceptions of service as 
evidence of the value of the triggering function in competence-
oriented, life process interventions. Clients, in verbal reports, 
provided a subjective sense of their workers' effectiveness as 
enablers, and of their consequent experience of more effective 
coping and environmental mastery, which Maluccio sees as 
enhancing dormant abilities as well as new patterns of coping. 
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On Social Work Assessment and the Naturalist Paradigm. 
FQr Rodwell (1987), the normative, scientific goal of locating 
one truth via professional objectivity (p. 235) is "unattainable 
and destructive," because to favor the existence of a single 
reality inhibits the best in our practice, which is "understanding 
the unique experience of the individual in context" (p. 237). 
Rodwell (p. 237) applies the five (previously noted) axioms of the 
naturalist paradigm (Lincoln and Guba, 1980), to seven guidelines 
for research, and by extension for assessment: (a) Inquiry 
should be conducted in the context of what is being studied. (b) 
I 
Humans are the most adaptable and adjustable data-gathering 
instruments. (c) Tacit (intuitive) knowledge is of equal value to 
propositional <linguistically expressed) knowledge, notably for 
appreciation of the shades of different realities. (d) Qualitative 
methods which reflect normal human activities are favored over 
quantitative ones as they can be better adapted to dealing with 
varied realities. They expose the nature of the investigator-
respodnent transaction more directly (p. 240). ee) Meanings and 
interpretations which are negotiated with their human sources are 
preferred because it is these human constructions of reality which 
the inquirer seeks. ef) Idiographic (case by case) interpretations 
are preferred over generalizations, because different 
interpretations may have meaning for different realities, with less 
emphasis given to notions of "typical" cases. (g) Tentativeness 
must guide any genera;lized application of findings because 
realities vary (Rodwell pp. 239-40), 
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Rodwell <1987, pp. 240-2) (using child abuse as an example) 
presents the following propositions about social work assessment: 
(a) "The nature of the problem would be seen as an interactive, 
situational one." (b) The purpose of assessment would be 
determination of the factors in that must be overcome in the 
(abusive) situation, if a future problem is to be prevented. 
(c) Focus would involve "all important stakeholders" (in the 
ba tterer 's fa mil y , for exa mp Ie) . (d) No prior assumptions would 
be made about the problem's boundaries or who is involved in its 
definition. (e) The social worker's posture would be 
investigative. (f) Provisional reports would be open to corrective 
scrutiny of all informants, so as to capture accurately the 
mUltiple perspectives. (g) A final assessment would be completed 
only when work with the entire family had concluded, because the 
work itself would be adding revised meaning to the situation. 
(h) The assessment report would be far more narratively 
descriptive than objective and conclusive in nature, and (i) would 
reflect the multiple realities of the participants. 
For Rodwell <1987, p. 243), naturalistic inquiry is seen as 
congruent with social work values. I t provides a different 
construction of expectations for the profession, namely that 
(a) there are multiple viewpoints, (b) the individual is unique in 
her. own context, and (c) "the social worker has no responsibility 




The preceding historical-theoretical literature review has 
been presented in two sections: (a) material which appeared up 
to the late 1970' s (Chapter II), and (b) material which has 
appeared since that time. 
Chapter II presents the relevant conceptual elements of the 
linear-mechanistic approach of the clinical-normative model in 
casework as it has expanded in an increasingly holistic and 
organismic direction through efforts of its adherents to respond to 
a more complex world. As these changes progressed, a shift to an 
ecologically-anchored world-view began to emerge in the 
contributions of practitioners who saw the old view as being 
insufficient to deal with the complexities of people, their needs, 
problems and relationships in a rapidly changing post-figurative 
world. Chapter II I, which begins with contributions since this 
study was conceived in the late 1970' s, presents elaborations of 
the ecological-systems approach and its life model application to 
practice. 
The material contained in Chapter I I presents basic 
conceptions that have been organized into principles which 
underlie the two alternative approaches on which this research 
focuses. These underlying principles and related operationalized 
criteria for practice are presented in Chapter IV, in the next 
several pages, along with this study's variables and hypotheses. 
CHAPTER IV 
Definitions and Hypotheses 
Introductory Note 
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This study was designed (a) to determine discernible 
differences in what social work student clinicians say they believe 
about their practice orientations; and Cb) to determine correlations 
between these beliefs and what social work student clinicians say 
they would do in specific kinds of simulated practice situations. 
The literature was reviewed to trace the historical and 
theoretical development of the two approaches which are under 
study. As the linear-mechanistic approach began to change in an 
effort to accommodate itself to a more complex world, the 
precursors of the ecological-systems approach began to develop, 
and that approach began to coalesce. 
Defining the Variables 
By drawing on the conceptual-historical review of the 
literature, definitions of the study's princpal independent variable 
(IV), its two dependent variables CDV's), and its two secondary 
I V' s will be presen ted in five sections which allow us to 
operationalize the hypotheses which then follow. 
1. Clinical-Orientation (Linear-Mechanistic versus Ecological-
Systems): Principal Independent Variable. 
Conceptual definition. Clinical-orientation may be 
conceptualized as the social worker's view, organization and 
interpretation of the knowledge base which underlies 
person-environment/person-situation concepts (see Bartlett, 1970, 
pp. 51-66, 62-83>' 
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Opera tional definition. For this study, clinical-orientation 
is defined through the identification of the degree of a clinican' s 
self-perceived adherence to specific theoretical-conceptual 
alternative views of practice, conceptualized in a series of eight 
(later revised to six) principles which present sets of linear-
mechanistic and ecological systems alternative views of practice. 
The differences involve distinctions between (a) linear-causality 
versus equipotentiality; (b) analytic versus organismic qualities; 
(c) drive-reduction toward a static equilibrium as opposed to the 
active readjustment of a steady-state; (d) adherence to mind-body 
dualism versus its rejection; ee) emphasis on regressive as 
opposed to progressive forces; (f) intervention in isolation versus 
in the client's life context; (g) rejection of teleology versus 
acceptance of purposeful phenomena; and (h) the application of 
linear causality as opposed to living systems principles. 
Figure 1, which follows, illustrates these differences. 
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Figure 1. Comparative outline of principles which underlie the 
linear-mechanistic and ecological-systems approach. 
Linear-mechanistic approach 
1. Linear causality. 
3. Additive analytic qual-
ity. An entity may be 
understood by reduction to 
the sum ot its parts, and 
their separate analysis. 
4. Homeostasis model. 
Drive reduction to static 
equilibrium. 
5. Adhere to mind - body 
dualism. 
6. Entropy. Emphasis· on 
regressive forces which 
inhibit growth. 
8. Client-worker encounter 
isolated from the life-
context the person, family 
or group to be helped. 






directed. determinism. Past 
*7. Application of linear-
mechanistic principles from 
19th . century sC.ience to 
behavioral, psychological 
and sooial phenomena. 
Ecological-systems approach 
1. Equifinality. 
3. Organismic quality. 
The whole is equal to the 
sum ot its parts, plus the 
relationship among parts. 
4. Heterostasis model. 
Active readjustment in 
steady - state. 
5. Rejection of mind-body 
dualism. 
6. Negentropy. Emphasis on 
progressive forces which 
promote growth. 
8. Client-worker encounter 
within the life-context of 
the person, family or group 
to be helped. 
*2. Ordered, purposeful spon-
taneous phenomena and behav-
ior to maintain the organism. 
Present- and future-directed. 
*7. Application of living 
systems principles from 
oganismic biology to 
behavioral, psychological and 
and social phenomena. 
*Although principles 2 and 7 (in lighter print) were initially 
utilized, they were subsequently eliminated in their application to 
the development of their respective scales on Instrument-I, based 
on internal reliability testing of Instrument-t. 
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2. Assessment: Dependent Variable. 
Conceptual definition. Assessment may be thought of as a 
process in which a common base of professional knowledge is 
selectively and competently applied in professional judgments 
toward understanding and identifying characteristics of people with 
problems in their psychosocial situations (see Bartlett, 1970, pp. 
139-170) . 
Operational defintion. For this study, assessment consists of 
judgements in five areas from which to view and understand a 
clien t' s psychosocial situ a tion. Each area is represented by two 
alternative judgment choices of aspects of the two practice 
approaches being studied. Assessment-related differences emerge 
from the same alternate orientations to the world as do the 
theoretical distinctions of clinical-orientation These assessment 
distinctions are, however, specific, close-to-the-work criteria which 
operationally define aspects of assessment. The five assessment 
criteria involve distinctions between (a) unilateral versus mutual 
assessment; (b) focus on personality deficits as opposed to 
strengths; (c) acceptance of environmental stability with deficits, 
versus search for environmental change and supports; (d) coping 
seen as a function of personality structure as opposed to 
person-environment mesh; (e) understanding based on history as 
opposed to current factors. 
The operationalized criteria for assessment are set forth in 
Figure 2 which follows. 
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Figure 2. Comparative operationalized criteria for assessment. 
Bmphasis on linear-mechan. 
1. Unilateral assessment 
by clinician to define 
problem/situation. 
2. Focus on personality 
deficits (ego's defensive 
capacities) as limitations 
to growth and change. 
3. Acceptance of environ-
mental st~bility with 
deficits. 
4. Coping as a function of 
change through personality 
structure or internal 
conflict resolution. 
5. Focus on history to 
understand the problem 
in the present. 
-- -- - -- --- -- --.-.~. ---
Bmphasis on ecolog.-systems 
1. Mutuality by contracting 
to define problem/situation. 
2. Focus on personality 
strengths (ego's defensive 
capacities) as enhancements 
to growth and change. 
3. Search for environ-
mental change and supports. 
4. Coping as a fiuntion of 
mesh, transactions between 
person and environment. 
5. Focus on current factors 
to understand the problem 
in the present. 
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3. Intervention Plans: Dependent Variable. 
Conceptual definition. Intervention planning, based on 
psychosocial assessment, may be thought of as a process in which 
the clinician defines what kind of change is needed and what can 
be done professionally to influence movement toward that change 
(Bartlett, 1970, pp. 153, 161-162). 
Operational defintion. For this study, intervention planning 
consists of action plans in nine areas of the change process in 
which the two approaches differ. Each area is represented by 
alternate judgment choices of aspects of the two practice 
approaches being studied. Intervention-related differences come 
from the same alternate orientations to the world as do theoretical 
distinctions of clinical-orientation. The distinctions are, however, 
specific, c1ose-to-the-work criteria which operationally define 
specific aspects of intervention planning. The nine intervention 
plan criteria involve distinctions between (a) unilateral clinician 
prescriptiveness versus mutual clinician-client decision-making; (b) 
abstract, general versus concrete, specific goals; (c) focus on the 
limiting quality of personality deficits as opposed to engageable, 
adaptive quality of personality strengths; (d) limited versus 
maximal focus on use of environmental supports; (e) use of office 
versus life context for interventions; (f) client versus environment 
as point of entry into case; (g) use of verbal dialogue as opposed 
to tasks as in terven tion method; (h) clinician I s role as therapist 
versus broad range of roles; (i) client resistance as opposed to 
transactional difficulties to explain lack of change. 
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Figure 3. Comparative operationalized criteria for intervention 
plans. 
Emphasis on linear-mechan. 
1. Unilat. prescriptiveness 
by clinician as expert to 
decide cn interven. plan. 
2. Abstract, general con-
ceptual goals. 
3. Personality deficits (ego 
defenses,growth-limitations) 
as limitations to inter-
vention. 
4. Environmental supports 
seen as limited in avail-
ability and helpfulness, 
with minimal focus toward 
meeting client need. 
5. Interv. in agency/office, 
not to intrude in cIt's life. 
6. Client(s) as the npoint 
of entry" for interv. plans. 
7. Client-clinician verbal 
dialogue toward increased 
emotional expression, self-
understanding, insight- by 
client. 
8. Clinician as primary 
helper or therapiatthrough 
verbal dialogue. 
9. Client resistance to 
explain lack of change. 
-- --- - --------------
Emphasis on ecolog.-systems 
1. Mutuality via contract-
ing between clinician & 
cit., to decide on interv. 
2. Concrete, specific next 
steps for change. 
3. Adaptive personality 
strength (ego coping behav-
iors and capacities) as 
engageable in intervention. 
4. Environmental supports 
seen as vital in meeting 
client need, to be located 
or established whenever 
possible. 
5. Intervention in context 
of client's daily life. 
6. Use of aspects of cIt's 
envir. as "pnts of entry." 
7. (Graded) tasks/steps for 
cIt. use of inner & envir. 
resources to experience new 
coping skills with human & 
physical envir. 
8. Clinician broad roles 
e.g., enabler, _broker &/or 
advocate in interventions. 
9. Transactional difficul-
ties between cit. & envir. 
to explain lack of change. 
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In addition, practice may be said to have meaning in a 
human context. We may conceptualize various contextual factors 
which traditionally have meaning in social work practice. Two 
sets of such contextual factors have been utilized as secondary 
independent variables in this study. One contextual variable is 
duration-severity. A second contextual variable is 
interpersonal-context. 
The thinking behind the choice of these two (secondary) I V IS 
is as follows: First, it was deemed to be of value to see how our 
the primary IV, clinical-orientation, would perform under varied 
and "extreme" conditions. The idea was to pick specific conditions 
which theoretically might pull the results in one direction or 
another. The conditions would be standard and important aspects 
of day-to-day clinical social work. The conditions would be 
meaningful to the purposes of this study. Finally, it could 
enhance social work knowledge to test conditions that are relevant 
to problem/situations which are regularly encountered in practice. 
4. Duration-Severity: Secondary Independent Variable. 
Conceptual definition. Conceptually, this variable combines 
two factors: duration of a client's psychosocial impairment, which 
is a temporal concept, and severity, a quantitative concept which 
refers to the relative degree of that client's psychosocial 
impairment. 
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Operational definition. Operationally, the combination of 
factors may be represented on a continuum between two end-points: 
chronic and acute. This secondary independent variable combines 
two factors which may be thought of as linked from a clinical 
perspective. Chronic duration-severity represents long duration 
coupled with strong severity of problem/situation. It generally 
portends serious developmental, diagnostic and treatment issues. 
I ts implicit emphasis on psychosocial dysfunction and 
psychopathology, as well as history (over time), might make it 
easy for linear-mechanistically-oriented clinicians to tune into. 
Such a condition might more amenable to a linear-mechanistic pull 
than to an ecological-systems pull. Acute duration-severity, on 
the other hand, may be thought of diagnostically as an adjustment 
disorder or situa tional disturbance, which represents an immediate, 
short-term interplay of psychosocial factors, and may therefore be 
seen as far more amenable to an ecological systems interpretation, 
and easy for ecological-systems otriented clinicians to tune into. 
The idea of linking duration and severity of problem/ 
situation into one factor, called duration-severity, was an effort 
to maximize variance by linking two powerfully differentiating 
factors, which may be seen as frequently going together in 
situations of serious psychopatholgy. The factor duration-severity 
was conceptualized in a simplistic way for purposes of this study, 
to reflect either an acute, mild, reactive problem/situation, or a 
chronic, longstanding, seriously pathological problem/situation. 
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5. Interpersonal-Context: Secondary Independent Variable. 
I 
Conceptual definition. This variable refers to a general 
degree of interpersonal involvement (or lack of involvement) with 
other human beings. 
Operational definition. This factor may be represented on a 
continuum which reflects either an interpersonally isolated or an 
interpersonally involved presenting problem/situation for a client. 
It was conjectured that someone who is rather involved with other 
human beings, or at least has the opportunity for such 
involvement, would present a problem/situation which lends itself 
easily to being conceptualized from a systems viewpoint, given the 
opportunity available to a clinician to conceptualize several 
humans in relationship to one another more easily in a system 
than one isolated person. It was thought that the involved 
situation might tend to generate an ecological-systems pull on 
assessments and intervention plans. 
By the same token, an isolated client might be seen as 
presenting a problem situation in which the relationship between 
client and social environment would be more difficult for a 
I 
clinican to see and conceptualize. Focus on the client alone might 
present fewer probelms for assessments and intervention plans for 
a linear-oriented clinician than for an eclogically-oriented 
clinican. Thus, an isolated client's problem/situation might tend 
to generate a linear-mechanistic pull on assessments and 
intervention plans. 
-- - -- - ------- ------------------
· ._-_ ..... ' .. " ..• _._--
Hypotheses 
1. Clinical-orientation as Related to (a) Assessment and 
(b) Intervention Plans. 
Hypothesis-1 a. 
General: There is a positive correlation between measures 
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which reflect what particular clinicians say they believe about 
their clinical-orientation, and measures of the kinds of assessments 
which they would formulate in specific practice situations. 
Specific: Clinicians who reflect a linear-mechanistic 
perspective will tend to formulate assessments which emphasize 
linear-mechanistic criteria, such as "unilateral assessments" and 
"emphasis on history." Clinicians who reflect an ecological-
systems perspective, will tend to formulate assessments which 
emphasize ecological-systems criteria, such as "mutuality through 
contracting" and "emphasis on current factors." (Figure 2 lists 
all criteria.) 
Hypothesis-1 b. 
General: There is a positive correlation between measures 
which reflect what particular clinicians say they believe about 
their clinical-orientation, and measures of the kinds of 
interventic;>n plans which they would formulate in specific practice 
situations. 
Specific: Clinicians who reflect a linear-mechanistic 
perspective will tend to formulate intervention plans which 
emphasize linear-mechanistic criteria, such as "personality 
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deficits" and "clinician as therapist". Clinicians who reflect an 
ecological-systems perspective, will tend to formulate intervention 
plans which emphasize ecological-systems criteria such as 
"personality strengths" and "varied clinician roles". (Figure 3 
lists all criteria.) 
The reader will note that there are two main instruments. 
Instrument-l determines each subject's clinical-orientation. 
Instrument-2 contains four case vignettes, which are each followed 
by a questionnaire. Along with providing data for measures of 
I 
the kinds of assessments and intervention plans determined by 
each clinician, Instrument-2 also provides measures of the effect of 
context on assessments and intervention plans. There is a 
hypothesis with reference to each contextual (secondary 
independent) variable, for both assessment and for intervention 
plans. 
The first contextual variable is duration-severity. Its 
hypotheses follow. 
2. Duration-Severity as Related to (a) Assessment and 
(b) Intervention Plans. 
Hypothsie-2a. 
General: There is a positive correlation between measures of 
duration-severity of problem/situation, and measures of the kinds 
of assessments formulated by participating clinicians in specific 
practice situations. 
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Specific: A client who is depicted as chronic should induce 
more linear-mechanistic assessment judgments by clinicians, an 
example of which would be "unilateral assessment" (as shown in 
figure 2). A client who is depicted as acute should induce more 
ecological-systems assessment judgments by clinicians, an example 
of which would be "mutuality by contracting" (as in figure 2). 
Hypothesis-2b. 
General: There is a positive correlation between measures of 
durationseverity of problem/situation, and measures of the kinds of 
-intervention plans formulated by participating clinicians in 
specific practice situations. 
Specific: A client who is depicted as chronic should induce 
more linear-mechanistic intervention judgments by clinicians, an 
example of which would be "personality deficits" (as shown in 
figure 3). A client who is depicted as acute should induce more 
ecological-systems intervention judgments by clinicians, an example 
of which would be "personality strengths" (as seen in figure 3). 
The second contextual variable is interpersonal-context. Its 
hypotheses follow: 
3. Interpersonal-Context as Related to (a) Assessment and 
(b) Intervention Plans. 
Hypothesis-3a. 
General: There is a positive correlation between measures of 
interpersonal-context of problem/situation, and measures of the 
kinds of assessments formulated by participating clinicians in 
specific practice situations. 
" , 
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Specific: More specifically, a client who is described as 
isolated would tend to evoke more linear-mechanistic assessment 
judgments in clinicians, an example of which would be "unilateral 
assessment" (as shown in figure 2>' A client who is described as 
involved would tend to evoke more ecological-systems assessment 
judgments in clinicians, an example of which would be "mutuality 
by contracting" (as shown in figure 2). 
Hypothesis-3b. 
General: There is a positive correlation between measures of 
interpersonal-context of problem/situation, and measures of the 
kinds of intervention plans formulated by participating clinicians 
in specific practice situations. 
Specific: More specifically, a client who is described as 
isolated would tend to evoke more linear-mechanistic intervention 
judgments in clinicians, an example of which would be 
"personality deficits" (as shown in figure 3). A client who is 
described as involved would tend to evoke more ecological-systems 
intervention judgments in clinicians, an example of which would be 




Hypothesis testing required the development of two 
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instruments. The first, Instrument-I, measures differences in what 
social work student clinicians say they believe about their 
respective clinical orientations, with reference to their adherence 
to principles of one or the other of our two alternate approaches 
to practice. The second, Instrument-2, tests what social work 
student clinicians say they would do, 
simula ted circumstances. 
Instrument-l Development. 
under a variety of 
The first instrument (which appears in Appendix B) is based 
on an assumption that a series of contrasting "principles", drawn 
from the theoretical literature, could serve as a means of 
distinguishing beliefs about practice. The distinctions which are 
drawn in each "principle" refer to a relative presence (or 
absence) of one kind of orientation or another. Clusters of ques-
tions were then drawn up about each principle, in an effort to de-
velop a questionnaire which would reliably distinguish between 
various aspects of our two approaches. 
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Initially, eight sets of comparative principles were developed 
for Instrument-l. 
The initial eight sets of comparative principles were 
presented in Figure 1 as a theoretical, comparative understanding 
of the two schools of thought. The process of instrument 
development involved the testing of clinicians with questions which 
cluster around each principle. A final group of six principles 
(which are represented as six internally reliable instrument-
scales) was arrived at. These were presented as the first six 
sets of principles in darker print in Figure 1. The two sets of 
principles in lighter print were eliminated in a process which will 
be explained in this chapter. The principles are numbered in the 
order in which they were initially drawn up. They are numbered 
according to that order throughout this study for the purpose of 
consistency. These principles are conceived as tapping a 
theoretical orientation which is represented in the totality of all 
six (final> principles together. This viewpoint is based on the 
understanding that a theoretical orientation is not represented by 
anyone aspect.. but by the totality of all its aspects combined. 
Anything less than the totality would be a different entity. 
I nstrument-2 Development. 
The second instrument (which appears in Appendix C) 
actually tests our hypotheses under a variety of structured, 
controlled, simulated circumstances. It presents four specific case 
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vignettes of clients in controlled, differing practice situations, 
and asks clinicians for their assessments and intervention plans 
for each situation. This second instrument represents what 
clinicians say they would do in a practice situation. In this 
study, it is compared to what clinicians say about their beliefs in 
the first instrument. Measures of this comparison, under the 
differing experimental conditions of our four vignettes, constitute 
our results. 
In order to develop the second instrument (which stayed 
close to actual concrete aspects of practice), sets of comparative, 
operationalized criteria, drawn from the literature, were formulated 
to describe the tasks of assessment (Figure 2) and intervention 
planning (Figure 3>' 
The second instrument included forced-choice and open-ended 
questions about actual assessment and intervention tasks. Each 
forced-choice question reflected one operationalized criterion. Each 
question was to be answered with either a linear-mechanistic or an 
ecological-systems form of assessment or intervention plan. 
Subjects were told to choose between one or the other, and could 
not pick a graded midpoint. This was done with the intent of 
evoking sharp contrasts in results. 
The open-ended questions, on the other hand, were conceived 
as allowing for gradations between the two orientations. Subjects 
wrote freehand responses for assessment and intervention plans for 
each vignette. These free-hand responses were scored by trained 
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.judges. The judges were trained to understand and to apply the 
criteria for assessment and for intervention plans, by arriving at 
a global rating for each open-ended response. A global score 
could be extreme or in-between. It represented the totality of all 
criteria considered. Each global score was conceived as the mean 
of the scores of each· .judge, for each open -ended response. Judges 
were all trained together, so as to consider criteria in a similar 
fashion. 
The comparative criteria for assessment and intervention are 
the operationalized criteria by which the hypotheses have been 
tested. These criteria are presented in Figures 2 and 3, 
respectively, on the two following pages. 
Structure of Hypotheses. 
The hypotheses in this study derive from its specifying 
questions. The first two hypotheses (-la and -lb) ~~st the 
principal independent variable, clinical-orientation. [hese two 
hypotheses are indeed tested through the application of the 
preceding operationalized criteria, in both instrument-construction 
and data analysis procedures. 
The second and third sets of hypotheses (-2a, -2b, -3a, and 
3b) test for effects of the two secondary independent variables, 
duration-severity of problem/situation and social-context of 
problem/situation. These hypotheses are tested in both instrument-
construction and data analysis procedures . 
. -............. --_ .... _ .... --
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·Choice of Subjects: General Statement. 
Two alternatives were considered for choice of subjects to 
participate in this study. Ca) It was thought that the use of 
experienced social work clinicans with substantive casework/direct-
practice/micro-system level experience might generate responses 
which would contribute highly to variance and reliability. It 
became clear, however, that the cost in time and money would 
prohibit the location and use of a committed final sample of two 
hundred subjects to complete two or three questionnaires. (b) The 
location, through accredited schools of social work, of second year 
students with clinicallcasework/direct-practice micro-system 
oriented training was more realistic. The maximizing of variance 
and reliability could be structured by using a large number of 
students from a variety of schools, on whom a dozen or so 
selection criteria (such as prior expereince, and course of study) 
could be applied (in a process to be described at length in the 
next subsection of this chapter). 
MSW programs in 1980, the year the data were collected, 
varied widely as reported by Dinerman C1981, p. 2), in curriculum 
structure and emphasis, but were expected to contain a number of 
broad areas of stl,ldy in a coherent and integrated format. 
Required content comprised several headings, among which are 
included the following (Dinerman, 1981, p. 2; Council on Social 
Work Education, 1971, pp. 56-61>: 
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1. Knowledge of Human Behavior and the Social Environment, 
which covered the contexts of individual, group, organizations, 
institutions and culture, was seen as bearing on behavior, and 
the theories about behavior which der-ive from biology, psychology, 
social science and humanities. 
2. There was no mandate for a particular Pratice Approach 
beyond and encouragement of an understanding of the relationship 
obetween knowledge, values and skill, inquiry, relationship to 
other human services approaches and personnnel, and 
responsibility for social problem amelioration/prevention. 
3. Field work was to enhance and reinforce curriculum 
while competence, values and skills developed. 
Dinerman (1981, p. 11) notes that content areas and their 
rationale were specified only in general terms for Human Behavior 
and Social Environment "to permit experimentation in teaching 
practice based on the tradition of method [alone) ... or combination 
of methods" (as in direct-practice or micro-level practice). 
In her selective survey of MSW programs, Dinerman <1981, p. 
11) notes that the Human Behavior and Social Environment area 
varied for different schools with a wide array of content 
possibilities. Most common were human Diversity, personality 
theories, and the situational-psychological interplay in human 
behavior, with a bent more in favor of the psychological factors. 
Common to all programs was the life cycle approach. Groups and 
community-oriented content tended to be not included <1981, p. 12). 
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Background and study concentrations among entering MSW students 
tended to be widely diverse (p. 41). For the large proportion of 
students, the MSW program is a first social work educational 
exposure (p, 66). Work with individuals and families was seen as 
a major focus. As pointed out by Fanshel in his introduction to 
Dinerman's study (p. xiv), "the variability among programs and 
the lack of order and predictability comes through quite strongly." 
Thus we see in 1980, a diverse group of many inexperienced 
social work students with a varied backgrounds entering programs 
which provided a strong emphasis on psychological factors in the 
person-environment encounter, with much emphasis on work with 
(a) individuals and (b) families. As may be surmised from the 
earlier chapters, systems-oriented thinking and an interpersonal 
perspective in family practice was indeed present in the literature 
by the late 1970's. It would seem implicit that among a large 
group of casework/direct-practice/micro-system level second year 
MSW stUdents in 1980, one might have found large numbers whose 
graduate curriculum and field work training reflected knowldge 
some family practice concepts of a systems and/or interpersonal 
nature, as well as individually-oriented psychologically-oriented 
knowledge. These would broadly reflect the choices between an 
individual and systems orientation with which the subjects were 
confronted in this study. Fully expounded ecological concepts 
were just entering the literature at that time. 
187 
Seguence of Procedures: General Statement. 
I 
Subjects who were ultimately included in the experiment were 
grouped categorically, . according to their predominant use in 
practice of either (a) a linear-mechanistic approach (Group LM) or 
(b) an ecological-systems approach (Group ES). A middle group 
(Group M) was selected from among those sub.jects who fell into 
neither the LM nor ES groups. 
Three instruments were utilized sequentially in the course of 
this study: An Introductory Questionnaire served to inform and 
select actual sub.jects, in a preliminary fashion, from the larger 
pool of potential su b.jects. Instrument-J and Instrument-2 were 
developed to serve as the means to actually test hypotheses. The 
development and administration of these instruments were as 
follows: 
Before the Introductory Questionnaire was utilized, letters 
were written to the Deans of all Council-on-Social-Work-Education-
approved schools of social work in the United States and Canada. 
The study was explained and approval was requested in the form 
of then-current, soon-to-be second-year students in casework or 
direct practice. Fourteen schools responded with full, non-
restrictive cooperation in providing the needed lists of students. 
A copy of the Introductory Questionnaire appears in Appendix A. 
Of the 1,007 questionnaires sent, over 700 were returned. OVer 
650 people indicated willingness and eligibility to participate. 
The questionnaire consisted of a letter which explained the study 
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along with a note of willingness to participate, on one side of a 
single sheet. The reverse side contained the questionnaire which 
asked twelve questions geared to elicit responses which included 
(a) confirmation of one's status as a second-year student in 
casework or direct practice. Questions also sought information 
about (b) current and future professional interests, (c) previous 
related academic and work experience, Cd) age, Ce) sex, and 
(f) school of social work attended. 
Of the more that 650 students willing to participate, 200 were 
chosen to receive Instrument-I, based on the following criteria for 
eligibility found in their responses to the Introductory 
Questionnaire: (a) It was required that a participant respond to 
being a second year student, and (b) that both first and second-
year field placements be in direct practice. (c) A current field 
placement in a mental health related setting was preferred, as a 
means of minimizing variance based on the influence of current 
field of practice. There was a preponderance of such 
participants. Additionally, one might surmise, that experience in 
such a setting lends itself well to practice in both models. 
Furthermore, the vignettes of Instrument-2 present participants 
with simulated practice situations wnich woiilCl· fraditfonally . be· 
occur in a mental health setting. (d) Primary professional 
interest at the time had to be in working with individuals, 
families and/or groups. Interest which focused on agencies, 
organizations, and/or communities was not accepted. ee) Career 
goals had to be stated in words which indicated, or did not 
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preclude, a continued interest in direct practice or in a 
supervisory role in direct practice. Cf) There was a large number 
of subjects with either previous experience in social work or a 
related helping profession, and/or a prior masters degree in a 
rela ted field. It was thought that such prior experience might 
enhance a participant's understanding of work and theory-related 
issues in direct practice.. and might thereby contribute to 
maximizing the variance of the final scores in our results. 
Cg) Sex of participants was addressed by attempts to balance the 
numbers of men and woman chosen. There were more women than 
I 
men among the more than 650 willing respondents. In general, on 
a school-by-school basis, this involved the researcher's first 
selecting all or most of the otherwise eligible men Cbased on the 
criteria already noted); and then choosing an equal.. or usually 
greater, number of women who fit the criteria for eligibility. 
This was done on a school-by- school basis. When, as was 
usually the case, there were too many eligible women from a 
particular school, choices were made by randomized selection 
among these women. Ch) This brings us to the issue of the 
representation of schools. Our sample of 200 chosen participants 
is approximately 31 % of our pool of just over 650 willing 
repondents. Therefore, approximately 31% of the total number of 
respondents per school was chosen as a means of proportionately 
representing each school in the sample of 200. I n this sample, 
representation of participants by sex was fairly equalized with 96 
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men and 104 women. It was not possible, for reasons beyond this 
experimenter I S control, to equalize the proportion of men and 
women on a school-by-school basis. Some schools presented far 
many more women than men for the pool. 
In the ideal design, Instrument-l was to be completed by a 
minimum of 120 sUbjects. It was designed to categorize each 
subject as to clinical-orientation, on a overall scale of 0.00 to 
100.00. Ideally, the 20% of subjects falling closest to 0.00 comprise 
those to be categorized as utilizing a linear-mechanistic (LM) 
approach. The 20% whose responses score closest to 100.00 
comprise those who utilize an ecological-systems (ES) approach. 
Subjects in the middle 20% constitute the middle (M) group. The 
second and fourth 20% groupings of subjects were to be discarded. 
Actual raw score does not determine group assignment. Rather, it 
is the. percentile rank of each score which determines the clinical-
orientation grouping to which each subject is assigned. Figure 4, 
below, illustrates this. 
Figure 4. Percentile ranges of clinical-orientation groups 
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Following the scoring of Instrument-1, twenty-four subjects 
were to be assigned to each group, for a total of seventy-two 
subjects for the experimental run. This is illustrated as follows: 
LM: n = 24 
M: n = 24 
ES: n = 24 
N = 72 
Of the 200 subjects to whom Instrument-1 was sent by mail, 
152 subjects actually completed and returned these. 
At a later date (a few months later>, after sujects had 
initially been categorized into three experimental groups, the 
experiment was run by mailing Instrument-2 to the subjects in the 
three groups. This consisted of a series of four written case 
vignettes which were presented to each subject to read, followed 
by a request to respond immediately to a questionnaire about each 
vignette. 
Data for the experiment consists of responses to Instruments-1 
and -2. Data analysis explored the responses in each 
experimental group CLM, M, ES) to test for the effects of the main 
independent variable, clinical-orientation; and to test for the 
effects of the two secondary independent variables, interpersonal-
context and duration-severity of problem/situation. The design 
sequence ran as follows. 
Figure 5. Time sequences of events in this study. 






LM ------> 0 1 
M ------> O2 
ES ------> 03 
Located pool of subjects and arranged for their participa-
tion. (X) This includes the scoring of the Introductory 
Question#taire and the selecting of a sample. 
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Administered Instrument-l to all subjects in sample. (Xb ) 
Analyzed data from Instrument-l in order to group subjects 
in either LM, M or ES, or to discard them. (Xc) 
Administered Instrument-2 to subjects in LM, M and ES. 
Analyzed responses to Insturment-2 and tested hypotheses. 
Instrument-2 carries a series of four case vignettes which 
were constructed for all subjects to read and immediately react to, 
by responding to a questionnaire after each vignette. The final 
versions of the four vignettes were developed through a pilot 
project which involved the pretesting of a group of professional 
social workers, followed by discussing with each of them the 
purpose of the vignettes, as well as their critiques of and 
suggestions about the content and format of the vignettes. 
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Structure and Presentation of the Vignetttes. 
Each vignette is composed of one of two extreme 
interpersonal-context categories (isolated or involved>; and one of 
two extreme duration-severity categories (acute or chronic). There 
are four such combinations to form four case vignettes which 
represent groupings of extreme differences in types of problem/ 
situation which a clinician may encounter. For example, these 
differences, might be seen as lending themselves (a) to significant 
differences in case conceptualization (Le., individual versus 
environmental focus in assessment); and (b) to significant 
differences in intervention/treatment plan (L e., emphasis on 
individual insight versus emphasis on more broadly based family 
support) . 
The vignettes are brief and clear, to maintain the reader IS 
interest and ability to follow them. They do, however, provide 
sufficient information to enable a clinician to make judgments from 
either a linear-mechanistic or an ecological-systems perspective. 
Figure 6 illustra tes the four types of vignettes developed. 
Figure 6. The four combinations of interpersonal-context and 
duration-severity utilized in vignette development. 
Duration-severity 
1. Acute adjustment reaction, 
developmental crisis 
of young adulthood. 
2. Chronic psychotic sta te 
of young adulthood. 
Interpersonal-context 
a. Lives alone, in isola ted 
fashion. 
b. Lives with support of an 
intact family. 
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To recapitulate, two extreme duration-severity categories and 
two extreme interpersonal-context categories were chosen. These 
categories were combined into the four possible types of vignettes. 
The vignettes have clear similarities and distinguishing differences 
which might affect results. 
1. Similarity lies in the developmental stage of clients. All 
clients are in early adulthood. This eliminates stage of life as a 
variable. 
2. There are differences in interpersonal-context categories: 
Ca} A person who lives alone in an isolated fashion, might be 
more easily assessed and engaged in individual interventions, 
which reflect a linear-mechanistic viewpoint, based on a lack of 
readily discernible environmental factors. Cb} An individual in 
an intact family living situation would be more easily assessed 
and engaged in the framework of an ecological-systems approach 
because of the readily discernible environmental factors. 
3. Differences for the two duration-severity categories might 
also reflect differences between the two orientations: linear-
mechanistic versus ecological-systems. Thus, a client with a 
chronic condition might be prone to be seen from a linear-
mechanistic perspective. By the same token, an acutely Buffering 
individual might tend to be seen more from an ecological-systems 
perspective. 
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There are four vignettes which are numbered on the basis of 
the prior illustration in Figure 6. 
(1-a) Acute adjustment reaction of young adulthood, for an 
individual who has left home and lives alone. 
Cl-b) Acute adjustment reaction of young adulthood for an 
individual who lives in an intact family. 
(2-a) Chronic psychotic state for a young adult 
who lives alone. 
(2-b) Chronic psychotic state for a young adult 
who lives in an intact family. 
The four vignettes follow in Figures 7,8,9 and 10. 
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Figure 7. Case vignette-la (acute-isolated condition). 
David is age twenty. His parents, recently divorced professionals, had always been 
materially and affectionately generous to David. Their generosity became more 
pronounced five years ago after David's only brother completed college, married and 
moved out West. Parents' marriage had centered around providing for the children. The 
family had always lived in a small neighborly New England town. 
David, due to be a senior in a college near home in the fall, says his parents expect 
him to go to graduate school, but that he has not even looked into this. Instead, he 
has been thinking about, and talking to his friends, parents and college advisor about 
leaving home where he lives with father and finishing college somewhere else. 
David has been edgy at home. He and father have been openly hostile to one another 
for the past year. He avoids much contact with mother who lives in the same town. He 
had been dating a young woman whom he had known since high school but felt he was only 
seeing her more recently because she kept him away from home where he hated to be. 
David came far to this city three weeks ago. He called his mother last week, long 
distance, collect, to say that he is fine and has money, but would not give his 
address. When David left home, he and his father were not on speaking terms. 
David was referred to this agency by a friend who lives at the "V" where David is 
Staying. David expects to run out of money in about a month and says he does not know 
what he will do then. He dislikes the impersonal atmosphere at the "V" but is having 
a good time meeting people in New Vork. 
David's complaints include feeling that his parents bother him, that there is really 
nothing for him in his home town, and that he needs to think things out away from 
home, perhaps permanently. 
David wants help in deciding what to do. He wants a "counselor" to help him think 
things out. He does not want a therapist to get into his head. 
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Figure 8. Case vignette I-b (acute-involved condition>. 
Martha, age nineteen, is living in the City with her parents and only sister age 
sixteen. Mother is a teacher and is home late afternoon every day. Father is a 
businessman, does very well financially, but keeps very long work hours. Martha is in 
her second year at city college. She entered college after completing art high school 
a year ago. 
Martha's college advisor referred her to this agecny after several talks with Martha. 
Martha also spoke with her mother about her distress. 
Martha's complaints include anxiety and short-temperedness at home and with friends. 
Martha saya her mother complains about her childishness, lack of cooperation at home, 
and late hours. Martha says her mother refuses to understand her and that she'll do 
as she pleases. 
Martha has a good relationship with her college advisor. She participates in some 
school activities, and has a regular group of friends to whom she complains often 
about her mother, as well as about the men she dates. Martha speaks fondly about her 
father, but with lots of ambivalence in her open recognition that he is never home and 
never does anything with the family the way he used to. 
Martha wants to feel less anxious about her school work which remains academically 
exceptional. She wants very much to feel less anxious about men and dating, and 
generally about making decisions herself. She also wants her mother to get off her 
back. Her college advisor, who referred her for help, remains interested and 
available, as is her mother. . 
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Figure 9. Case vignette 2-a <chronic-isolated condition). 
John Smith, age twenty-four, has one brother age twenty-seven. Parents died when John 
was in his late teens. He has had no contact with his brother for the past three 
years, although his brother has tried to help him. 
John earned a college diploma in engineering three or four years ago. Work and living 
history are unclear since John was graduated from college and left his brother's home 
in Philadelphia to live in this City. Since then he has lived in transient fashion in 
both cities, where he spent a good part of his childhood. He has lived in transient 
hotels supported by public assistance for the past two or three years. He spends lots 
of time at the movies, in parks, and in his hotel rooms. He has no friend, and says 
he really does not need any. 
John is seen regularly for brief appointments for medication renewal at the outpatient 
psychiatric clinic of a large loc~l hospital. He says the medication keeps him calm. 
John was referred to this agency through a social worker assigned to our new multi-
faceted community outreach program which covers the hotel where John lives. They spoke 
for about half an hour this morning and John came to this agency this very sfternoon 
asking to be seen. 
John is not sure why he is coming to this agency for help, except that he was told 
that we might be able to help him with his situation. He does not seem to really 
understand what that means. He has some generalized intellectualized notions that 
"life can be lIore interesting," but he says he hasn't the vaguest idea as to how to go 
about it. He doesn't acknowledge anxiety when asked ab.out his work history. He does, 
however, reveal that he lost his first professional engineering job after college for 
cursing at his supervisor. He has not been able to work since then. 
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Fisure 10. Case vignette 2-b <chronic-involved condition>. 
Mary Jones, age twenty-four, is two years younger than her only brother. Her brother 
is married, has a child, is successful in his new business, and is living in the City. 
Mary has always lived with her parents who are now semi-retired in their mid-sixties. 
Brother and his family are frequent visitors, and are always helping out, doing favors 
for parents and sister. Mary's mother is controlling, dominating, pivotal in the 
household. Her father is emotionally distant and passive. 
Since the age of seventeen, Mary has had several periods of psychiatric 
hospitalization. She has held several clerical jobs for brief periods, and has either 
quit "because of the pressure," or been fired. She has always lived home, except for 
brief periods in a halfway house after two of her hospitalizations. 
Referral was made to this agency by the social worker at the halfway house which Mary 
recently left after a stay of a few weeks to return to live with her parents. The 
halfway house staff had, however, recommended t~at she not go home but continue to 
live there for at least a year. 
Her complaints include serious anxiety about any new venture, times when she feels 
like she is floating, and episodes of hallucinations. When she is lu~id, she has a 
sense that not only is she a real failure, but that even when she tri~s to succeed, at 
a job or at the halfway house, someone underhandedly causes her to fail. 
Although she has taken various sorts of psychotropic medication for the past several 
years, Mary has never had shock therapy. She has also never seen the same therapist 
for lore than a year. 
Mary wants to feel better. She does not want to have to go in and out of hospitals 
all her life. She says, when asked, that she wants her brother to offer to take care 
of her when her parents die or become too old, which is one of her greatest and most 
haunting fears. 
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Each series of case presentations consisted of the four 
vignettes in one of twenty-four possible sequences. There are 4 x 
3 x 2 x 1 = 24 possible permutations or sequences. Each possible 
sequence was to be presented once to each of our three groups. 
Each vignette in each series of four was to be read by a 
subject who would respond immediately to the questions in 
Instrument-2. Thus, a vignette, followed by the Instrument-2 
questionnaire, would be presented four times to each subject. 
This is illustrated in Figure 11. 
Figure 11. Alternation sequences of presentation of vignettes 




















Ideally, there would be twenty-four subjects in each of the 
three experimental groups. Each subject would be assigned to one 
of the twenty-four presentation sequences in a group. Final 
tabulations actually were of twenty-one (21) subjects in each 
group, for a total of sixty-three (63) subjects. The events 
leading to this change will be described later in this narrative. 
This change is illustrated as follows: 
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Group Ideal totals Actual totals 
LM: n = 24 n = 21 
M: n = 24 n = 21 
ES: n = 24 n = 21 
N = 72 N = 63 
Each group was to be given the same twenty-four 
permutations of vignette presentations. This allows us to 
counterbalance the sequences of presentations. Counterbalancing 
enables us to deal with unforseen effects. These ma y be effects of 
learning, of fatigue, or of the effects of the subject matter of a 
I 
particular vignette on a particular clinician. These effects ma y 
skew the responses of particular subjects to particular vignettes. 
Counterbalancing is a technique which is preferable, in this case, 
to random order presentation, because we want each subject to be 
exposed to each vignette. In random sequence presentations, one 
subject may be exposed to the same vignette more than once, yet 
not be exposed to all four vignettes. This technique of counter-
balancing was utilized by Orcutt <1962, 48-49, 53) in her 
dissertation research. 
Figure 12, which follows, illustrates the twenty-four possible 
orders of vignette presentation to be given to subjects within each 
of our three groups. 
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Figure 12. Twenty-four permutations of case vignette presentations. 
Series no. Presentation order 
1 la, Ib, 2a, 2b 
2 la, 2a, Ib, 2b 
3 la, 1 b, 2b, 2a 
4 la, 2a, 2b, Ib 
5 la, 2b, 2a, lb 
6 la, 2b, lb, 2a 
7 2a, 2b, la, Ib 
8 2a, la, 2b, Ib 
9 2a, 2b, Ib, la 
10 2a, la, 1b, 2b 
11 2a, Ib, la, 2b 
12 2a, lb, 2b, la 
13 Ib, la, 2b, 2a 
14 Ib, 2b, la, 2a 
15 1 b, la, 2a, 2b 
16 1 b, 2b, 2a, la 
17 1 b, 2a, 2b, la 
18 Ib, 2a, la, 2b 
19 2b, 2a, lb, la 
20 2b, lb, 2a, lb 
21 2b, 2a, la, lb 
22 2b, Ib, la, 2a 
23 2b, la, lb, 2a 
24 2b, la, 2a, Ib 
Instrument-2 is solicits measures of our two dependent 
variables, assessments and intervention plans. It solicits these 
measures through both open-ended and forced-choice questions. 
Scoring for each subject, on each of the four vignettes, is on the 
basis of scores for Ca) open-ended and Cb) forced-choice responses 
for assessments and for intervention plans. 
The open-ended and forced-choice scores are not treated as 
being additive with one another, since the methods for soliciting 
these scores were different. The open-ended scores were derived 
from procedures which utilized outside raters. The forced-choice 
- _.. - ._ .... ----
· " 
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scores were su bjects ' actual own ra tings . Thus, open-ended and 
forced-choice responses will be treated separately in our results. 
Reliabilitv Testing of Instrument-l and Scoring of its Final 
Format. 
Of the sample of 200 subjects selected to receive the tested 
version of Instrument-I, 152 scorable forms were returned. This 
version of Instrument-l contained fifty items which were divided 
into eight scales according to eight "principles". The "principles" 
which were previously illustrated in figure t, were developed from 
the literature as theoretical distinctions between linear-mechanistic 
and ecological-systems orientations. 
On the basis of scores on the fifty-item tested format, 
subjects were divided into three groups: a low-scoring LM group; 
a mid-scoring M group; and a high-scoring ES group. On the 
basis of membership in one of these three groups, Instrument-2 
was administered to subjects. The procedure was a technical error, 
because reliability-testing had not yet been done on the fifty-item 
version of Instrument-l whose scores had served as the basis for 
the experimental groupings. Therefore, reliability-tested, 
retroactively-corrected regroupings of subjects were arranged from 
the initial three groups. This was done after su bjects had 
completed their responses to Instrument-2. These regroupings 
(happily) retained a workable distribution of subjects' scores. 
The regroupings were the result of a process of establishing 
internal reliability for Instrument-t. This process resulted in the 
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elimination of twenty-three items from Instrument-I, which was 
reduced to twenty-seven items. (a) I tems were elimina ted whose 
values had been contributing to reduced values of Cronbach' s 
Alpha coefficients for each of the Instrument's eight scales. 
(b) Item-deletion was also based on an item's point-biserial 
correlation with (1) the total score of the entire instrument, and 
(2) with the total score of the particular scale to which it 
belonged. In general, items having a point-biserial coefficient of 
less than .30 for the entire instrument, and/or for its respective 
scale, were deleted. Item-deletion was an iterative process, 
whereby reliability was assessed and reassessed upon each item's 
deletion. In the end, the total number of items in the instrument 
(and in all scales but Scale-I) was reduced. The instrument was 
reduced from fifty to twenty-seven items. Scales 2 and 7 were 
eliminated in the process. 
As a result of this process, (a) a few su bjects were shifted 
from one group to another, and (b) a small number ended up in 
the discarded groups. Although this resulted in a few subjects 
being "lost," it was nonetheless possible to maintain statistically 
viable group compositions of n=21 for each of the three groups, 
with a total of N=63. At this juncture, group size was reduced, 
as previously noted. Of significance, however, is that all three 
groups were designed to contain equal numbers of subjects, so as 
not to complicate data analysis with a potential problem of 
unequal group sizes. 
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Below, in Table 1, are the six scales which survive after 
the whittling away of items with low reliability coefficients. They 
replicate in abbreviated form Figure 1 in Chapter I, comparative 
principles which underlie a linear-mechanistic approach and an 
ecological-systems approach. Instrument-1, with a highlighting of 
its final twenty-seven items, may be found in Appendix B. 
Table 1 
Point-biserial correlations between item scores and subscale total 
scores for the six final scales of Instrument-1, and between item 
scores and total score of overall Instrument-1 
Scales: Specific Total Point 
scale no. of biserial 
Name items items median Alpha 
1 Linear causality versus 
equifinality 
3 Analytic quality versus 
organismic quality 
4 Homeostasis versus 
heterostasis 
5 Mind-body dualism versus 
holism (rejection of dualism) 
6 Entropy versus 
negentropy 


















* There is some inflation in the coefficients, because each subscale 
total score includes the item with which it is correlated. Refer to 
Appendix B for a full listing of all 27 items according to scale. 
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Table 1 reveals a high degree of correlation between each 
subscale score and the total instrument score. It also reveals an 
acceptable degree of reliability for each scale. 
Discussion of the relationship between the total final 
Instrument-l and its six subscales follows Table 2, which appears 
next. That table presents a correlation matrix for each scale for 
the total scores of all groups combined. 
Table 2 
Intercorrelation matrix of the six scales of Instrument-l, 
with one another, and with the total score of each scale I 
for all groups combined 
Scale One Three Four Five Six Ei!ht 
One 
Three 30* 
Four 17 12 
Five 19 37* 11 
Six -01 13 28* 19 
Eight 10 24 10 06 -18 
Total 65* 56* 63* 50* 41* 33* 
Note: Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients with 
decimal points removed . 
* p < . 05 
207 
Table 2 illustrates a clear pattern of statistical significance 
for correlations of scales to the total Instrument-1, when all 
three groups were combined. This occurred only with regard to 
the combining of all three groups. Each correlation of scale-score 
with the total score of Instrument-1 is positive, and each is 
significantly different from zero. Otherwise, most correlations do 
not obtain significance, and in two cases are negative (i.e., Scale 
1 with Scale 6, and Scale 6 with Scale 8). Scales 6 and 8 do not 
fit as well with the four remaining scales as those four scales fit 
with one another. 
Data Collection for Instrument-2. 
Seventy (70) sub.jects (of which sixty-three were ultimately 
utilized), in Groups LM, M, and ES, completed Instrument-2. The 
instrument consists of open-ended and forced-choice items. 
Instrument-2 appears in Appendix C. 
One open-ended item (which appears as Question ttl) inquires 
about the clinician's overall assessment of each of the four case 
vignettes. A second open-ended item (Question tt2) inquires about 
the clinician's overall intervention plan for each of the four 
vignettes. 
Five forced choice assessment items appear in Instrument-2 
as Questions tt3 to tt7. Nine forced-choice intervention items 
appear in Instrument-2 as Questions tt8 to #16. These inquire 
about a clinician's thinking. Each item represents one 
operationalized set of comparative criteria about one aspect or 
parameter of assessment or of intervention plans, exactly as 
presented previously in Figures 2 and 3. 
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As no!:ed earlier, the Questions in Instrument-2 appear four 
times, once after each case vignette. Clinicians who respond to 
Instrument-2 are asked to think of themselves, in practice, as 
being halfway through a first face-to-face client-contact, at their 
current agency. This is the point at which the clinician may 
indeed begin to think about assessment and intervention plans. It 
is traditionally part of an agency's intake process. 
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Data for open-ended items was collected as the free-handedly 
written responses of subjects. These responses were then scored 
by raters via procedures which were developed and applied as 
follows: 
1. Of the three raters (excluding the rearcher), two were 
experienced clinical social workers; the third was a 
psychometrician. 
2. The raters each read the full research proposal. They 
specifically studied Figure 1, which describes "principles", and 
Figures 2 and 3 which describe "comparative criteria". They also 
specifically studied the vignettes and the rationale behind them. 
3. The researcher then met with the three raters for a four 
and one-half hour initial training session, during which they 
reviewed all they had studied, and specifically discussed 
"operationalized criteria" for the rating of responses. Responses 
which the researcher, as "expert", considered to be exemplary of 
linear-mechanistic and ecological-systems perspectives, were 
reviewed. They then practiced applying the criteria to ratings, 
and refined the use of the criteria as rating tools, in the process. 
4. Seventy-seven (77) responses were scored as exemplary of 
extreme and middle-range scores. 
5. Each rater scored responses on an integer scale of zero 
(0) to four (4), where "0" is fully linear-mechanistic (with no 
ecosystems aspects); "4" is fully ecological-systems (with no 
evidence of a linear-mechanistic view); and "2" is uncertain, 
mixed or unclear. "N" signifies not-scora ble, and is reserved 
only for responses which are so sparse that a rating becomes 
impossible. Other rating choices are "1" or "3". 
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6. Responses were considered "unproblematic" where there 
was full agreement (L e., all raters gave the same score), or 
where there was a difference of only one point among the raters 
(e. g., two raters gave a score of "1", and one rater gave a score 
of "2"). 
7. All response-ratings which did not meet the requirements 
for being "unproblematic", were considered to be "problematic". 
The problematic designation also included any rating of "N". 
8. Conferences were held to discuss each "problematic" 
response-rating, and a few "unproblematic" ones as well. The 
goals were to understand differences among raters, and to clarify 
and develop guidelines for the systematic application of criteria 
by all three raters. The outcome of the conferences, in the large 
majority of cases, was either full agreement among raters, or a 
difference of only one point among them. It is seen as positive 
evidence for the validity of criteria utilized by the judges in 
their assignment of ratings that, in some instances, despite long 
discussion, one or two raters refused to change a score, and 
offered evidence taken from actual responses to support a 
particular rating. Such periodic, unwavering perceptions, 
evidenced across all points on the rating scale, may be seen as 
evidence for the validity of the ratings. 
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9. Then, a series of 114 responses, was given to the 
I 
raters, to score totally independentl.v. These were chosen by the 
researcher, as expert, for their varied qualities which were 
exemplary of the range of possible scores. It was planned that if 
reliability' estimates obtained from these ratings were acceptable, 
then these scores would be utilized as part of our final results. 
We would then procede with the rest of the rating process. Of 114 
sets of ratings, 105 (or 92%) fully met our criterion for inter-rater 
agreement. Of the nine (9) sets of ratings (or 8%) which did not 
meet our criterion for inter-rater agreement, five (or 6%) almost 
did so. 
10. Based on these favorable results, following discussion 
with the three raters, the remaining [560-114=] 446 responses were 
scored independently by the raters. All responses which had been 
rated earlier in the training/practice process were rescored along 
with the large majority of responses which had never been scored. 
The fact that some had once been scored and discussed at an 
earlier time is seen as having minimal or no impact on the final 
results, because raters had no stake in replicating any prior 
results. Furthermore, previously rated responses were not visibly 
identified. In fact, given that many responses indeed sounded 
similar to one another, it is unlikely that a rater would actually 
have recalled a previously discussed response, nor the rating 
which had been attached to it in the training process. Also, 
there was a time interval of eight to twelve weeks between the 
training ratings and the period of final scoring. Therefore, 
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raters' memories would be expected to have lapsed over time for 
previously scored responses, which were then presented in an 
unidentified and random order as part of the "final" 446 responses 
to be rated. In addition, there had been an intervening set of 
114 responses, (our first group of "final ratings",) which also 
served to attenuate the memories of raters for the specific recall 
of any ratings which they had previously assigned. 
11. Given that there are eight open-ended responses per 
Instrument-2, the total of 560 ratings represents (70x8=) 560 
response ratings per judge. This includes the (63x8=) 504 
response ratings per .judge for the sixty-three (63) subjects whose 
responses formed the final data base for Instrument-2. 
Da ta collection of forced-choice responses was a far simpler 
matter than for open-ended responses. Each response-choice was 
made by the clinician-subject directly. Each item was then simply 
scored by the researcher as either "0", if the clinician had chosen 
the "linear-mechanistic" response, or as "4", if the clinician had 
chosen the "ecological-systems" response. 
Data Tabulation and Analysis: Introduction. 
As noted, the open-ended and forced-choice scores are treated 
separately, as not additive with one another, because methods for 
their solicitation were distinct. We recapitulate below. 
The open-ended scores were derived via carefully applied 
procedures in which outside raters scored free-style written 
.. ... - . ------
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responses of su bjects whom they did not know. The forced-choice 
scores, however, were derived direct! y from su bjects ' responses to 
specific questions. The questions were based on operationalized 
criteria about practice which appear in Figures 2 and 3. These 
criteria, drawn from the literature, were developed to describe the 
tasks of assessment and intervention planning. 
These criteria do, however, visibly relate to the "principles" 
which were addressed in the questions in Instrument-I. The 
dimensions addressed by Instrument-l "principles", and by 
Instrument-2 "criteria" indeed reflect similarities. Thus, to 
I 
subjects' eyes, the forced-choice questions may in some way 
emulate the earlier questions of Instrument-I, since each set of 
questions makes salient the dimensions involved in Instrument-l 
and Instrument-2, respectively. In the open-ended questions, 
however, this salience of common dimensions is not forthcoming to 
the clinician. Therefore, the clinician-subject is left sitting with 
the "pull" of each specific vignette, without any structured 
questions about orientation which might affect that "pull". 
Thus, one might expect the pull of the specific dimensions, 
which define linear-mechanistic versus ecological-systems, to come 
to the fore with our more structured, forced-choice questions. By 
the same token, however, one might expect that the totally 
unstructured open-ended questions would more freely highlight and 
draw out the embedded of duration-severity and interpersonal-
context which were not alluded to in any questions of either 
instrument. 
Data Tabulation and Analvsis: Explanation. 
Open-ended response scores were conceived as interval 
measures of continuous data, to be treated by an analysis of 
variance. 
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I twas, however, observed that forced-choice response scores 
could be conceptualized (and therefore treated) in two ways: 
1. At first, forced-choice scores had been conceptualized as 
end-points on a continuous scale for which middle-range scores 
(which include mixed gradations) exist, but had not been offered 
as response alternatives. These had not been offered in an effort 
to "force" sharp differences. Clinicians are, nevertheless, seen as 
learning and utilizing gradations and ranges of alternatives in 
assessments and interventions. The balance in any particular 
case would reflect a weighting toward one or another set of 
operational alternatives in the choice of assessments and 
intervention plans which reflect either a more linear-mechanistic or 
a more ecologicalsystems approach in a particular case. 
Furthermore, each forced-choice question derives directly from 
an operationalized criterion for assessment or intervention. These 
criteria were conceived as partialized aspects of a total way of 
working. It is therefore the totality of operational choices which 
makes each assessment and each intervention plan relatively more 
linear-mechanistic or more ecological-systems, and not anyone 
particular criterion taken out of context. Therefore, it is the 
respective aggregate of scores for all five assessment and all nine 
intervention items which are primary to this collection of data, 
" , 
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and not individual item-scores. (Mean scores, it is worth noting, 
rather thdn simple totdls, were chosen as the aggregate scores, in 
order to prevent an occasional missing value from skewing our 
results. ) 
2. It was subsequently observed that despite the initial 
working concept of "forcing" subjects to declare end-point choices 
on d continuous scale, an alternative view was possible. We 
could, in fact, make a case for treating forced-choice reponses as 
discrete da ta . Thus, the two response alternatives to each forced-
choice question could be seen dichotomous and unrelated. This 
would allow us to conceptualize our response-choices as binary 
measures. These measures could then be adjuncti vel y tested, item-
by-item, for significance, through chi-square tests. Each item 
would be tested separately, because binary, chi-square data 
cannot incorporate the totality of items. This would provide us 
with interesting data about each item (and about the respective 
operational criterion from which each item derives). 
Analysis of variance was utilized to test continuous datd, 
which was conceptualized as being scored on an interval scale, for 
both open-ended and forced-choice responses. Figure 13, which 
follows, was adapted from B.J. Winer's (1971, p. 284) discussion 
of computational measures through which to derive analysis of 
variance scores. That schema presents, in detail, the three 
sources of variance in the independent variables. The twelve 
cells for response-scores represent results which were repeated 
separately for assessment and for intervention scores. 
Figure 13. Souroes of varianoe with schema for the 
tabulation of results. 
Independ. variable Condition 
No. Name 























A word is given about the actual data utilized. For open-
ended responses, the judges' choices for scoring were on a scale of 
"0" to "4". As noted, a score of "0" represented the most linear-
mechanistic choice for assessment and intervention, while a score of 
"4" indicated the most ecological-systems choice. The actual 
working score for each open-ended response, for each subject, is 
the mean of all three judges' ratings for a subject's response to a 
particular item. For example, for a particular clinician for vignette 
tHa, each judge read and rated the response to the question: 
"What is your overall assessment of this situation?" Judge-l may 
have rated the clinician's response as 3, and Judge-2 may have 
also given it a rating of 3. Judge-3, however, may have given the 
response a rating of 2. A mean of 2.67 would be the working score 
which would be used in calculations for analysis of variance. 
For forced-choice responses, the scores utilized are the 
aggregdte means of the five assessment items and of the nine 
intervention items scored by each subject, for each vignette-
situation. For example, for vignette tHa, each subject read and 
responded to the five assessment questions. Thus, if a clinician I s 
responses to these five questions respectively were 4, 1, 4, 4 and 
2, then the score for that subject's assessment of vignette tHa 
would be a mean of "3". This is a relatively ecological-systems 
mean, despite the fact that there is one linear-mechanistic score 
(1), one middle score (2) and three strongly ecological-systems 
scores (4). The mean of 3 would have been the actual aggregate 





Data from Instrument-2 takes two forms: (a) mean scores of 
the three raters for each open-ended response, and (b) scores of 
the forced-choice items, both of which are examined in clusters 
according to our three independent variables (clinical-orientation, 
interpersonal-context and duration-severity). 
In order to present··our data as meaningful results, however, 
a number of steps are necessary. ( a ) We first assess in ter-ra ter 
reliability for the three judges who scored our open-ended 
questions. (b) We then assess mean group differences for the 
open-ended item-scores through analysis of variance. (c) Next, we 
assess mean group differences among forced-choice scores through 
analysis of variance. (d) We do this in conjunction with a brief 
highlighting of findings about response frequencies across groups 
through chi-square analysis of forced-choice scores. All analyses 
are done separately for assessment data and for intervention data. 
The intention is to lead upto a presentation of results about 
the hypotheses in a systematic manner, and then discuss the 
meaning of our results in a manner which highlights principal 
findings. 
-'---'- ---- -- .. -.----
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Inter-Rater Reliability: Open-Ended Assessment Scores of 
Instrument-2. 
Pearson correlation coefficients among the three raters are 
presented in Table 3. Coefficients are provided for each clinical-
orientation group, as well as for all groups combined in all 
secondary variable conditions. With regard to the analysis of 
each group, five of thirty-six coefficients were found to be non-
significantly different from zero. All of these low coefficients 
were found for vignettes where the duration-severity was acute 
Four of these coefficients also were for the acute-isolated 
condition; one was for the acute-in vol ved condition. The 
intercorrelations shown in Table 3, which follows, indicate that 
the correlation-scores of Rater-l with Rater-2 are consistently high 
and sta tisticall y significant. Intercorrelations of Rater-3 with 
either Rater-lor Rater-2 are also statistically significant, 
although they are also visibily lower. This trend is constant 
within each of the three subject-groups, as well as for all groups 
combined, although it did not significantly affect reliability. 
Thus, we may conjecture that Rater-3 (a psychometrician) may not 
have evaluated the assessment open-ended responses of subjects in 
a manner which would be similar to Raters 1 and 2 (clinical 
social workers). 
On the overall, a very high degree of reliabilit_y exists 
across assessment scores . 
. - -- -_._---------
Table 3 
Inter-rater reliabilities of the three judges who rated the 




Group LM Group M Group ES All groups 
(and rater) (n=21) <n=21) (n=21) . (N=63) 
Acute duration-severity 
Isolated 
( 1 and 2) 87* 84* 92* 87* 
e 1 and 3) -05 67* 49* 36* 
(2 and 3) 31* 52* 35* 42* 
Involved 
( 1 and 2) 90* 73* 67* 93* 
( 1 and 3) 57* 20 13 63* 
(2 and 3) 48* -09 07 60* 
Chronic duration-severity 
Isolated 
(1 and 2) 84* 84* 100* 88* 
e 1 and 3) 35* 37* 86* 55* 
(2 and 3) 57* 44* 86* 67* 
Involved 
( 1 and 2) 100* 94* 100* 98* 
( 1 and 3) 42* 76* 76* 64* 
(2 and 3) 42* 83* 75* 66* 
Note: Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients 
with decimal points removed. 
* p < .05 
. -.---.. ----------~--
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Inter-Rater Reliability: Open-Ended Intervention Scores of 
Instrument-2 
221 
Inter-rater reliability for the open-ended intervention scores 
show a similar pattern of reliability coefficients as is seen in our 
assessment data. 
As with the assessment data, Rater-l consistently shows a 
high degree of correlation with Rater-2. The scores of Rater-3 
correlated moderately with those of Rater-l and Rater-2. Again, 
as with assessment data, the results indicate that Rater-3, (a 
psychometrician) did nC?~. assign scores in a manner similar to that 
of Rater-l and Rater-2 (both clinical social workers). Yet, except 
for the chronic-isolated condition for Group LM, there is a very 
high degree of reliability with statistically significant correlations 
across responses for all three raters. 
, .... , .. , .. , ., .. ,. ------
Table 4 
Inter-rater reliabilities of the three judges who rated the 




Group LM Group M Group ES All groups 
(and rater) (n=21) (n=21) (n=21) (N=63) 
Acute duration-severity 
Isolated 
( 1 and 2) 100* 92* 85* 91* 
(1 and 3) 48* 68* 76* 62* 
(2 and 3) 48* 70* 67* 60* 
Involved 
(1 and 2) 95* 100* 74* 90* 
( 1 and 3) 69* 56* 76* 67* 
(2 and 3) 75* 56* 67* 65* 
Chronic duration-severity 
Isolated 
( 1 and 2) 90* 96* 96* 94* 
( 1 and 3) 23 60* 48* 41* 
(2 and 3) 06 55* 42* 35* 
Involved 
(1 and 2) 97* 86* 92* 93* 
(1 and 3) 77* 48* 38* 56* 
(2 and 3) 76* 41* 44* 55* 
Note: Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients 
with decimal points removed. 
* p < .05 
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Instrument-2, Open-Ended Questions: General Sta temen t. 
I 
Analysis of variance for assessment and for intervention 
plans in vol ves three factors. The main independent variable, 
clinical-orientation, is represented by the groups, LM, M and ES. 
The other two factors are the secondary independent variables, 
duration-severity (acute versus chronic>, and interpersonal-context 
(isolated versus involved>. Subjects' response scores were anlyzed 
separately for assessment and for intervention procedures. No 
hypotheses were presented for interactional effects between 
assessment and intervention measures. The analysis of variance 
procedure, therefore, is a 3 x 2 x 2 (group x duration x context) 
ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last two factors. 
A fourth factor.. however, is that of rater (or "Judge"). Of 
concern is whether .judges' ratings differ significantly from one 
another with respect to the three independent variables or the 
interactions among those variables. A finding of any significant 
main effects or interactions with the factor judge would indicate 
differential ratings by judges. Such a finding would call for a 
separate analYs~s of each judge's ratings, because the use of a 
mean rating for all judges combined might mask the true effects of 
our findings. 
Analysis of Variance for Assessment: Open-Ended Questions. 
A 3 x 2 x2 x3 (group x duration x context x judge> ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the last three factors was performed on 
the assessment data, as shown in Table 5. 
224 ' 
Table 5 
Four-way analysis of variance for open-ended assessment responses 
Source 
Judge 
Judge x Group 
Error 
Duration 
Duration x Group 
Error 
Context 




Duration x Context 
D'tion x C'text x Grp 
Error 
Duration x Judge 
D'tion x Judge x Grp 
Error 
Context x Judge 
C'text x Judge x Grp 
Error 
D'tion x C'text x Judge 
D'tion x C'text x Judge 
x Group 
Error 












































































Group (or Grp) = clinical-orientation group 
Duration (or D'tion) = duration-severity 
Context (or C'text) = interpersonal-context 


















There were no statistically significant group differences. 
Yet, the factor group did interact significantly with 
duration-severity as illustrated in Table 6. 
Table 6 shows chronicity as evincing lower (more linear-
mechanistic> scores for within-group comparisons of LM, M and ES. 
For conditions which involve chronic duration-severity, a 
trend supports the main hypothesis: Mean scores for Group LM are 
somewhat lower (more linear-mechanistic) than for Group ES. 
Most pointed, is that mean differences between acute and 
chronic duration are sharpest for Group LM. Indeed, this group, 
I 
in the chronic condition, has the lowest (most linear> score. To 
explain this result, one might conjecture from a theoretical 
perspective, that both the passage of time and the focus on 
personalit.v deficits are very present in the chronically-focused 
vignettes, and that these two themes would be inherently 
recognized by the more linear-mechanistic clinicians. 
On the other hand, an acute situation would tend to involve 
less the passage of time, and less in the way of personality 
deficits. It would, instead, likely carry with it more in the way 
of current circumstances. This would fit far more outstandingly 
with the ecological-systems bent of Group ES than with the LM 
subjects for whom current circumstances do not hold inherent 
prominence. 
We may conjecture that with acute duration-severity, LM 
clinicians may not be able to fall back on personality deficits and 
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historical emphasis, and may therefore be more inclined to relate 
to the environmental and social factors which stand out. 
Table 6 
Differential mean scores for duration x group: Assessment 
Duration x Group Mean 
Acute x LM 2.35 
Acute x M 2.28 
Acute x ES 1. 90 
Chronic x LM 1. 21 
Chronic x M 1.27 
Chronic x ES 1.40 
The factor judge neither obtained significance, nor interacted 
significantly with any remaining factors. Hence, in our analysis 
of assessment scores, we may disregard the effect of the factor 
judge. 
In contrast, the measure of duration-severity obtained 
significance. In Table 7, the acute condition (M = 2.17) received 
higher (ecological-systems-weighted) scores than the chronic 
condition (M = 1.29), whose scores were weighted toward the lower 
<linear-mechanistic) end of the spectrum. 
(It should be noted, henceforth, that for visual space in 
tables, and a less cumbersome text, our three independent 
variables will often be referred to as "Group" (clinical-orientation 
group), "Duration" (duration-severity), and "Context" 












A statistically significant difference emerges in the analysis 
of variance for interpersonal-context. As illustrated in Table 8, 
the isolated condition induced lower (more linear-mechanistically-
weighted) scores than the involved condition (whose scores 
reflected an ecological-systems weighting>. 
Table 8 








Table 9, shows the interaction between duration-severity and 
in terpersonal-con text. 
Table 9 
Differential mean scores for duration x context: Assessment 










A review of Tables 7,8 and 9 shows that chronic duration 
generates lower (more linear) scores than acute duration. 
Furthermore, the isolated context produces lower means than the 
involved one. It is, however, only in combination with chronic 
duration that the isolated context stands out from the involved one 
by a difference (.65) which is four times greater than the 
difference under the acute condition (.16). Thus, while chronic 
duration generates lower (linear-mechanistic) scores, the chronic-
isolated condition generates the lowest (most linear) scores. While 
the acute-involved condition generates the highest (most 
ecosystems) mean, it is set apart less dramatically from the means 
of the other conditions than the chronic-isolated condition is set 
apart from the other scores. 
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Analvsis of Variance for Intervention: Open-Ended Questions. 
The results of a four-way ANOVA (group x duration x context 
x judge), for intervention data, are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Four-way analysis of variance for open-ended intervention responses 
Source 
Judge 
Judge x Group 
Error 
Duration 
Duration x Group 
Error 
Context 




Duration x Context 
D'tion x C'text x Grp 
Error 
Duration x Judge 
D'tion x Judge X Grp 
Error 
Context x Judge 
























D'tion x C'text x Judge 2.33 
D'tion x C'text x Judge 1.03 
X Group 
Error 25.41 


























Group (or Grp) = clinical-orientation group 
Duration (or D'tion) = duration-severity 










































There is indeed a main effect for the factor judge. 
Moreover, this factor interacts significantly in three particular 
combinations with other factors, which will be addressed 
subsequently. 
Table 11 illustrates differential scores among the three 
raters. 
Table 11 











Our findings show Judge-1 to be more linear-mechanistic in 
score, Judge-2 to be mid-range, and Judge-3 to be more ecological-
systems. 
A glance at Tables 12, 13 and 14 shows that there are 
statistically significant findings for each judge, separately with 
respect to the factors duration-severity and interpersonal-context. 
Therefore, our use of judges' combined scores did not mask true 
effects for these two factors. Thus, we may, indeed, utilize 
combined scores in our data analysis of these two factors. 
--... - . -.. _ .. - -----
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Table 12 
Analysis of variance for open-ended intervention responses: Judge-l 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Souroe squares freedom Square F 
Duration 2.08 1 2.08 4.13* 
Duration x Group 2.54 2 1.27 1. 91 
Error 38.48 58 0.66 
c.ontext 16.75 1 16.75 24.79** 
Context x Group 0.02 2 0.01 0.02 
Error 39.19 58 0.68 
Group 1.85 2 0.93 1.25 
Error 42.84 58 0.74 
Duration x Context 0.01 1 0.01 0.03 
D'tion x C'text x Grp 0.10 2 0.05 0.09 
Er'('or 32.88 58 0.57 
* p~ .05; ** P~ .01 
Table 13 
Analysis of variance for open-ended in terven tion responses: Judse-2 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Source squares freedom square F 
Duration 3.09 1 3.09 5.48* 
Duration x Group 2.07 2 1. 04 1. 84 
Error 32.69 56 0.56 
Context 16.20 1 16.20 27.37** 
Context x Group 0.15 2 0.08 0.13 
Error 34.33 56 0.59 
Group 3.59 2 1.80 2.44 
Error 42.65 56 0.74 
Duration x Context 0.04 1 0.04 0.06 
D'tion x C'text x Grp 0.18 2 0.09 0.15 
Error 34.54 56 0.60 
* p~ .05; ** p~ .01 
... _- - - -.-. - --.---
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Table 14 
Anal~sis of variance for o~en-ended in terven tion res~onses: Judse-3 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Source squares freedom square F 
Duration 5.88 1 5.88 7.51** 
Duration x Group 2.10 2 1.05 1.34 
Error 43.85 56 0.78 
Context 3.48 1 3.48 4.72* 
Context x Group 0.80 2 0.40 0.43 
Error 52.38 56 0.94 
Group 1.64 2 0.82 0.69 
Error 66.09 56 1.18 
Duration x Context 4.62 1 4.62 6.32* 
0' tion x C'text X Grp 0.23 2 0.11 0.16 
Error 40.91 56 0.73 
* P.i .05; ** P.i .01 
As main effects, there are statistically significant differences 
for both duration-severity and interpersonal-context for all three 
judges. The interaction between duration and context, however, 
appears only for Judge-3. The most parsimonious explanation for 
this difference would be a sampling vagary for an unreliable 
Judge-3. who repeatedly appears as a maverick. 
In Table 15, we see that vignettes with acute duration-
severity received higher (ecosystems-oriented) scores (M = 2.30) 
than vignettes with chronic duration-severity. The latter received 
significan t1 y lower (linear-mechanisticall y-weigh ted) scores 
(M = 2.11>. 
Table 15 









When we look at the trend for interpersonal-context in Table 
16, we see that the isolated condition has lower (more 
linear-mechanistic) scores than the involved condition, whose 
scores are higher. 
Table 16 









In summation, one sees two general trends for both open-
ended assessment and intervention scores. First, chronic duration-
severity tends to have a greater effect in generating lower (more 
linearmechanistic) means than acute duration-severity. Second, 
the isolated interpersonal-context tends to produce the lowest (most 
linear-mechanistic) scores for both assessment and intervention 
responses. 
Finally, for open-ended assessment scores, the factor group 
interacts with duration-severity such that for open-ended 
assessment, the chronic condition seems to effect a linear 
interpretation. On the one hand, it operates as a main effect 
such that the chronic condition generally contributes to a linear 
interpretation. On the other hand, the chronic condition interacts 
with the isolated interpersonal-context such that clients who are 
seen as chronic and isolated tend to be seen as most linear, while 
the "chronic" clients are perceived particularly by the linear-
mechanistic group of clinicians in a linear fashion. 
Instrument-2, Forced-Choice Questions: General Statement. 
Both analysis of variance and chi-square analyses were 
performed on the forced-choice responses of Instrument-i. The 
rationale for both types of data analysis is as follows: 
The binary forced-choices for each response may be seen as 
representing the two ends of a continuum, for which mid-range and 
mixed gradations exist, but are not offered as choices, in order to 
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force sharp differences for scoring purposes. Nevertheless, with 
I 
continuous data, analysis of variance would be utilized. 
If, however, we were to consider response alternatives to 
represent discrete and dichotomous choices, then cross-tabulation 
analysis of these two factors, and of their interaction, could not 
directly be addressed (Winer, 1971, p. 284), and chi-square 
analysis would indeed be our alternative. In planning our data 
analysis, it seemed to be of potential interest and value to 
consider the notion of discrete data, and perform chi-square 
analyses, to see what might emerge. It was in this spirit that 
chi-square analyses were performed, separately for the five 
assessment and the nine intervention items, in a 3 x 2 (group x 
response) matrix. Responses were first assessed with regard to 
clinical-orientation of subjects for the four combinations of acute/ 
chronic and involved/isolated conditions. 
Analvsis of Variance for Assessment: Forced-Choice Questions. 
A four-way analysis of variance was done for the factors (a) 
clinical-orient~tion group, (b) duration-severity, (c) interpersonal-
con text and ( d) their in teracti ve effects. 
As illustrated in Table 17, the two factors which showed 
statistical significance are clinical-orientation group (primary 
independent variable), and duration-severity (a secondary 
independent variable>. There was no statistical significance for 
in terpersonal-con text. 
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Table 17 
Four-way analysis of variance: Forced-choice assessment responses 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Source squares freedom square 
Group 41.52 2 20.76 
Error 224.90 60 3.75 
Duration 46.29 1 46.29 
Duration x Group 5.81 2 2.90 
Error 91.90 60 1. 53 
Context 0.14 1 0.14 
Context x Group 2.38 2 1.19 
Error 60.48 60 1.01 
Duration x Context 1.92 1 1. 92 
D'tion x C'text x Grp 0.13 2 0.06 
Error 51.95 60 0.87 
** p~ .01 
Group (or grp) = clinical-orientation group 
Duration (or D'tion) = duration-severity 









Data in Table 18 support Hypothesis-1, that there are 
statistically significant positive correlations between clinical-
orientation groups to which clinicians belong, and their 
assessments, as scored on Instrument-2. The mean for Group LM 
is lowest (most linear) The ES group presents the highest mean. 
The mean score for the middle (M) group is technically in the 
middle, but is clearly very close to the LM group mean. 
Table 18 










Table 19 illustrates support for hypothesis 2a, that there are 
statistically significant positive correlations between l duration-
severity and the kinds of assessments which are formulated by 
clinicians. Chronic duration-severity clearly produces lower (more 
linear-mechanistic) scores. I nversel y, the acute condition 
responses produce higher (more ecosystems) scores. (While these 
results represent forced-choice assessment data, they were 
previously shown to be true for our open-ended assessment data as 
well> . 
Table 19 
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Since there are no statistically significant results for social-
context, there is no support for hypothesis 3a, which deals with 
the correlations between interpersonal-context and clinicians I 
assess men ts . 
Chi-Square Analysis for Assessment: Forced -Choice Questions. 
Chi-sqaure scores represent indices which compare response-
frequencies of Groups LM, M and ES. This means the frequency 
with which su bjects from each group differ by chosing either a 
linear type response or an ecological type response. Statistical 
significance of a score indicates that the frequency distributions 
of these choices among our three subject-groups are statistically 
unlikely to be so different unless particular factors influence these 
differences. These factors would be one or more of our 
independen t varia bles. 
Because chi-square data for forced-choice assessment 
responses did not produce much in the way of statistically 
significant findings, chi-square frequency-distribution tables were 
omitted. A perusal of these tables, however, reveals a deHnite 
and almost fully consistent trend on an item-by-item basis. 
Clinicians in Group LM have a larger proportion of linear-
mechanistic choices than ES clinicians have. while clinicians in 
Group ES show a larger proportion of ecological-systems choices 
than do LM clinicians. This trend supports hypothesis-la . 
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There is, however, one repeatedly statistically significant 
result from our chi-square data. Operationalized assessment 
·criterion #11 (forced-choice Item 3 on Instrument-2), which 
represents "unilateral assessments versus mutuality through 
contracting", is the only operationalized assessment criterion which 
demonstrates statistical significance under three out of four 
conditions of duration-severity combined with interpersonal-context. 
The three conditions are acute-involved (k2 =6. 20), chronic-isolated 
('l(r=9.72) and chronic-involved (~2=10.31). All are significant to 
at least the level of p ~ .05. Of note is the observation that 
while the acute-isolated condition does not produce a chi-square 
value which is of statistical significance, it too presents data 
whose values support hypothesis-I: The LM group has a alrger 
proportion of linear responses than the ecological group, while the 
ES group presents a larger proportion of ecological responses than 
the linear group. 
Thus, we are presented with a rather regular trend in chi-
square frequency-distributions which reveals operationalized 
assessment criterion #11 (forced-choice Item 3) as demonstrating 
frequency-distributions which show statistical significance more 
regularly than any other item. We may indeed infer that the 
comparative vignette criteria for this item of "unilateral 
assessment" versus "mutuality through contracting" have more than 
chance influence on the clinical judgments of our subjects. 
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Analysis of Variance for Intervention: Forced-Choice Questions. 
A four-way analysis of variance was done for the factors 
clinical-orientation group, duration-severity, interpersonal-context, 
and their interactive effects 
As illustrated in Table 20, the only factor which obtained 
statistical significance is group. This result lends support to 
hypothesis I-b that differences exist in intervention formulations, 
according to group. 
Table 20 
Four-way analysis of variance: Forced-choice intervention 
responses 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Source squares freedom square 
Group 38.38 2 19.19 
Error 332.55 60 5.54 
Duration .06 1 .02 
Duration x Group 3.56 2 1. 78 
Error 226.88 60 3.78 
Context 5.73 1 5.73 
Context x Group 9.56 2 4.78 
Error 98.21 60 1. 64 
Duration x Context 6.35 1 6.35 
D'tion x C'text x Grp 7.84 2 3.92 
Error 147.31 60 2.46 
* p .i .05 
Group (or grp) = clinioal-orientation group 
Duration (or D'tion) = duration-severity 










As in analysis of variance of forced-choice assessment data, 
the factor group showed statistical significance. <Unlike the 
situation with assessment data, however, there was no statistical 
significance for duration-severity.) 
Data in Table 21 which follows, illustrates support for 
hypothesis-l b, that there are statistically significant positive 
correlations between clinical-orientation groups to which clinicians 
belong, and their intervention plans, as scored on Instrument-2. 
As with assessment scores, the mean for Group LM is lowest <most 
linear) . The ES group presents the highest mean. The mean 
score for the middle (M) group, again, is technically in the 
middle, but is clearly very close to the LM group mean. 
Table 21 
Differential mean scores for group according to vignette condition: 









Chi-Sguar-e Analvsis for- Inter-vention: For-ced-Choice Questions. 
As was the case with assessment data, chi-squar-e data for-
for-ced-choice inter-vention r-esponses did not pr-oduce much in the 
way of statistically significant findings. Ther-efor-e, chi-squar-e 
fr-equency-distr-ibution tables wer-e omitted. These tables, however-, 
r-eveal some tr-ends in more than half our- intervention items. 
Namely, clinicians in Group' LM have a lar-ger proportion of 
linear-mechanistic choices than ES clinicians, while clinicians in 
Group ES show a lar-ger- pr-oportion of ecological-systems choices 
than LM clinicians. The trends for- inter-vention data, however-, 
are less consistent and ther-efore mor-e qualified than the 
assessment tr-ends, and therefor-e cannot clear-ly be said to suppor-t 
hypothesis-lb. 
Ther-e is, however-, one repeatedly statistically significant 
result from our- chi-square data. Oper-ationalized inter-vention 
cr-iterion 1t5 (for-ced-choice Item 12, on Instrument-2), which 
represents "emphasis on officel agency inter-ventions versus var-ied 
life locations for- inter-ventions" is the only operationalized 
inter-vention cr-iterion which demonstr-ates statistical significance in 
thr-ee out of four- conditions of duration-sever-ity combined with 
inter-personal-context. These thr-ee conditions ar-e: acute-involved 
('t2 =13. 33), chronic-isolated ('X.2 =13. 24), and chr-onic-involved 
('X.2=6. 71>' All ar-e statisically significant at the level of p < .05, 
at minimum. Of note is the observation that while the acute-
isolated condition does not pr-oduce a chi-square value which is of 
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statistical significance, it nevertheless presents data whose values 
support hypothesis-l b: The LM group has a larger proportion of 
linear-mechanistic responses than the ES group has; while the ES 
group presents a larger proportion of ecological-systems responses 
than the LM group presents. 
Thus, we are presented with a rather regular trend in chi-
square frequency-distributions which reveals Operationalized 
Intervention Criterion "5 (forced-choice Item 12) as demonstrating 
frequency-distributions which show statistical significance more 
regularly than any other item. We may indeed infer that the 
comparative vignette criteria for this item of "emphasis on 
office/agency interventions versus varied life locations for 
interventions" have more than chance influence on the clinical 
judgments of our subjects. 
Trend for the Four Vignette Conditions. 
The combination of the factors duration-severity with 
interpersonal-context attains statistical significance only in the 
analysis of variance for open-ended assessment data. A constant 
trend is, nonetheless, visible when we examine this combination 
for our open-ended intervention data, for forced-choice assessment 
da ta and for forced-choice in terven tion da ta. Table 22, below, 
demonstrates this trend. In four sets of conditions, the chronic-
isolated condition produces lower (more linear-mechanistic) scores 
than the other three conditions. This is a testament to the power 
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of the chronic-isolated condition to generate responses in our 
clinicians which reflect a linear-mechanistic orientation. There 
is no clear counterpart for any other condition to uniformly 
generate highest (most ecosystems) scores an all four sets of data. 
Table 22 follows. 
Table 22 
Summary of open-ended and forced-choice means for the four 
combinations of duration-severity and interpersonal-context of the 
four vignette presentations 
Open-ended Forced-choice 
Condition Assess*** Interv** Assess* Interv* 
Chronic-isolated 0.97 1.83 2.26 2.47 
Chronic-involved 1.62 2.37 2.46 2.76 
Acute-isolated 2.10 2.14 3.13 2.67 
Acute-involved 2.25 2.46 2.97 2.63 
*** Statistioally significant for at least two judges. 
** Trend; statistically significant for one judge. 
* Trend 




Introduction to Findings. 
Principle findings. The findings of this study will be 
related to its hypotheses, by beginning with a look at Table 23, 
below, which summarizes the data from the analyses of variance 
wi th reference to the hypotheses. 
Three criteria will be utilized to determine the relevance of 
various data. 
1. Whether or not particular data shows statistical 
significance as opposed to presenting a trend, bears on its 
relevance. 
2. Whether or not a particular finding transcends both 
methods of data collection (open-ended and forced-choice), as 
opposed to its being limited to one method of data collection. 
3. Whether or not a finding is a main effect of one 
independent variable, as opposed to its being an interactive effect 
between two (or more) independent variables. 
Additional findings. Two specific chi-square findings will 
be discussed with reference to comparative operationalized criteria 




Summary of findings for each independent variable conditlon. 
according to type of data and method of data collection 
Assessment Intervention 
Open- Forced- Open- Forced-
Condition ended choice ended choice 
Jlain erreats: 
Hypothesis-I: 
* * Clin-orient'n: LM Group more more 
linear linear 
ES Group more more 
ecolog ecolog 
Hypothesis-2: 
* * * Duration-severity: Acute more more more 
ecolog ecolog ecolog 
Chronic more more more 
linear linear 1 inear 
Hypothesis-3: 
* * Intpers.-ctext: Isolated more more 
linear linear 
Involved more more 
ecolog ecolog 
Interaations: 
Group x Duration: 
* LM Grp x Chronic most 
linear 
Context x Duration: 
* 
+ + + 
Isola. x Chronic most most most most 
linear linear linear linear 
* 
Statistioally signifioant. + Trend, not signifioant. 
........... --. -_ ..... _----_._----. __ .. 
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Type of Da ta : Assessment and Intervention Data. 
I 
We note that findings for assessment data tend to be stronger 
than those for intervention data. 
Intervention data show only three significant findings for 
main effect, and none for interactions. 
Assessment data demonstrate four significant findings for 
main effect and two additional ones for interactive effects. 
Hvpotheses-l a and -1 b: On clinical-Orientation Group. 
Hypotheses-la and -1 b are supported by statistically 
significant forced-choice data. The findings are in the correct 
direction: For both assessment and intervention data, significantly 
lower (more linear) scores are genera ted by Group LM, and 
significantly higher (more ecological> scores are generated by 
Group ES. 
There is also a fair amount of support for hypothesis-la, on 
assessment, in the interaction of the the factors group and 
duration, for our open-ended data. This finding is in the correct 
direction: The LM group genera tes the lowest (most linear-
I 
mechanistic) judgments for assessment of the chronic probleml 
situations. 
Thus, we observe that support for hypothesis-la, on 
assessment, derives from both methods of data collection. It 
derives from forced-choice data, where it emerges as a main 
effect, as well as from open-ended data, where it comes out as an 
interactive effect. Hypothesis-l b, on in terven tion, however, is 
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supported only by data which emerge from the forced-choice method 
of data collection. 
It is interesting to ponder why the statistically significant 
mClin effects which support hypotheses-l a and -1 b come from 
forced-choice data: 
We note that clinicians responded to the differences in 
conditions of the four vignettes which they read. These clinician-
su bjects, themselves, were una ware of the group differences which 
had previously been generated in this research. This 
experimenter, on the other hand, was of course aware of 
differences both in vignette conditions and in clinical-orientation 
group membership. 
When clinicians responded to the open-ended questions about 
vignettes, they were inherently required to think in their own 
language, to pay more attention to what they had actually read in 
each vignette, and to formulate their own ideas, so as to be able 
to write an assessment or an intervention plan. They, themselves, 
had to be sensitive to the conditions of each vignette. 
The forced-choice items of Instrument-2, however, give 
preformulated statements which are cached in rather formal, 
conceptual, theoretical language. The questions in Instrument-l 
were indeed couched in this more formal, conceptual-type 
language, as well. In retrospect, one might think of the forced-
choice questions, to some extent, as repetitions of the kind of 
material which had already been utilized for inquiry in 
Instrument-l, except that a vignette intervened, which could 
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indeed change the response. Unlike the graded multiple-choices 
which were offered in I nstrument-l, however, there was no room 
for thought-through complexities among forced-choice response 
options. Therefore, it is not surprising that the forced-choice 
response measures ended up being more sensitive to distinctions for 
the variable clinical-orientation group, given that the parameters 
from which these measures derive clearly distinguish group 
differences. 
It would therefore be equally unsurprising that the more 
freewheeling style of the open-ended responses lends itself to 
I 
greater sensitivity to the factors duration-severity and 
interpersonal-context, in light of the fact that judges were trained 
to notice these variables. 
Hvpotheses-2a and -2b: On Duration-Severity. 
The findings for duration-severity cut across both open-ended 
and forced-choice methods of data collection. 
There are five findings, (three for main effects, and two for 
interactive effects,) and they are in the correct direction: 
Significantly lower (more linear) scores are generated by the 
chronic condition, while significan tl y higher (more ecological> 
scores are generated by the acute condition. 
The only partial exception is for the interaction of group 
with duration. While it is clear that the lowest (most linear) 
score is generated for the interaction of the LM group with the 
chronic factor, the picture presented by the interaction of the 
acute factor with the ES group is not a clear inverse of that 
finding. The reasons for this discrepancy are not clear. 
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With regard to support for hypothesis-2a, on assessment, by 
the interactive effect of duration together with context, the 
chronicisolated problem/situation, for open-ended data, generates 
by far the lowest (most linear) scores, while the acute-involved 
interaction produces the highest (most ecological> scores. 
It is striking, however, among our five findings for 
duration-severity, that for hypothesis-2a, on- assessment, there are 
two statistically significant main effects (one for open-ended and 
one for forced-choice data), and also two statistically significant 
interactive effects for our open-ended data. There is only one 
statistically significant finding for duration-severity for 
intervention data; it is a main effect for open-ended data. 
Hypotheses-3a and -3b: On Interpersonal-Context. 
Statistically significant results for our hypotheses on 
interpersonal-context are limited to the open-ended method of data 
collection. There is less support for these hypotheses, because 
they do not transcend both methods of data collection. 
Specifically, hypothesis-3a, on assessment, is supported by 
one main effect and one interactive effect (with duration). 
Support for hypothesis-3b, on intervention, is limited to one main 
effect. 
251 
With reference to support for both hypotheses by a main 
effect, significantly lower (more linear) scores are generated by 
the isolated condition, and significantly higher (more ecological> 
scores are generated by the involved condition, for both 
assessment and intervention data. 
With regard to support for hypothesis-3a, on assessment, by 
the interactive effect of context with duration, the chronic-isolated 
problem/situation, for data which are collected by the open-ended 
method, generates by far the lowest (most linear) scores for the 
chronic-isolated interaction and the highest (most ecological> 
scores for the acute involved condition. 
In teracti ve Effects. 
The interactive effects of group with duration, and context 
with duration have been discussed with reference to the support 
which they lend to particular hypotheses. 
There is, however, a particular situation for the chronic-
isolated condition of the interaction of context with duration. The 
chronic-isolated condition presents the lowest (most linear) 
assessment and intervention scores for both open-ended and forced-
choice data. While this finding is at a statistically significant 
level only for open-ended assessment data, it is also a marked 
trend for forced-choice assessment data, and for open-ended and 
forced-choice intervention data. As a trend, it transcends both 
methods of data collection. It holds up for intervention scores 
(although not quite as strongly) as well as for assessment scores. 
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It is noteworthy that the "theoretically inverse" problem/ 
situation, the acute-involved condition, does not stand out boldly 
across the board, so to speak, under both metjhods of data 
collection, and for both assessment and intervention plans. 
Duration-Severity and Interpersonal-Context as Interactive and 
Main Effects: Commentarv and Speculation. 
It is really quite interesting to speculate about why 
statistically significant findings for duration-severity and 
interpersonal-context emerge from all our open-ended data. (This 
is particularly interesting because open-ended data were not a 
source of statistically significant findings for our 
clinical-orientation hypotheses.) What stands out is that our four 
vignettes may indeed be thought of as a series, which is the way 
in which they were presented to our subjects. Because the 
problem/situations described in the foLlr vignettes are all so 
strikingly different from one another, one would expect that 
clinicians' could not help but observe and react to these 
differences. (By way of contrast, a clinican might not so readily 
observe his own clinical-orientation, especially if he is not 
seasoned in and secure in its use.) Clearly, the free-handed 
openended format allows for such reactive responses, while the 
forcedchoice format would appear not to do so. 
What is not clear is an explanation about the limitation of 
statistically significant interpersonal-context findings to open-
ended data only, while duration-severity produced significant 
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findings across both types of data. We may, therefore, simply 
observe that the open-ended response format allows differences in 
interpersonal-context to be distinguished more readily than does 
the forced-choice format. 
We may draw some conclusions about results for the two 
secondary independent variables. Chronic duration-severity, in 
combination with an isolated interpersonal-context, most 
consistently produces lower (most linear-mechanistic>, statistically-
significant responses. We have conjectured that chronicity I 
because it inherently involves a timeline view of a case, may lend 
itself more readily to the application of linear-mechanistic 
principles, which take place over time. These include linear 
causality, drive reduction, and regression and entropy. We might 
also conjecture that the chronicity seen by the clinician might 
readily lend itself to thinking along lines of personality deficit 
and psychopathology, which from a linear-mechanistic orientation 
require time to develop and "set in," so to speak. Such a view 
might also signify an intrapsychically-oriented focus of mind-body 
dualism. 
An acute situation, on the other hand, would be more 
immediate and not related to an extended time period. It would 
therefore not present an "unfriendly" context for the application of 
ecological-systems principles which would seem to lend themselves 
more readily to being applied to more acute, immediate, situations. 
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These principles would especially include equifinality, organismic 
quality and heterostasis. 
There seems to be a tendency in our interpersonal-context 
variable, for the isolated condition to induce lower Cmore linear-
mechanistic) scores than the involved condition. Although this 
tendency does not demonstrate the strength which is shown by 
chronic duration-severity, it is sufficiently present to be worthy of 
an attempt at explanation. It would appear that an isolated 
client would present a simpler, more easily analyzable picture 
which would appear to lack the environmental richness of an 
involved client. Focus, for a clinician, on one client might lend 
itself more readily to intrapsychic analysis and thereby fit with a 
notion of mind-body dualism. Also, a more isolated person-in-
situation might more readily accommodate the notion of intervention 
in isolation from any interpersonal-environmental life-context. 
By contrast, the involved interpersonal-context would tend to 
present factors which could be more readily seen from the vantage-
points of equifinality, organismic quality and heterostasis. There 
would be no inherent ease in employing interventions in isolation 
from the life context of the personCs) in the easily viewable 
in terpersonal-environmen tal con text. 
Additionally, the lack of experience of student clinicians may 
make them rather vulnerable to the pull of situational variables, 
despite their stated adherence to a particular theoretical clinical-
orientation. 
.. ----.. - .--.. _- - ----
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Additional Findings; Comparative Operationalized Criteria for 
Assessment and Intervention Plans. 
Among forced-choice assessment items, only operationalized 
assessment criterion 111 (assessment item-3 on Instrument-2>, which 
refers to unilateral assessment versus mutuality through 
contracting, was supported in a statistically significant manner by 
chisquare data. The implications for this would appear to lie in 
the degree of client involvement by clinicians as they go through 
an assessmen t. Clearly, if ES clinicians mutually involve clients 
more fully than LM clinicians do, in the assessment process, we 
might expect major effects on the outcomes of interventions. The 
implications, however, would appear to reflect on the adherence 
(or lack thereof) to a basic principle of social work practice 
about the importance of client involvement in the helping process. 
Traditionally, this would include understanding as well as 
intervening. Gordon Hamilton, whose person-in-situation 
formulation would fall into a broadened clinical-normative, but 
nevertheless, linear-mechanistic framework, reflected that "help is 
most effective if the individual participates actively and 
responsibly in the helping process" (Hamilton, 1951, 13). A lack 
of client involvement in the processes of understanding and 
planning raises a serious question about the degree to which 
linear-mechanistically-oriented clinicians (explicitly or implicitly) 
miss opportunities to engage the client to the fullest extent 
possible. Such a discrepancy has a bearing on social work 
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education, in the need for a watchful emphasis on teaching the 
application of the principle of client involvement by also teaching 
about pitfalls where clinicians might inadvertently be blind to this 
principle. 
Among forced-choice intervention items, only operational~zed 
criterion 115 Cintervention item-12 in Instrument-2) was supported 
by statistically significant chi-square findings. This item refers 
to office/agency interventions versus interventions at varied life 
locations. There are implications here for both practice and 
education in the exploration of the effects of meeting with clients, 
either within or apart from the varied physical locations of 
clients' lives and relationships. The types of situations and the 
kinds of client need which lend themselves more specifically to one 
or the other type of intervention, are clearly useful as knowledge 
for both practice and research. Measures of both client and 
clinician experience, might also be interesting avenues for future 
research. 
Some Conclusions. 
In conclusion, about our hypotheses, we may say that from a 
clinician's theoretical-philosophical orien ta tion -perspecti ve as 
measured by Instrument-I, some predictions may reasonably be 
formulated regarding assessment, but not so reasonably with 
regard to intervention pldns. Hence, there seems to be a 
dissociation between assessment and intervention plans. 
One possible explanation for this dissociation may be that 
assessment may be more directly related to (and easier to 
extrapolate from) one's theoretical orientation than one's 
257 
intervention plans. Thus, it may be that what one does about a 
situation clinically may not necessarily be closely related to how 
one sees the problem. Research into dependence or independence 
between a clinical assessment, and what clinicians actually do 
that is ostensibly based on such assessment, would be of great 
interest here. We may conjecture, therefore, that while in the 
practice literature, the assessment and intervention processes have 
an important relationship to one another, they may actually 
involve different kinds of cognitive processes which may have as 
much, or more, bearing on clinical choices, than the ostensible 
traditional :-:.ractice relationship between assessment and ensuing 
in terven tion plans. This, however, remains conjecture for 
purposes of our discussion, as this study does not purport to 
delve into the psychological or physiological issues behind 
cognition. 
Comparison of Results. 
It is difficult to make comparisons of this study with others, 
as we know of no other studies which undertake this particular 
research in which clinical .judgments of case material is compared 
to practice-orientations, notably with reference to the two 
approaches researched in this study. 
258 
Ecological Validity. 
Ecological validity is a research term (which is not direc;:tly 
related to the ecological metaphor utilized in this study). It 
refers to the question of how much can be validly generalized from 
specific details of the laboratory study to the general conditions 
of the na tural world. 
We may conjecture that the open-ended method of data 
collection is closer to what a clinician really does in the actual 
work, and might therefore have more ecological validity than the 
forced-choice method of data collection. The latter, which deals 
with the extremes of a construct, would seem to be removed from 
the subtleties of a clinician's day-to-day work. 
It is therefore rather discomfiting that the main effect for 
clinical-orientation groups did not transfer to our open-ended 
data. 
On the Use of Students as Subjects. 
Experienced clinicians, if utilized as subjects, might have 
been chosen on the basis of criteria which reflect a depth of 
conviction about principles which underlie a practice-orientation, a 
depth of conviction which second-year students could not possess. 
Such depth of belief would contribute to reliability. Additionally, 
experience and concommitant degree of comfort and confidence with 
assessment and intervention planning, within one's self-perceived 
practice-orientation might contribute to the likelihood of high 
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reliability of assessment and intervention plan responses. The 
prohibitive cost in time and money to locate a pool of such 
available clinicians from which to choose the LM, M and ES groups 
for this design precluded this route as a viable option. 
The use of students as subjects was facilitated by the 
cooperation of fourteen CSWE-approved graduate schools in the 
United States and Canada which placed no restrictions on the 
availability of lists which comprised a pool of over 1,000 students 
for participation in this study. From this pool of potential 
subjects, over 650 willing students met basic eligibility criteria 
from which the researcher could choose 200 who most closely met 
specific selection criteria which were geared to balancing subject 
characteristrics and maximizing variance of responses. 
There were some clear limitations to use of the student pool. 
Students I clinical experience and training were minimal (although 
among those chosen for the group of 200, many did have prior 
experience and/or degrees in related fields). 
Given their newness to the field, the reliability over time of 
subjects I self-J;lerceived adherence to principles of a particular 
school of thought, might be questionned. Because, however, 
Instrument-2 vignettes and the questionnaires about assessment and 
intervention plans were administered within weeks of Instrument-l 
completion, the likelihood of change in beliefs over such a brief 
peiod would seem to have been minimized. 
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While students with the most extreme Instrument-l scores were 
grouped into the LM and ES scores, the depth and conviction of 
belief in principles of a particular practice orientation might 
generally be far less for students than for experienced clinicians. 
Experienced clinicians who are clear about the way they see their 
practice orientation might be seen to have gleaned a set of 
internalized beliefs about practice based on years of professional 
experience, and perhaps additional training as well. 
Minimal experience might also render student assessments and 
intervention plans less reliable. One might expect that the more 
clinical experience a clinican has had, the greater the reliabilty 
(and perhaps ecological validity, as previously defined) of that 
clincian 's clinical judgments). 
Observations and Conjecture about a Design Alternative to Enable 
the Use of Experienced Clinician-Subjects. 
The design and format used in this study for data analysis 
is, in its traditional search to determine certainty, reflective of a 
linear view of epistemology. A design which were based on in-
depth descriptive interviews, and focused more on description and 
subjective interpretation of the interrelationship of data, as 
oppoed to efforts to determine certainty of results, might have 
been more in line with an ecological approach to epistemology. 
Such an alternate design would have traded off, so to speak, 
large amounts of data from many clincians to be statistically 
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analyzed, for detailed, descriptively-oriented, in-depth data, to be 
interpreted from varied viewpoints such as those of the clinicians 
and the clients being worked with. The use of a small number of 
(more expensive) highly experienced clinician-subjects, might have 
been a cost-effective trade-off to the large number of 
(minimally-remunerated) student-subjects. Such a saving in time 
and money might have rendered feasible the engagement of some 
form of "live" case material as oppoesed to "constructed" vignettes. 
The use of mailed, situational vignettes, while viable for reasons 
of uniformity and practicality, does not present a clinician with 
I 
the client affect and the oppotunity for client-worker involvement 
which have a bearing in the real clinical situation. Such a 
design and format, for data collection and results interpretation, 
might have been more in line with an ecological view of 
epistemology. 
Implications for Social Work Education. 
Group differences. Clearly, it is of value for social work 
educators to teach differences between our two approaches. It 
could be useful for the educator to keep in mind that theoretical 
differences, which show up more readily in our forced-choice 
responses, may be easier for students to understand and deal with 
than the actual differences in live practice situations, where 
issues must be identified from the case material as it emerges in 
process. 
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The use of Instrument-l, or a revision of it (some 
suggestions for which are explored later in this chapter), could be 
an excellent self-observational tool which would enable students 
(as well as advanced clinicians) to look objectively at, and 
thereby think carefully about their explicit (and hidden) 
orientations to practice, in ways which they may not have 
previously conceived. It could indeed be utilized as an adjunct 
in the teaching of theory which may then be compared to one's 
own, possibly idiosyncratic, notions about the components of a 
particular clinical-orientation. 
Secondary independent variables. The chronic-isolated client 
problem/situations tend to pull the clinician' s judgments away from 
the ecological approach. In their learning the ecological 
approach, students need to be made aware that the very use of 
that approach may be inherently more difficult with a client who 
demonstrates chronic and isolated circumstances. 
By the same token, the acute-involved client problem/ 
situation might be a rather useful starting point for from which 
students might effectively learn ecological principles in practice, 
and then move toward the more problematic area of applying these 
principles in practice situations which provide an inherent linear 
pull. It could indeed be a significant learning experience for 
students to apply principles they have learned about the ecological 
approach in the face of problem/situations which do not easily 
lend themselves to the application of that approach. 
" , 
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Furthermore, our results point toward a problem in the 
application of one's view of practice in an open-ended way, which 
is the way in which clinicians work in their day-to-day practice. 
It would appear, from our findings, that students may abandon 
their theoretical conceptions when faced with specific material from 
an actual case. This would make it all the more important in 
graduate education for attention to be paid to the learning process 
of the actual application of practice concepts in the open-ended, 
true-to life, format. Thus, while students may be working with 
open eyes if they "say it as they see it" so to speak, it may be 
that they do not see how to apply what they have learned 
conceptually, or that they do not see its relevance in specific 
practice situations, especially those which tend toward the more 
chronic-isola ted problem/situ a tions . 
The implications for emphasis on first year as opposed to 
second year curriculum, as well as for requirements which are 
placed on field instruction agencies to provide specific types of 
experiences to students, might be looked at fruitfully in light of 
our findings. Specifically, it would seem important to arrange for 
students first to be made aware of, and then to deal with the 
expected difficulties inherent in distinguishing and applying the 
ecological approach in the face of chronic-isolated problem/ 
situations. 
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Implications for Further Research. 
It would be useful to social work education and to clinical 
knowledge in general to determine if the same type and direction 
of results would emerge from the testing of experienced clinicians. 
The latter would likely have their clinical-orientation beliefs, and 
their assessment and intervention judgments based on a firmer, more 
solid sense of knowledge born of experience and learning. Thus, 
a seasoned clinician who belongs to the ES group, by virtue of 
beliefs about practice, might be more likely to produce clear, 
ecologically oriented assessments and intervention judgements, 
especially in the problematic area of the chronic-isolated 
condition. In fact, such a finding would empirically SUbstantiate 
the usability of ecosystems thinking under most-difficult-to-use 
conditions. In addition, if seasoned clinicians were to generate 
open-ended statistically significant results, we would have some 
highly useful information about the use of both the ecological and 
linear approaches, and about differences between capabilities of 
more seasoned, as opposed to new, clinicians. One conjecture 
might be that students, whose practice orientation falls in the 
province of an ecosystems perspective, may not yet have the 
necessary world-view and vocabulary to utilize this approach in 
practice, notably when faced with the pull of a chronic-isolated 
client. 
It is not in the province of this dissertation to pass 
judgment on which approach is more helpful to clients. It might, 
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in fact be a useful hypothesis for future research to inquire about 
each approach under varied conditions of client problem/situation 
(such as those presented in this research), and under varied 
conditions of practice. (Conditions of practice to explore could be 
those which specifically achieved statistical significance as aspects 
of assessment and intervention plans in Instrument-2--namely, 
"unilateral assessment" versus "mutuality by contracting to define 
the problem/situation," and "intervention in agency or office" 
versus "interventions in the context of the daily life of the 
client." ) 
Furthermore, the presentation of practice situations in such 
future research might be done in a more comprehensive format, by 
attempting to counterbalance not only for sequence of situational-
vignette presentation, but also by attempting to account for 
idiosynchratic effects of particular vignettes on particular 
clinicians by having more than one vignette story which presents 
the same problem/situation. (The particulars about which 
clinician is presented with which vignette, and how many vignettes 
to present to each clinician, would clearly have to be worked out 
as part of the design of an experiment.) 
Other dimensions of problem/situation could be utilized in the 
development of vignettes. I t might be fruitful to pick dimensions 
which, again, might tend to pull clinical judgments toward one or 
the other school of practice, as a way of testing our hypotheses 
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under "extreme conditions," so to speak. Thus, in addition to the 
dimensions already employed, those such as "degree of client 
psychopathology" (a linear-oriented concept) and explicit "phase of 
life transitions" (an ecologically-oriented concept) might be 
conveyed in vignettes. Furthermore, the dimension of duration-
severity could be broken down into a dimension of "duration" 
alone, and a dimension of "severity." The researcher could 
subdivide the dimension of "severity" into one which mig·ht reflect 
severity of psychopathology <linear), and one which might reflect 
severity of stress in entire system (ecological>. 
Such research could be follow-through and outcome-oriented 
research. Most interesting would be not only a comparison of 
outcome measures under varied client problem/situations (especially 
the chronic-isola ted condition), under varied conditions of practice 
(as .just outlined), and especially with open-ended, true-to-life 
reportage of assessments and intervention plans. Although the 
current study is not an effectiveness study, it does point to i:he 
utility of such empirically based research in relation to our two 
practice approaches. 
A full appreciation of such outcome research would, 
necessarily, involve a critique of our Instrument-l, which served 
as the basis of our determination of each individual clinician I s 
clinical-orientation. In any successor to Instrument-l (to the 
extent that it is empirically possible) we might develop for all 
scales, a margin of several items above a minimum of ten, so that 
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we might increase the likelihood, after item elimination procedures, 
of ending up with at least ten items per scale in a final, 
internally reliable format. This was done for some scales, and 
not for other scales. A difficulty in doing this for all scales 
would appear to be the possibility that there may be a limitation 
in the extent to which a concept lends itself to being broken down 
into partialized, specific aspects which may be presented as 
statements to subjects. 
Alternative approaches to dealing with this limitation would 
seem to lie in both form and substance. Formwise, the problem 
might be handled by the initial development of many items with 
similar partializations, but with carefully arranged alternative 
wording, to see if one or another form of wording format presents 
a higher reliability coefficient. This might promote the inclusion 
of items whose wording presents high reliability coefficients. 
Substancewise, a more expensive but useful alternative would be 
the use of a panel of experts to jointly develop item-content as 
well as the principles themselves from which the item-content is 
developed. The idea would be to tap the various aspects of 
theory which go into making up a clinician's orientation, in as 
fruitful a way as possible. Such a panel could also work out 
several different wording possibilities for each partialized concept 
which is represented in an item, toward the end of maximizing 
reliabilty scores for the overall instrument. This formalized use 
of consesus among experts could be especially useful, because 
... -- ---- ---------
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early decisions about content, its scope and its presentation, 
affect our later choices and enhdnce the content vdlidity of our 
final results. Given the importance of the current dialectic, and 
the utility of agreed-upon definitions for any valid testing of 
practice alternatives, consensual validation of content by experts 
would enhance respectabilty of results. 
Last, in order to keep the final format of such an instrument 
down to a number of items which will not overwhelm subjects, any 
increase in the number of final items per scale to a minimum of 
ten should go hand-in-hand with a lowering of the findl number of 
scales to no more than four or five. This would allow for a 
maximum of about fifty items for subjects to dedI with, dnd would 
thereby help to minimize effects of fatigue. Then, each scale, 
perhaps of ten to twelve items each, would present the interesting 
potential of being statistically testable as a separate instrument. 
There would dlso be fewer scales to analyze in our results. The 
idea would be to simplify the appearance of our results, and to 
simplify the process of data analysis, including the number of 
correlations which are necessary. This, in turn, would diminish, 
dnd hopefully simplify, the possible numbers of patterns to be 
distinguished among our data. Finally, a simpler instrument, 
whose content validity is recognized through expert consensus, 




On the overall, we may conclude about this study, that 
meaningful differences exist between clinical-orientation groups in 
measures of judgments about assessments and intervention plans. 
These differences emerge or remain latent as a function of the 
controlled presence or absence of various forms of the situational 
factors which we have called duration-severity and interpersonal-
context; and the method of data collection which consisted of 
either forced-· choice or ··o·pen-ended responses. 
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Notes 
1. The notion of testing "alternate recommendations" is this 
author I S adaptation of Merton I s concept of testing "opposed 
recommendations" for the advancement of knowledge. Refer to 
Merton, R. K. (1959) . Notes on Problem-Finding in Sociology: 
Introduction. In R. K. Merton (Ed.), Sociology Today (pp. 
ix-xxxiv). New York: Basic Books. 
2. It is noteworthy that Hollis (1964, p. 208-9) sees these 
individual and social norms as indispensable in evaluations of 
clien ts I functioning. Norms are then indispensa ble for setting 
treatment goals toward more adaptive normative functioning. 
3. While one motif about the place of COS in social work is 
emphasized here, COS was not monolithic. For example, COS in 
America "worked to effect the coordination of existing welfare 
services and agencies" (Reid, 1981, p. 49), and "to improve the 
health and social resources of the community. II These functions 
eventually split into (a) family service, and (b) coordinating and 
planning councils (p. 53>' 
4. We note this, for example, in the elaborate procedures 
described by Richmond for the systematic gathering of specific, 
relevant data about clients in general, and about clients who 
belong to particular socially identifiable groups. These included 
immigrants and widows, clients with disabilities such as insanity, 
.' 
blindness, and feeble-minded ness (Richmond, 1917, pp. 373-448). 
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5. It is by its earlier title, "The Problem of Anxiety," that 
I 
this paper is referred to by Rapaport (1959a). 
6. Heinz Hartmann' s E~o Psychology and the Problem of 
Adaptation, published in English translation in 1958, was 
originally published in German in 1939 as Ich-Psychologie und 
Anpassungsproblem, in Internazionale Zeitschrift fUr Psychoanalyse 
und Imago. 
7. For subsequent fuller development of the differentiation 
of id and ego from a common matrix, see Hartmann, H., Kris, E. & 
Loewenstein, R. M. (1946). Comments on the Formation of Psychic 
Structure. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. ~, 11-38. New 
York: International Universities Press. 
8. In Chapter 5, "Methods of Access: Space," Kantor and 
, 
Lehr discuss mechanisms used by a family to access and utilize its 
immediate space and that of the wider world in its life. 
9. Altman discusses issues of privacy, personal space, 
territorial behavior, crowding and density. 
10. Germain refers to: 
(a) Park, R. E., Burgess, E. W. & McKenzie, R. (925). 
The City. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
(b) Hawley, A. (1950), Human Ecology: A Theorv of 
Community Structure. New York: The Ronald Press. (Cited in 
text of this dissertation) 
(c) Park, R. E. <1952>' Human Communities: The City and 
Human Ecology. Glencoe, I L: The Free Press. 
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interest and participation are ~ost '/alued :lnd needed, in order for r.1e to 
. complete this research and earn ~y rlc~reel Thank ~'ou. 
Sincerely yo~s, 
=:zra Tei telhaur.t, C. S. ':!., ACS'.'! 
InSTRUCTIONS: Please write your narne and address to ~'rhich a ~ ~o.~, he sent, 
and to Which, oossibly a second nuestionnaire ~ay be sent. Please 
return this ,vi th the comnleted ::tuestionnaire in the enclosed 
stamced return envelope. This inforr.1ation ':li11 be lcect secaratelv 
from your responses. 
NAME 
ADDRESS 












Following are fifty brief ~ulti~le choice questions. 
Please roark only ~ choice for ear.h ~uosticn. 
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Mark your .lnSIVer with \'lith nn X 1n the "rOller s~ar:e 8 fter each 
question. 
Choose one of' the follol'lin!) responses to each auestion: 
(1) Strongly soree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Neutral, neither aqree nor disaqree 
(4) Disngree 
(5) Stronqly disa~ree 
(6) Not ~ppUcaklo 
Plesse answer all questions. 
Note: In the follol'lino "uofotions, the word "client" is used in a 
goneric sense and n~y be interpreted .lnd defined by you according 
to your 0~'1n usage in your OWn practice. 
III 11' n, .. , lSI It! 
--T1"""tf'ty r~LY I)IIt~ ... , 
In.eru •• ne - 1 (a.vl ••• ) ..!!::'.!!.... ..!!!!!.. ~!!!!!J: ~D~r ...!!:!!J.. 
Wh.n I ,vllu.c. I c •••• I '.,um. ch.r. I. I. 
~ kiD' ot ,rawch .nd hl.lch, chin, •• -11-'- --;;;r I'iI --r.r ~ -m-
Vh.n I .v.lule •• c •••• I ••• ~. ch.r •• r. 2. 
•• n, kind. d. Iroweh .n' h.lleh, chln,l. --m- ....-;.r -.,-,- -r.r -m- -rr.;-
Wh ... I .v.lule. e C •••• I 'S.ual thlt qn~ 3. 
po ... lbl. InC.rvlnClon viII 1.ld to • plr' f'i'I -r-r '(jJ --r.r --m- """nI 
elcul.r e,p' ot ."Icelvi chIn, •• 
Wh.n I .v.lulel • c •••• I I •• U •• ch.c •• n, •• po •• lbl. Int.rv.nClon pl.nl .1, 1 ••• e ... ""Tii"" -m- -m- --r.r -rrr- -r;;r 
p.relcull' c,p. of .tt.cctv. eh.nl" 
When I ullult. • c •••• I I •• u •• C~.C • cur- l. 
rene poobl .. II pcl.'oU, chi ... ulc of !!.!!S ""TiT" I"T- IlT"' -r.r -rrr- ""'Tf:! 
.. lin heto •• 
Whln I ,V.\UIU • C.II. I ..... ". chIC I C. 
c~rr.nC probl •• t. prt •• oll, Chi ollult ... Ii'r ,;T" ~ -:.r- -nr I!I 
U!!1 '.cton .ectnl In coaeere. 
V,en I .v.lulc •• c .... I '''UII chIc. 7. 
eurrlnC probles t. Chi r •• ule d. o~. po.' --;"iT"" -r-j"" --r:rr --:rr- "'71 "-rc;r" 
.Ibl ••• qUlnc. ot t.eeoo •• ,.ehlr th.n 
.. v.ul po •• lbl •• Iqu.ne ... 
HUIIln blh.vtoc I. dlc, .. lned b, ';llcIUe I. 
"lav." of .e I,nc. or naeur •• ,n- -m- '"'TIT" ""'"Tir ,;:J -rn-
Hum.n b.h.vlor c.n b, ,rl.lce •• If VI •• ILnov thlle "1 .... " Inc! h,vl aufU:hnc In- iii -vi -m- """Til' --m- --m-
,o .. aelon .bout chi p.,.on(.) Involvl4. 
(l) 10. HUII.n blh.vlor C.n •• chlnl" If VI knaw 
ch ..... 1 .... " end b,vI .uUlc I.IIC tdo".a. 
10. 
~ --m- --rrr- Iii"' --m- --rer 
tlon .bout ,h ... rlonh) Illvolv ••• 
*IZ> Vh.n 1 .v.lua" • c .... I pl.co ,h. II. I, •• e •• e •• ph,.l. on curr.nt flceor •• --err- -rzr -m- '"""iiI -rn- liT"" 
• (2) 
Vh.n 1 ,vllu.e. e c •••• I plac' 
•• t •• ph,.l. on lutur. 10.1 •• 
,h. Iron- 11 • 
-"ii"l Iir -m- --m- -m- Iii""" 
(2) When I ..,Ilu'" e CII •• I pllc. ch. I,IIC-
•• e ,.ph •• t. on .ctol01" 11. 
iii '"'"i:"T""" '"1lr ""'"Tir -nr- --nr 
* (2) Wh.n I plan lnt.rv.ncton. In • c •••• I plleft ch, Ir •• , •• t .. ph •• l. on curr.ne II. 
hctorl. iii -m- -m- -r.r --m- -m-
* (2) Whu I plan InUrv.nclont III • c .... I pl.e. thl I ••• el.e •• ph •• t. on tueuI' 1°·1 •• I~. 
'"T:T'" '"'"i:"T""" -m- -m- -m- ic;) 
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cn C11 III c., '" CCI 
:c;.T1IC'I"r.LY STAOI't:LY I'IOr" No'T 
~ ~ ~,,~~.!!- ..!"!".ll. 
"".n I pl.n IOUI",,,clonl In 0 c •••• I 
pioci chi 11.'c •• c .Iph •• ll on .&10101" 
I ••• UI. ch.c .... IponCln.aul chen ••• nd 
,cawch c.nnac b. o.ploln.d on the b •• l. 
at p'rcho.ocUI fucon. 
Growch I. 0 ~ to h .... '" b.ha"tol. 
•• ~raduclnl Ind anhlnclnl chI n •• C I.n-
.r.tlon II 0 ~!1 co hu.ln b.h."lol. 
(3) 20, r cln be.e und.r.e.nd 0 c ••• b, •• p.,.cel, 
.I.vlna It I I.n, p.rclcul., ch.,.c:.,I.· 
UCI. 
I CGn b •• e underlt.nd I co •• b, 91.wlO8 
chi I'nn.r in which .11 ltl ',p.Cl. lacl'-
act with an •• aoch.r. 
(:) 22. I c.n b.et und.r.Clnd .n lndl"ldu.l b, 
I.p.r.co', "l.wlnl. on.l,olnl. hll .Ift, dlf-
f.rlGe p.,clcul., ch.c.celrl.tlci. 
1 c.n ~ •• t ond.r.e.nd .n Indl"lduI' b, 
"I.wlnl ht. o •• 0 .ntlr. p.'lan. ond tho 
I'an., In which .11 hi. ch.r.cc.rllcici 
Inullct. 
(4; 2 •• A w.ll"functlonln,. h •• ttb, Indlvtdu.1 h •• 
• chl."ed 0 falel, unchanllnl Ine.,o.l .qul-
Ub,lI •• 
(4) 2'. Th •• ~b.,. at I .. It-Iunetlonlnl. h.olth, 
f .. 'I, hi'" IChlo".d 0 1.lrl, .tlbla. un-
cha~llnl lac 01 r.l.clon.hlp •• 
Cit) 26 • the ~mb.r •• f • w.ll-functlan'nl. h •• lth, 
• roup hi .... n.r.ll, .ch'.ved 0 f."I, un-
;'II"I'na .. t If nlotlan.hlp' In .qulllbrl-
'a _on& on. ano:her. 
*,10) ~7. , __ 11-"",.\10"""" h .. 11JI1 lnlllY\d.e' h ' ...... n' 
.. ucl,l •• u", t. 1Il.,Alt .. '~I.I .. 1 .nII .~c\ll .nnn .... n'. 























-m- -C-,-,- """'iir -m- iii 
---r,r- (j"j""" iii" 
--m- -rr;r 
-m- liT'" -m- -m- --r;;r 
-~ 
--m- ,..,- -m- -r;;J 
----m- -m- iii" -m- -m-
--m- -m- -r.r- -m- -m-
---m- -m- -m- -m- -m-
""i':'I 111 --r.r --rrr- ""'"Ti.J 





*(~I z.. , .. !l"~cU.ftl"'. htll"', r ... u, 10 •• n .... lI' .. ucl,lu.U", \. 
11" p~,.lc'.l end locl.1 .nY'lrornin\, an4 U,.' ."'f1fti-Jt,,~ la ;01.-'-'-'- -m- -,-,-, - --,-.-,- --,-,-, - -nr 
len_ra.Ur rCldJI.a"lnc \.0 "~I 
LG It. ;ilYlh.1 and locl,l 1r.:'l.rolWt'nL. and \hl\ en,1N,...n\ 
1. '.N'.1~ "'jIJ •• U,. ,. U. 
It I. ultlele.l, pOlllbl. co qu.nc\t, tn • 
.. aune 01 lnttu.ne. of Ilnd. bod, .nd en-
vlroa..nc In • p.,.an'. behlvta,. 
thft d'.~'actloo •• cw •••• Ind Ind bod,. 
,.ych, Ind .0.1. t. I.treell, u •• fut for 
~n'll.tlndlnl •• d conc.ptuallalnl hu..n 
..... .,tor. 
* (~) 32. Tb. dl'tlnctlon blCw'ln .1nd ond bad, I. 
n,c u •• lul c. undl,.t.ndl.1 Ind ca~.p­
tUII,.lal bueln blhlvlar. 
* (" 33. the 41lel"ctl00 blewlao .I~d oDd bad, t. 
not "did, 
* (6) ]4. A ~ell-funcet'nlnl ,.r.on·. eandlne, co araw 
• nd de~.lap t. n.tyr.lly 'CrD~ ~hln hi. 









-m- -,-,-,- -r.r ~ liT"" 
-m- -m- ---m- -,-~-,- -ur 
-m- -"Til --r.;- -m- Iir 
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III ,~, ')I ,., IS. "., 
'":'''I':·':I.Y 111IOII~L' DIlt', ''''' ~ ..!.!:!!!:.. ~ D~".!~ ~ 
* (6) 35. A v.ll-functlonlnl fastl,'. ctad.ne, CO I{QW 
l~ • 
• nd d.V9lop I. n.rur.llr .rro~~ th~ It. 
-'II -m- -fir 
--r.r- -;rr- -1i.I C.nd.ne, co rtcr •••• nd dl.or •• nt'l. 
*(6) ,.. A v.I'-'unettonlna Iroup'l r.nd.ac, co ~O • 
• row I"d d.".lap h QWr.!!IUU2!!&U. f'iJ err- I"ir -,..- -r.;r- -,;:r thin lei c.ad.ne, co re.r •••• nd dl.or,ln-
t ••• 
*(6) 'eapl. u,uIII, tlnd co ~ .n .nylronm.nt 
rh.t viii .n.bl. ch .. to Irow. l·. 
11(6) Vh.n I .v.lu.t. I c •••• I .mph'.I •• ao.t 
--11-'-
-ur iii ..,... -m- Ii'r' 
curr.nc Ind pot.ncl.1 .tr'Dlth •• lO. 
-"r I;T"'" --m- -r.r --m- "f'i:r 11(6) Th. eo.e If'.ctlv. v., to help • (",e". 
I. to vork with hll/h.r curr.nc .nd par an-
.g. 
thl urenlchl. 
-W- -m- -rn- lOr -r;r 
-m-
(6) Vh.n 1 IVllulel • c •••• 1 foc'lI mOn on 
th. block. co utlllllni It ranlch •• on. 
-,-,-,-~ --;rr "I7l -m- -m-(6) Vb .. n 1 .v.luar •• c •••• 1 focu •• or. on 
• ra •• of p.,choplrhole". 
.1. -III 
11(6) When I Iy.lu.t. I c •••• I •• ph •• , ••• ~r. -;::-r- -,-,-,- i;;- -r;;r-~ 
und.r.r.ndlnl v.,. of r.sovlnl block. '0 
crovtll. It:. -;r;-
--:-;r 
-'-J-'- -,:r;- -m-' err-
*(7) If w. und.r.clnd the a.tura of II' •• VI 
c.n aIC,.~o'lra co und.rar.nd rh. n.,ura I'. of th.'lndlvldu'l. 
--m- ". 
--;n- -r.-:-" ,;r I'i'I 
*(7) If va und.rat.nd rh. n.tur. of 'If •• w. 
e.n •• r •• pol.,. to u"dar.,and rha nltu •• u. 
of hu •• n Iroupl. '-'-1-'- --rrr- "I1"t -,-.-,- -m- rr;-
(1) If VI und.r.c.nd Ip.clfle ph,.le.l .cl.nt!- It. Ue II ••• VI c.n •• rr.po\lcl co und.r.,.nd ij'f'-
-'-1-' - -0:- -;-;r -m.- """j";;J the n.tur. of ch. lndlvl~ull. 
(7) If v. und.r.c.nd .p.ellie ph,.Ic.l Icl- 4C. __ 
.nrUIc h .... v. c.n ."er.puler. to un'~lr-
-'1;'1 
-'-'-1- -r.r -cq- -m-
.t.nd ChI nlCur. oC hualn ,roup •• II' 
(I) 47. Th. IO.C .ff.cltva v., to h.lp • cll.nt t. 
.,. In .n offlc. 11k. Ilcu.clon .hlch 1. 
-,-,-,-
-m- -,-,-,- ......,... -,::I -.,-,-
•• p.r.r. t.oe lh. r •• e of hl./h.e 111 •• nd 
.cUvIU ... 
(I) 41. Th • .a.c .ffactlv. v., Co h.lp • f •• ll, II .~. ln en otfle.-ll_ •• leulC1Dn vhlrh 1. 
-'-1-'- -m- --en- -m- -,,-,- liT" 
"p.CICI fro •• h • ••• e of lc. llf •• n4 
,cclvlthl. 
(I) ... Th. eoee .ff.~clv. v., to help e ,ro.·p 
.,. lila I Ileu,clon .p.r: from It. rl,ul.r iii ~ -rrr- -r.r -m- -rr.r 
.cctvtU ... 
• (1) I cDn.ld.r ., •• If •••• help.r. ro b • ~n. 
p'rl of lh •• nvleon.ent In • c •••• iii --m- -;r;- -m- -m- -',:;r-
Note: Number to the immediate lett ot each item is the item number. 
These are the items in the 27-item final version. 
Numbers in parentheses represent the orisinal eisht scales, 
of which only six scales survived (i.e .• scales 1:3.4.5,6,8) . 
• Asterisk indicates reversal ot score ot an item to achieve 





CLINICAL JU~ENTS PROJECT 
EZRA TEITELBAlJ.1, C.S.l'l. 
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10025 
(212) 
near Graduate Social "'orker: 
Thank YOU for your continued partlcl~ation in the 
I Clinic~l Jud,~nta Project. Your First t:'Iuestion-
naire haa been received. Enclosed is a check for 
$5.00 for your effort. 
I You have been selected to com"lete and return a 
final ~econd Questionnaire, for which you will be 
"aid $ln.OO. I am re~uestinR that you please 
make every effort to complete and return this 
item. The destl!l\ of this phase of the research 
is Ruch that Just ahout every Cluestionnaire 
I which is sent out to selected ren"ondanta is 
I needed for the final dlita collection, or my 
I findin~s may not be valid. 
Thank you for your cooperation and assistance. 
I If you have reCluested, I will send you information 
about the study when my data have been sufficiently 
pulled tORether. 
Once ap.ain, thankinp. you in advance for supplyinp. 
what has heen the heart of my research, so that I 
I may e~n my de~rp.e and make a contribution to 
social worl< knowled~e, I remain, 
Sincerely ,yours, 
Ezra Teitelbaum, C.S.W., ACSW 
-------------------------
Please indicate current information helow, so that 
a chec~ may he sent to you. This ,.,UI be detached 
I and filed separately from your responses. 
Name 
Address ________________________________________ __ 
Tele"hone: area code ____ number _________ _ 
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TO THE READER I 
YOU ARE BEINC ASKED TO READ roUR CASE VICNETTES AND ANSWER QUESTIONS 
ABOUT EACH CASI lJOtEDIATELY AnlR READlNe EACH V leNITTI. 
ASSUME THAT THI CLIINT(S) IN EACH CASI HAVI lIEN RlrERRED TO YOUR 
ACINCY. AND THAT YOU HAVE TAKIN THI RlrERRAL AND ACCEPrID IT ON 
BEHALP or YOUR ACOCy. AnER YOU HAVI READ EACH CASE, COtiSIDIR 
THAT YOU ARE THEN HALFWAY THROUCH THI PIRST rACE-To-rACI CONTACT 
WITH THi CLIENT(S). THE INFORMATION IN EACH VICNETTI REPRESINTS 
A SUMMARY "r WHAT YOU HAVE THUS FAR LEARNED ABOUT THE CASE rROM THI 
TIM" or REFERRAL TiiiiOucH THEPiRiTIN-PERSOti CONTACT. 
COtiSIDER THE ACENCY YOU REPRESENT TO BI THI ONI IN WHICH YOU 
DID YOUR LAiI CRADUA~STUDENT ~ PLACEMENT. ASSUMI THAT YOU 
TEND THEREFORE TO WORK WITH EACH CASI AS YOU WOULD IN YOUR ACINCY. 
ASSUME, HOWEVER. THAT AGENCY POLICY IS VERY 'LEXIBLE SO THAT YOU ARE 
PRE! TO HELP EACH CLIENT AS YOUR OWN BEiT'JUDCMENT INDICATES. YOU 




David is age tventy. His parents, recently divorced professionals, had alvays 
been materially and affectionately generous to David. Their generosity 
became more pronounced five years ago after David's only brother completed 
college, married and moved out vest. Parents' marriage had centered around 
providing for the children. The family had alvays lived in its own home in 
a small neighborly New England town. 
David, due to be a senior in a college near home in the fall, says his parents 
expect him to go to graduate school, but that he has not even looked into this. 
Instead, he has been thinking about, and talking to friends, parents and 
college advisor about leaving home vhere he lives vith father and finishing 
college somevhere else. 
David has been edgy at home. He and rather have been openly hostile to one 
another for the PISt year. He avoids much contact vith mother vho lives in 
the same town. He had been dating a young voman vhom he had known since high 
school, but felt he vas only seeing her more recently because she kept him avay 
from home vhere he hated to be. 
David came tar to this City three veeks ago. He called hh mother last veek, 
long distance, collect, to say that he is fine and has money, but would not 
glve his address. When David left home, he and his father vere not on speaking 
terms. 
David "as referred to thh agency by a friend vho Uves at the "y" where David 
is staying. David expects to run out of money in about a month and says he 
does not knov vhat he vl11 do then. He dislikes the impersonal atmosphere at 
the "y" but h having a good time meeting people in Ne" York. 
David's complaints include feeling that his parents bother him, that there is 
really nothing for him in his home town, and that he needs to think things out 
e"ay from home, per~.ps permanently. 
David vants help ln deciding vhat to do. He "ants a "counselor" to help him 





ynu HAVE JUST RYAn A CAS" VICNETT". PLEASE ANSWER THE 'OlLOWING 
QUESTIONS ABOUT IT: 
I. BRIEFLY OF-SCRIBE YOUR ASSF.SSHENT OR F.VAlUATrON 0' TillS CASF. 
STATF. YOUR REASONS. 
Z. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR INTERVENTION PLANS IN THIS CASE. STATE YOUR 
REASONS. 
----- .-.- .-. ----
POR IACH OP THE 'OLLOWINC STATEMENTS. THERE ARE 'NO CHOICES. (d OR 
(b) TO COHPLETE THE STATEMENT. POR EACH STATEMENT. INOICAT! YOUR 
PREPERENC! P.OR COMPLETING THE STATEM~BY RANKING CHOICES C.) AND 
Cb) AS YOUR PIRST OR SECOND PREPERENCE FOR COMPLETING THE STATEMENT. 
IN THE BLANK SPACE TO THE LEPT OR CHOICES C.) AND (b). PLACE EITHER 
NUM!RAL "I" OR "l" TO INDICATE YOUR "'IRST" AND"'SECONO" PREVERENCE 
rOR SENTENCE COMPLETION. RDlEHlER. YOU ARE WED TO INDICATE A 
PREFERENCE. NOT AN ABSOLUTE CHOICE. SINCE BOTH CHOICES C.) AND (b) 
HAY BE VALID. 
ON ASSESSHENT 
1. Th. mo.t .ff.ctl •• v., to d.fln. the problem or .Itu.tlon 
r.qulrlnl h.lp In thl. c ••• I. 
__________ C.) to utili ••• 11 the Info~tlon ••• II.ble 
to .. fra. the cllent(.). r.f.rr.1 
.ourc ••• nd other .ource.. .nd th.n to 
fo~ul.tl .n ••• I •• m.nt b ••• d on ., 
profe •• lon.1 •• pertl.e .nd knowl.dl" 
__________ Cb) to .rrl ••• t I .vtu.1 und.rlt.ndlnl vlth 
the cll.nt'.), throulh .11 the Info~tlon 
••• II.bl. to u. both. 
4. In thl. c •••• the .a.t .ffectl •• v., to d.fln. the probl .... 
•• p.rlenc.d b, the cll.ntC.) I. 
__________ C.) to •••••• the 11_lt.tlon •• nd d,'lclt. la 
the cll.nt'l per.onillt, vlth ref.r.nc. to 
cll.nt c.paclt, for ch.nl' .nd Irovth. 
__________ Cb) to •••••• the client'. current I, 1 •• II.ble 
coplnl .nd .dlptl •• c.p.cltle. for ch.nl' 
.nd Irowth. 
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5. In thl. c •••• the .a.t .ff.ctlv. v., to d.flne the probl .... It •• llt. 
In the en.lronaent I. 
__________ C.) to •••••• the 11_lt.tlonl .nd deficit. In the 
en.lror.ent which pre •• nt lupport of cll.nt • 
• nd which pr ••• nt ... tlnl n •• dl of cll.nt •• 
_____ Cb) to ...... the ••• Il.bl. or pot.nU.ll, ... 11-
.bl. r.lourc •• to .upport client •• nd to ... t 
ne.d. of cll.nt •• 
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6. In thl' C" •• the mo,t .ffectlve w.y to define the problem In It. over.11 
per,pectlve I, 
_________ c.) to ."e" whIch Intern.1 ',pect, of the cll.nt·. 
per,on.llty .re .cce,slble to ch.n~e Ce.c •• eco 
Krovth. ,upere~o modlflc.tlon. conflict re,olutlon). 
________ Cb) to ."e" how well the n.ed, of the cllentC,) me,h 
with the phy,lc.1 .nd emotlon.1 .nvlronment. 
7. In thl. c.,e. the mo,t effective time fr.me for •• ,e.~ent I. 
________ c.) totr.ce the hl.tory of the cllentC.) to under.t.nd 
the problem In the pre.ent. 
________ Cb) to de.crlb. the Interpl.y of curr.nt f.ctor. In the 
cll.nt·. life to under,t.nd the pre.ent problem. 
ON INTERVENTIONS 
8. In thl' c •••• the mo,c .ffectlve per.onC.) to decide on Inltl.1 Inter-
vention plln 1,I.re 
_________ C.) the work.r •••• n obJ.ctlye e.pert. 
________ Cb) the worker Ind cll.ncC.) toc.ch.r ••• mutu.1 
p.rtlclp.nt. In the helplnl proc.". 
'. In thl. c •••• the .a,t .ff.ctlye cype of Int'rY.ntlon pl.n .nd lOll. 
utili ••• 
_________ Ca) concrete •• peclflc ne.t .c.p. for ch.nl" 
_________ Cb) .b.trlct. I.n.r.l conceptull lOll. for ch.nle. 
10. In thl. c •••• the -a.t .ff.ctlvI type of Int.r •• ntlon plln In r.l.tlon 
to the client'. per.on.llty I, 
CI) r •• p.ctlnl the client'. ne.d for hi. elo defen.e, Ind 
-------- re.pectlnl the 11.ltltlon. to hi. Irovth due to hi. 
per.on.llty deficit, .nd con,trllnc,. 
Cb) enl'llnl the client'. '10 coplnl beh.vlor •• nd 
--------- clplcltle, •• nd enl'llnl hi •• d.ptlye per.onliity 
.trenlth,. 
II. In thl. c •••• the mo.t err.ctlYe type of Interv.ntlon pl.n 
C.) recolnlle. the Ilmlt.tlon. of .v.lllbility .nd 
--------- llmlt.tlon. to helpfulne •• of envlronment.l .upport •• 
_________ Cb) lie. In loc.tlnl or e.t.bll.hlnc envlronment.1 
,upport. which me.t client ne.d .nd .upport client 
., much ., po,.lble. 
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iz. In thll CI,e, the most effective pllce or phy,lcll locatIon It which to 
provide help Is 
_________ CI) It the Igency In the worker', office, '0 .1 not to 
Intrude In the clIent', life. 
____ Cb) In the context of the client', rtally life. 
13. In this cI,e, the mo,t effective "point of entry" for Intervention I, 
____ c.) the client or client,. 
----
Cb) specific I,pect, of the clIent's envIronment. 
14. In thl, cIse, the mo,t effective method of Intervention I, 
(.) verbll Inter.ctlnn between worker Ind client toward 
--------- IncrelslnK the client', eKpre"lon of emotion. and 
toward IncreaslnK the clIent', understandlnK an~ 
In,lght Into the nlture of his problem' In Ilvlnl. 
Cb) pllnnl"1 ,tep, or t.,k, within the context of the 
--------- client's Iv.'lable Inner Ind env"lronment.1 re,ource, 
towlrd hi' experlenclnK new WlY' of copIng Ind new 
vlY' of InterlctlnK, both with people Ind with hi' 
psy,lcll environment. 
1~. In this clse, the malt eff.ctlve role (,) for the worker 1,/lre 
_________ Ce) prlmlry helper, or therlpl,t. 
_________ (b) enlbler, Idvoclte Ind/or broker, towerd helplnl the 
client utilize hi' Inner Ind outer resources to 
restructure hi' relltlonlhlps with hi' environment. 
16. In this Clae, the .ost effective expllnltlon for lick of chanle despite 
Intervention pllns Ie 
_________ c.) client re,l~t.nce. 
_________ Cb) probl~' experienced betveen client Ind envlronement. 
(I-b) 
Hartha, age nineteen, is living in the City with her parents and only 
sister age sixteen. Mother is a teacher and Is home late afternoon 
every day. Father Is a businessman, does very well financially, but 
keeps very long work hours. Hartha Is in her second year at city college. 
She entered college after completing art high school a year ago. 
Hartha's college advisor referred her to this agency after several talks 
with Hartha. Hartha also spake With her mather about her distress. 
Hartha's complaints include anXiety and short-temperedness at hame and 
with friends. Hartha says her mather complains about her childishness, 
lack of cooperation at home, and late hours. Hartha says her mother 
refuses to understand her and that she'll do as she pleases. 
Hartha has a good relationship with her college advisor. She participates 
in some school activities, and has a regular group of friends to whom she 
complains often about her mother, as well as about the men she dates. 
Hartha =peaks fondly about her father, but with lots of ambivalence in her 
open recognition that he is never home and never does anything with the 
family the way he used to. 
Hartha wants to feel less anxious about her school work which remains 
academically exceptional. She wants very much to feel less anxious about 
men and dating, and generally about making deCisions for herself. She 
also wants her mother to get off her back. Her college advisor, who referred 
her for help, remains intere.ted and available, as is her mother. 
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z. BRIE'LY DISCRIBE YOUR INTERVENTION PLANS IN THIS CASI. STATE YOUR 
REASONS. 
POR rACH or THI 'OLLOWINC STATEHINTS, THIRE ARE TWO CHOICIS. (e) OR 
(b) TO COMPL£TE THE STATEHENT. FOR IACH STATEMENT. INDICATI YOUR 
'REPERINCE 'OR COHPLETINC TH! STATEM~BY RANKINC CHOICES (.) AND 
(b) AS YOUR PIRST OR SECOND 'RIFERENCE FOR COMPLETINC THE STATEMENT. 
IN TH! BLANK S'AC! TO THE L!FT OR CHOICES (.) AND (b), PLACE EITHER 
NUM!RAL "I" OR "2" TO ItlDICAT! YOUR ""RST" ANi)1'SECOND" PAEPERINCE 
POR SEItl'INCI COMPLETION. ROtEMBER. YOU ARI ASiED TO INDICATE A 
PREFERENCE, NOT AM ABSOLUTE CHOICE, SINCE BOTH CHOICES (.) AND (b) 
HAY B! VALID. 
ON ASSESSMENT 
1. The mo.t .ff.ctlv. v.y to d.fln. the problem or .Itu.tlon 
r.qulrlnl help In thl. c •• e I. 
_____ (.) to utllll •• 11 the Info .... tlon .v.ll.ble 
to .. from the cllent(.>. r.f.rr.l 
.ourc ••• nd other .ourc •• , .nd th,n to 
for.ul.t •• n ••••••• ent b ••• d on ., 
prof ••• lon.1 •• p.rti ••• nd knovl.dl" 
_______ (b) to .rrlv •• t • .utu.1 und.r.t.ndlnl vlth 
the cll.ntts). throulh .11 the Info~tlon 
.v.ll.bl. to u. both. 
4. In thl. c •••• the ~.t .ffectlv. v., to d.fln. the probl .... 
,.p.rl.nc.d by the cll.nt(.) I. 
______ (.) to ...... the lIalt.tlon •• nd d,flclt. I. 
the cll.nt'. per.on.llty vlth r.f.r.nc. to 
cll.nt c.peclty for ch.nl' .nd Irovth. 
_________ (b) to •••••• the cll.nt·. curr.ntly .v.ll.bl. 
coplnl .nd .d.ptlv. c.p.cltl •• for ch.nl' 
.nd Irovth. 
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5. In thl. c •••• the ~.t .ff.ctlv, v.y to d,fln. the probl~ •• It •• I.t. 
In the .nvlro ... nt I. 
_________ (.) to •••••• the Iialt.tlon •• nd deficit. In the 
.nvlror-ent which prevent .upport of cll.nt • 
• nd which pr.v.nt ... tlnl need. of cll.nt •• 
________ (b) to •••••• the .v.ll.bl. or pot.ntl.lly .v.ll-
.bl. r •• ourc •• to .upport cll.nt •• nd to ... t 
ne.d. 01 cll.nt •• 
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6. In thl. CI.e, the mo.t effect lYe VI, to define the problem In It I oyerlll 
per.pectlve Is 
____ h,) to lun. vhlch Internel upects of the cllent'l 
per.onillt, Ire Icce •• lble to chln~e Ce.e., elo 
~rovth, .upere~a madlflCltlon, conflict re.olutlon). 
____ Cb) to lueu hav veil the need. of the cllentCS) muh 
vlth the phy.lcil Ind emotlanll environment. 
7. In thll CI.e, the mo.t effectlye tIme frlme for I •• e.~nt II 
____ CI) to trice the hlltar, of the cllentC.) to undentlnd 
the problem In the pre.ent. 
____ Cb) to ducrlbe the InterpllY of current factan In the 
cilent'l life to under.t.nd the prelent problem. 
ON INTERVENTIONS 
8. In thl. CI.e, the .a.t effectlye perlanCI) to decide on Inltlll Inter-
yentlon plln 1"lre 
____ h) the _rker. II In abJect"l e.pert. 
____ Cb) the _rller Ind cllenth) toeether, u lIutuII 
plrtlclplntl In the helplnl proce.l. 
'. In thll clle, the IIOlt effect Iv. type of Intervention plln Ind 10111 
utlliz .. 
________ C.) concretl. lpeclflc nl.t ItlPI for chinle. 
_________ Cb) IbltrlCt. Iln.rll conceptuII 10111 for chinle. 
10. In thll Clle. the IIOlt efflctlve type of Intervention plln In relltlon 
to the cilent'l perlonility II 
____ h) relpectlnl the client·. need for hll elo defenl" Ind 
re.pectlnl the 11.ltltlonl to hll Irovth due to hll 
perlonility deflcltl Ind cOG.trllntl. 
(b) enllllni the cilent'l elo copl~1 behlylorl Ind 
--------- clplcltlel, Ind enllllni hi. Idlptlye per.onility 
.trenlthl. 
II. In thl. clle, the mo.t effective type of Interyentlon plln 
CI) recalnlle. the Ilmltltlonl of IYllllblllty Ind 
--------- Ilmltltlan. to helpfulne •• of enylronmentll .uppartl. 
________ (b) Ilel In locltlne 01' e.tlbll.hlnl envlranmentll 
support. which meet client need Ind .upport client 
I. much I. pa •• lble. 
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iz. In thll cI,e, the most effective pllce or phy,lcll locltlon It which to 
provide help II 
_________ (.) It the Igency In the vorker's office, '0 II not to 
Intrude In the client', life. 
____ (b) In the context of the cllent', dilly life. 
13. In this cI,e, the most effective "point of entry" for Intervention II 
____ (1) the client or clients. 
----
(b) ,peclflc .,pect, of the client', environment. 
lit. In thl, cne, the most effective methcod of Intervention" 
_________ Cl) verbll Interlctlcon betveen worker Ind client toverd 
Increl,lnK the client', expres,lon of emotion, Ind 
tovlrd IncrelslnR the clIent', understlndlnK Incl 
In,lght Into the nlture of hIs probl~' In living. I 
(b) pllnnlng ,tep. or tl,k, vi thin the context of the 
--------- client', IVllllble Inner Ind envlronmentel re,ource, 
tovlrd hi' experlenclnK nev vlY, of coping Ind nev 
WIY' of InterletlnR, both with people Ind with hI, 
psy,lell environment. 
I 
I~. In thl, cI,e, the mOlt eff.ctlve role (,) for the worker 1,/lre 
____ (1) primary helper, or therapist. 
_________ (b) enlbler, edvocete Ind/or broker, tovlrd helplna the 
client utilize hi' Inner .nd outer resource, to 
reltructure hi' relltlon,hlp' vlth hi' environment. 
16. In thl, clle, the mo,t effective expllnetlon for lick of ehlnge de.plte 
Intervention plln. II 
_________ (e) client re,l.t.nce. 
_________ (b) problem, experienced betveen client Ind envlronement. 
(2-a) 
John Smith, age twenty-four, has one brother age tventy-seven. Parents 
died when John was in his late teens. He has had no eontaet with his 
brother for the past three years, although his brother has tried to help 
him. 
John earned a eollege diploma in engineering three or four years ago. 
Work and living history are unelear sinee John was graduated from eollege 
and left his brother's home In Philadelphia to live in this City. 
Sinee then he has lived In transient fashion In both elties, where he 
spent a good part of his ehildhood. He has lived In transient hotels 
supported by publle a.sl.tanee for the past two or three years. He 
spends lot. of time at the movies, In parks, and In his hotel room.. He 
has no friend, and say. he really does not need any. 
John is .een regularly for brief appointments for medieation renewal at 
the outpatient psyehlatrle ellnlc of a large local hospital. He says the 
medication keeps him calm. 
John was referred to this agency through a social worker assigned to our 
new multi-faceted eommunity outreach program which covers the hotel where 
John lives. They spoke for about half an hour this morning and John came 
to this agency this very afternoon asking to be seen. 
John is not sure why he Is coming to this agency for help, except that he 
was told that we might be able to help him with his Situation. He does not 
seem to really understand what that means. He hal some generalized intell-
ectualized notions that "Ufe can be. more Interesting, II but he says he 
ha.n't the vaguest Idea as to how to go about It. He doesn't acknowledge 
anxiety when asked about his work history. He does. however, reveal that 
he lost hts flr.t profes.ional engineering Job after college for cursing 




YOU H~Y! JUST .. 'AD A CAS!! VTCNF.TT!!. PLEASE ANSWER TilE POLLOWINC 
OUEST IONS ABOUT IT: 
I. BRIEFLf DF.SCRIBE YOUR ASSF.SSHENT OR !!VALUATION 0' TillS CAS'. 
STATF. YOUR REASONS. 
Z. BRIE'LY DISCRIBE YOUR INTERVENTION PLANS IN THIS CASE. STAT! fOUR 
REASONS. 
-------------
'OR !ACH 0' TIlE 'OLLOWINC STATIMENTS, THERE ARE 'NO CHOICES. Ca) OR 
Cb) TO COMPLETE THE STATEMENT. 'OR EACH STATEMENT. INDICATE YOUR 
PRE'ERENCE 'OR COMPLETINC THE STAT£H~8Y RANKINC CHOICES Ca) AND 
Cb) AS YOUR 'IRST OR SECOND PREFERENCE FOR COMPLETINC THE STATENENT. 
IN TIll ILAMK SPACE TO THE LEn OR CHOICES C.) AND Cb). PLACE EITHER 
N\IH!RAL "I" OR "2" TO IN1)1CATI YOUR "'IRST" ANii'""'SECOND" PREFERENCE 
'OR SENTENCI COKPLETION. REHEHBER, YOU ARI ASKED TO INDICATE A 
PREFERENCE. NOT AN AISOLUTE CHOICE, SINCE BOTH CHOICES Ca) AND Cb) 
HAY IE VALID. 
ON ASSESSMENT 
1. Th. mo.t .ff.ctl •• vay to dafln. the problem or .Itultlan 
r.qulrlnl h.lp In thl. ca •• I. 
_____ h) to utili •• III th. InfonuUoa ... Illbl. 
to .. fro- the cll.ntC.), r.ferrll 
.ourc ••• nd oth.r .ourc •• , Ind th.n to 
fo~ul.t. In •••••••• nt bl.ed on ., 
prale •• lon.1 •• p.rtl.e .nd knavl.dl'. 
_____ Cb) to Irrl.e .t • ~tu.1 und.r.t.ndlnl vlth 
the client',), thraulh .11 the Info~tlan 
•• III.bl. to u. bath. 
•• In thl. c •••• the mo.t effectl •• v,y to d.fln. the prabl .... 
•• p.rl.nc.d by the cll.ntC.) I. 
_______ C.) to •••••• the 11.lt.tlon •• nd deficit. ID 
the cll.nt·. per.on.llty vlth r.f.r.nc. to 
cll.nt c.paclty for ch.nc •• nd cravth. 
_____ Cb) to •••••• the client'. curr.ntly 1.lll.ble 
caplnl .nd .dlptl •• c.p.cltl •• for ch.nl' 
.nd Iravth. 
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5. In thl. c •••• the mo.t .ff.ctl •• v.y to d.fln. the problem I. It •• I.t. 
In the en.lran-.nt I. 
_____ C.) to •••••• the 1I.ltatton •• nd dellclte In the 
en.lrar.ent which pre.ent .upport of cll.nt. 
Ind which pr •• lnt ... tlnl ne.d. of cll.nt •• 
______ Cb) to •••••• the 1 •• llabl. or pot.ntlally a •• II-
abl. re.ourc •• to .upport client •• nd to ... t 
ne.d. of client •• 
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6. In thl. cI.e. the most effective vly to define the probl~ In It. oyerell 
perspective I. 
________ Ce) to a •• es. vhlch Internel e.pect. of the cllent'e 
personllity ere Icce •• lble 10 chanRe (e.a •• elO 
Rrovth. supereRo modi fleet Ion. conflict resolution). 
________ Cb) to e.se •• hov veIl the ne.d. of the cllentC.) me.h 
vlth the physlcII Ind emotlonll .nvlronm.nt. 
7. In thl. else. the most effective time frlme for .,se.sment I. 
________ Cl) totrlce the hlltory of the cll.ntC.) to und.r.t.nd 
the problem In the pre.ent. 
______ ~-_:Cb) to de.crlb= the Interpley of curr.nt feet or. In the 
client'. life to und.r.tend the pr ••• nt problem. 
ON INTERVENTIONS 
8. In thl. c •••• the mo.t effect I •• per.an(.) to decld. an Inltl.1 Inter-
vention pl.n Is'.re 
________ c.) the worker. e. en abJectl.e .xpert. 
________ Cb) the worker .nd cllentC.) toaeth.r. e •• utuel 
p.rtlclpent. In the helplnl proc •••• 
9. In thl. c •••• the most eff.ctl.e type of Intervention plln .nd loell 
utlll.e. 
________ Cal concrete. lpeclflc next .t,p. for chInle. 
________ (b) Ib.trlct, I,nerel conceptuel loel. for chenl •• 
10. In thl. c •••• the ... t ,ff.ctlve type of Inter.entlon plln In rel.tlon 
to the Client'. per.on.llty Is 
________ Ce) re.p.ctlnl the client'. need for hi. elo defen.es end 
respectlnl the 11_lt.tlonl to hi. Irovth due to hi. 
per.onellty deficit •• nd can.trelnt •• 
(b) enl'ltnl the client'. elo coplni behlvlor. Ind 
--------- capacltle., end .nlellnl hi. adaptive per.onallty 
strenlthl. 
11. In thl. cI.e, the mo.t effective type of Inter.entlon plan 
(I) recolnl.e. the llmltltlons of IVlllebillty and 
---------- limitations to helpfuln ••• of environmental .upport •• 
___________ (b) lie. In locatlnl or •• t.bllshlnl .nvlronmental 
supports which meet cll.nt ne.d .nd .upport client 
•• much .s possible. 
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iz, In thlo cose, the most efrectlve pllce or physical locltlon at which to 
provide help hi 
_---_Co) It the agency. In the worker's office, so 01 not to 
Intrude In the client's life. 
________ Cb) In the context of the client's dolly life, 
ll. In this cue, the most effective "point of entry" for Intervention Is 
________ Co) the client or clients. 
______ Cb} specific ospects of the client's environment. 
14. In this case, the most effective methad of Intervention Is 
_____ eo) verbol Interoctlan between worker ond client toward 
IncreoslnK the client's expre,slon of emotion, and 
tovard IncreoslnK the client's understondlnK and 
Insight Into the nature of his prnblem, In living. 
(b) plonnlng step. or tosk. within the context of the 
------ client's availible Inner Ind envlronmentol resource, 
toward his experlenclnK new wlys of coping Ind new 
voy. of InterlctlnK, both with people Ind with hi' 
psy,lcal environment. 
15. In this case, the mOlt effective role e,l for the worker ls/lre 
________ Ce) prlmlry helper, or theropllt. 
_____ (b) enlbler, Idvoclte Ind/or broker, towlrd helping the 
client utilize his Inner Ind outer resources to 
reltrueture hi' relatlon.hlps with his environment. 
16. In this cI.e, the most effective explon~tlon for lick of chlnge despite 
Intervention pi In. I. 
_______ Col client resl~tlnce. 
_______ Cb) problem, experienced between client Ind envlronement. 
(2-b) 
Mary Jones, ale twenty-four, is two years younler than her only brother, 
Her brother is merried, has a child, Is successful In his own new business, 
and is living In the CI ty. Mary has always lived with her pannts who an 
now semi-retired In their mid-sixties. Brother and his family are frequent 
visitors, and are always helplnl out, doinl favors for parents and sister. 
Mary's mother Is controlllnl, dominatlnl, pivotal in the household. Her 
lather is emotionally distant and passive. 
Since the ale of ~eventeen, Mary has had several periods of psychiatric 
hospitalization. She has held several clerical Jobs for brief periods, 
and has either quit "because of the pressure," or been lind. She has 
always lived home, except for brief periods In a halfway house after two 
of her hospitalizations. 
Referral was made to this alency by the social worker at the halfway house 
which Mary recently left after a stay of a few weeks to return to live with 
her parents. The halfway house staff had, however, recommended that Ihe 
not 10 home but continue to live there for at least a year. 
Her complaints Include serious anxiety about any new venture, times when she 
feels like she is floatinl, and episodes of hallucinations. When she is 
lUCid, she has a sense that not only is she a real failure, but that even 
when she tries to succeed, at a job or at the halfway house, someone under-
handedly causes her to fail. 
Althoulh she has takea various sorts of psychotropic medication for the past 
several years, Hary has never had shock therapy. She also has never seen the 
same therapist for more thaD a year. 
Mary wants to feel better. She does not want to have to go in and out of 
hospitals all her life. She says, when alked, that she wants her brother 
to offer to take care of her when her parents die or become too old, which 
il one of her Ireatest and most haunting fears. 
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I. BRrEPLY DF.SCRIBE YOUR A$SP.SSHENT OR "VALUATION 0' TillS CAS'. 
STATK YOUR REASONS. 
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Z. IRIE'LY DESCRIII YOUR INTERVENTION PLANS IN THIS CASI. STATI YOUR 
REASONS. 
POR IACH OP THI 'OLLOWING STATEMENTS, THERI ARE TWO CHorclS, C.) OR 
(b) TO COMPLETI THE STATEMENT. ,OR EACH STATEMENT. INDICATE YOUR 
'REPIRINCI POR COHPLETING THE STATEM~BY RANKING CHOICES C.) AND 
Cb) AS YOUR 'IRST OR SECOND PRE'ERENCE 'OR COMPLETING THE STAT!HENT. 
IN THE BLANK S.ACI TO THI LI" eft CHOICES C.) AND (b). PLACI liTHER 
NUHZML "I" OR "2" TO INDICATE YOUR "PlRST" AHjj"'1'SICOND" PRE'ERENCE 
'OR SENTENCE COMPLETION. R!HEHlER. YOU ARI ASKED TO INDICATE A 
'RlFERENCI, NOT AN ABSOLUTE CHOICE, SINCI BOTH CHOICES (e) AND (b) 
MAY BE VALlO. 
ON ASSISSMENT 
1. Th. mo.t .ff.ctl •• v,y to d.fln. the probl~ or .Itu.tlon 
r.qulrln, help In thl. c •• e I. 
__________ C.) to utili ••• 11 the Infon.etlon ••• II.bl. 
to .. fra. the cllentC.). r.f.rr.1 
.ourc ••• nd other .ourc •••• nd th.n to 
fon.ul.te .n ........ nt b ••• d on ., 
prof ••• lon.l •• ,.rtl ••• nd knovl.d, •• 
__________ (b) to .rrl ••• t • ~tu.1 und.r.t.ndln, vlth 
the cll.ntls), throulh .11 the Info,..tlon 
••• II.bl. to u. both. 
4. In thl. c •••• the .o.t .ffectl •• v,y to d.fln. the probl .... 
•• p.rl.nc.d by the cll.ntC.) I. 
__________ C.) to •••••• the II.It.tlon •• nd d.flclt. I_ 
the cll.nt·. ,.r.on.llty vlth ref.r.nci to 
cll.nt c,,.clty for ch.n,1 .nd ,rovth. 
_____ Cb) to ...... the cU.nt'. currlntly ••• Ihbl. 
copln, .nd .d.ptl.1 c.p.cltl •• for ch.n, • 
• nd ,rINth. 
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5. In thl. c.... the .o.t Ifflctl •• v.y to d.flnl the probl.- •• It •• I.t. 
In thl .n.lron.cnt I. 
__________ c.) to •••••• thl 11.lt.tlon •• nd deficit. In thl 
.n.lro~nt which prl •• nt .upport of cll.nt • 
• nd which pr ••• at ... tln, n.ld. of clllnt •• 
__________ Cb) to •••••• thl ••• II.bll or pot.ntl.lly ••• 11-
.bl. r •• ourci. to .upport cll.nt •• nd to "It 
ne.d. of cll.nt •• 
318 
6. In thll c.,e. the malt effect I.e v.y to define the probl .. In It I over.ll 
perspective II 
________ c.) to •• ,e •• which Int.rn.1 •• pect. of the cll.nt·. 
per.on.llty .re .cc ••• lbl. to chan •• C •• a •• 'ao 
arovth •• upere~o modlflc.tlon, conflict re.olutlon). 
______ Cb) to ule .. hov veil the needl of the cllenth) N.h 
vlth the phy.lc.l .nd emotlon.1 .n.lro~ent. 
7. In thla c.,e, the mo.t effect I •• tim. fr •• e for ••• e.eMent I. 
______ (.) totr.c. the hl.tory of the cllentC.) to under.t.nd 
the probl .. In the pre •• nt. 
____ (b) to d •• crlb. the Interpl.y of current f.ctora In the 
client'. Ilf. to und.rlt.nd the pre.ent probl ... 
ON INTERVENTIONS 
8. In thl. c •••• the mo.t .ffectl •• per.on(.) to decld. on Initial Inter-
•• ntlon plan I,'.r. 
______ Ca) the worker ••• an obJectlw •• xpert. 
________ (b) the work.r .nd cllent(.) toa.th.r. al ~tual 
partlclp.nt. In the helplna proc •••• 
9. In thl. c •••• the ~.t .ff.ctl •• type of Int.rY.ntlon plan .nd ao.l. 
utllll .. 
______ (.) concrete •• paclflc n.xt et.p. for chana •• 
_____ (b) .b.tr.ct. a.n.r.1 conc.ptu.1 loal. for ch.na'. 
10. la thl. c •••• the .. at .ff.ctl •• typa of Int.rventlon plan In r.l.tlon 
to the cll.nt'. per.o..-Ilty I. 
_______ C.) r •• p.ctlna the cll.nt". ne.d for hi. 'ao d,'en.e •• nd 
r •• pectlna the 11_lt.tlon. to hi. arovth due to hi. 
per.on.llt, d.flclt •• nd coa.tr.lnt •• 
______ Cb) .na'alna til. cUent". 'ao copl"'a b.ha.lora and 
c.p.cltl,," .nd .na.alna III •• d.ptl •• per.on.llty 
.u.nath •• 
II. In thl. c •••• the mo.t .ff.ctl.e type of Int.r.entlon pl.n 
C.) recoanl ••• the llmlt.tlon. of ••• Il.bliity .nd 
---- lImlution. to helpfulne .. 0' en.lro_nt.1 .upporu. 
____ (b) lie. In 10c.Una or e.ubH.hlna enwlrocnent.l 
.upport. which .. et cll,nt need Ind ,upport client I. much al po •• lbl •• 
u. In thll cI,e, the mo.t effective pllce or physlcII locltlon It whIch to 
provide hel p Is 
_________ Cl) It the Igency In the worker', office, '0 II not to 
Intrude ,n the client', life. 
____ Cb) In the context of the client', dilly life. 
Il. In this cI.e, the molt effect lYe "point of entry" for Intervention II 
____ Cl) the client or cltenU. 
_________ Cb) ,peclflc I'pect' of the client', envIronment. 
14. In thl. cI,e, the most effective method of InterventIon I, 
_________ Cl) verbll Interlctlon between worker Ind clIent toward 
Increl,lnK the client's expressIon of emotion, and 
tovlrd IncrelslnK the client's under.tlndlna .n~ 
Insight Into the nlture of hi' probl~. In Ilvlnl' 
(b) pllnnln, .tep. or tlsks within the context of the 
--------- client's IVllllble Inner Ind envlronmentll re,ource, 
tovlrd hi' experlenclnK nev VlY' of coplnl Ind nev 
vlys of InterlctlnK, both vlth people Ind vlth hI. 
psy,lcII environment. 
U. In this cue, the malt effrct!ve role (,) for the vorker "'In 
_________ Cl) prlmlry helper, or therlpl.t. 
_________ (b) enlbler, Idvoclte Ind/or broker, towlrd helpln, the 
client utilize hi, Inner Ind outer re,ource. to 
re.tructure hi' relltlon.hlp. vlth hi. environment. 
16. In thl. CI.e, the malt effective expllnltlon for lIck of chln,e deepltl 
Intervention plln. II 
____ (e) client re,htlnce. 
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_________ Cb) problems experienced betveen client Ind envlronement. 
